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ABSTRACT 
 
EQUITABLE ACCESS TO HUMAN BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES: 
BENEFIT SHARING WITHOUT UNDUE INDUCEMENT 
 
The main research question of this thesis is: How can cross-border access to human genetic 
resources, such as blood or DNA samples, be governed to achieve equity for developing 
countries?  
Access to and benefit sharing for human biological resources is not regulated through an 
international legal framework such as the Convention on Biological Diversity, which applies 
only to plants, animals and micro-organisms as well as associated traditional knowledge. This 
legal vacuum for the governance of human genetic resources can be attributed (in part) to the 
concern that benefit sharing might provide undue inducements to research participants and their 
communities.  
This thesis shows that: 
(a) Benefit sharing is crucial to avoiding the exploitation of developing countries in genomic 
research.  
(b) With functioning research ethics committees, undue inducement is less of a concern in 
genetic research than in other medical research (e.g. clinical trials).  
(c) Concerns remain over research involving indigenous populations and some 
recommendations are provided.  
In drawing its conclusions, the thesis resolves a highly pressing topic in global bioethics and 
international law. Originally, it combines bioethical argument with jurisprudence, in particular 
reference to the law of equity and the legal concepts of duress (coercion), unconscionable 
dealing, and undue influence.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
Humans have since ancient times sought to unravel the mysteries of life.  This quest, involving 
fields of knowledge ranging from life science to philosophy, has a mysterious and even 
existential component, delving as it does into the very heart of the human condition. Human 
DNA has been at the centre of relevant research endeavours since the 20th Century. This thesis 
will examine the equity or fairness of the exchange of human biological resources, in particular 
DNA samples, across national borders. This exchange is very important for scientific and health 
research; yet it has been described as highly exploitative of developing countries (Macklin, 2004 
p.68).1 How to enable scientific and medical research using human biological resources without 
exploiting individuals, and in particular vulnerable populations such as the indigenous or 
Aboriginal peoples frequently targeted for genetic research, is the main question of this thesis. 
In order to resolve this question, a number of sub-topics have to be examined, in particular: 
1. How does the putative exploitation of donors of human biological resources manifest 
itself at the beginning of the 21st Century?  
2. What is the legal and ethical landscape governing this area of enquiry? That is are there 
existing legal or ethical frameworks, which aim to protect relevant groups from 
exploitation? If so, what are their deficits given on-going exploitation claims? And how 
can these be addressed? 
3. Working towards answering these questions requires clarity on the concepts used.  In 
particular it needs to be clear what I mean by genetic and genomic research, and by 
human biological resources.  In addition, other terms such as benefit sharing, 
exploitation, equity, common heritage of humankind, altruism, solidarity, indigenous 
peoples, international customary law, commodification, and undue inducement will 
become important as the study progresses and will be explained as they arise.  
                                                          
1The commonly used descriptive adjectives, developed and developing countries are utilised throughout this thesis 
rather than, ‘first and third world’, ‘north and south’, or other formulations currently in use.  
 
  
 2 
At the same time a number of questions fall outside the scope of this investigation. Namely, 
questions about the legitimacy of genomic research. For instance, one might argue that the public 
funds spent on genomic research on malaria could be better used to distribute bed-nets.2   
However, I shall assume with Gro Harlem Brundtlandt the former Director General of the World 
Health Organisation (WHO, 2002) that, “it is clear that the science of genomics holds 
tremendous potential for improving health globally [...] the specific challenge is how to harness 
this knowledge and have it contribute towards health equity, especially amongst developing 
nations” (ibid p.3). 
Questions about the potential exploitation of clinical trial participants or researchers, of forensic 
databases created by governments for purposes of resolving crime and enforcing law and order 
also fall outside the scope of this thesis. Broader questions about the human right to access to 
health care as well as major issues in global distributive justice (Pogge, 2008) cannot be ignored 
and will be used for context, but will not be addressed as part of this PhD study. 
With this thesis I intend to address the question of the fair and equitable treatment of indigenous 
peoples in genomic research, and to provide convincing arguments to persuade or counter the 
beliefs of an imaginary sceptic whose views, a composite of various authors who will be referred 
to below, could be condensed and expressed as follows, 
Exploitation is not a problem in genetic research, for indigenous peoples or any other 
communities. Benefit sharing is inappropriate for a number of reasons, including the fact 
that human genetic resources are part of the common heritage of humankind. In addition, 
individuals should share willingly out of altruism, and they have done nothing to add 
value to their DNA. If benefit sharing were to be allowed, (which we do not concede) it 
would run the risk of unduly influencing or coercing poor research participants. Finally, 
indigenous peoples are but one of many types of genomic research communities, and 
their concerns are adequately addressed by mainstream research ethics guidelines.   
In order to achieve the objective set out above and to counter the views of the imaginary sceptic, 
the origin of the notion of benefit sharing will need to be broadly examined in this introduction, 
the latter having been proposed as a mechanism to prevent exploitation during the exchange of 
genetic materials for research. Three research questions will be specifically addressed in the 
thesis, namely firstly whether and in what circumstances benefit sharing is appropriate for human 
                                                          
2Question from the floor at the Human Heredity and Health (H3) Conference, Cape Town 3-6 March 2011. 
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genetic research, secondly whether such benefit sharing runs the risk of unduly inducing or 
coercing research participants, and thirdly whether the particular concerns of indigenous peoples 
are adequately met by the current research practice and guidelines. 
For the remainder of this introductory chapter I shall describe the field of genetic and genomic 
research involving human biological resources, proceeding to a description of global research 
today. 3 Problems occurring in the exchange of human genetic samples for research purposes will 
then be described, with reference to a number of cases that have been viewed as exploitative or 
unfair in various ways, which form the backdrop to and motivation of the research questions. 
The chosen cases involve communities described as indigenous peoples, whose concerns about 
and responses to these issues will be examined as a priority in this thesis. Apprehensions about 
the fairness of genomic research encounters with such communities in the developing world will 
then be examined, leading to a description of proposals for benefit sharing to be introduced as a 
mechanism to counter the potential unfairness in the exchange of genetic material for research. 
The chapter will close with an outline of how the research questions will be addressed during the 
remainder of the thesis. 
1.1 Genetics, genomics and human biological resources 
In 1794, Erasmus Darwin, grandfather of the more famous Charles, a renowned polymath poet 
and physician of his time, predicted the discovery of a single basis of all organic life, one that 
was later to be termed as DNA.4 
As the earth and the ocean were probably peopled with vegetable productions long before 
the existence of animals: and many families of these animals long before other families of 
them, shall we conjecture that one and the same kind of living filaments is and has been 
the cause of all organic life? (Darwin, 1794 p.244)  
Exponential advances in biotechnology over the past decades have exposed the essential building 
blocks of nature, termed by some, “God’s blueprints for life” (Ridley, 1999 p.8), in their 
fascinating complexity. Popular authors such as Richard Dawkins (1995) and Matt Ridley have 
                                                          
3 The term genomic research is used more often in this thesis for the reason that it is broader in scope and includes 
genetic research.  In some contexts the words are used as being more or less interchangeable.  
4According to the Joy of Knowledge Encyclopedia DNA or deoxyribononucleic acid is a long strand of matter too 
fine to be seen with the most powerful optical microscope, arranged in the form of a twisted rope ladder with 
millions of rungs – the double helix. The struts are made up of alternating units of phosphate and deoxyribose sugar. 
Each rung contains a linked pair of chemical compounds called nucleic acid bases.  
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contributed towards placing the idea firmly in the public domain, and human genetic resources 
have   become a new and valuable commodity, their exchange fuelled by and contained within a 
rapidly transmuting intellectual property rights system. 
Exploration of the human genome has proceeded apace, triggered by the discovery of the 
structure of DNA by Watson and Crick in 1953, and characterized by a dynamism and breadth 
that has transformed the paradigms previously underpinning science and public health.  Watson 
and Crick’s discovery of the DNA double helix can be equated with Darwin’s theory of natural 
selection as a milestone in human history in its presaging of a new era of biological and scientific 
exploration.  The heightened importance of human genetic resources over the past decades has 
contributed towards an explosion in genomic research, has forced states to revisit their laws, and 
has given rise to fresh ethical and legal challenges. 
The term human biological resources refers to all and any parts of the body including tissue, 
bone and fluids, whereas human genetic resources is a more narrow term denoting the 
components of human DNA. The latter comprises the raw material utilised by the vast 
biomedical research industry, the appropriate utilisation of which is the intended subject of this 
thesis. A brief description of human DNA commences with cells, which exist as the basic 
working units of every living system, and with the chemical deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) within 
each such cell which contains the full instructions to create that entire individual (Mehlman & 
Botkin, 1998). These instructions are located within the chromosomes, namely twenty-three pairs 
of individual DNA strands, which in humans contain an estimated thirty thousand encoded genes 
(The International Human Genome Sequencing Consortium).5  Genes provide codes for proteins, 
which in turn determine the structure and characteristics of all life forms (Ridley, 1999 pp.6-9).  
Genes used to be regarded in abstract form as the unit of inheritance that transferred 
characteristics from parent to child, but have now with the advancement of molecular biology 
become physically observable units, sequences of DNA which when converted into strands of 
what is called messenger RNA become the basis for building the associated proteins.  As Richard 
Dawkins explains in his book The Selfish Gene, in which he describes the central role played by 
                                                          
5 This number has been estimated as being closer to 20,000 genes by the National Human Genome Research 
institute. [online] Available at http://www.genome.gov/DNADay/q.cfm?aid=2&year=2012 
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genes in evolution,  “genes are denizens of geological time: genes are forever.”  This message 
was recorded more playfully in the following verse form 
An itinerant selfish gene    
Said, ‘bodies aplenty I’ve seen. 
You think you’re so clever,  
But I’ll live forever, 
You’re just a survival machine. (Dawkins, 2004 p.630) 
Genetics, the study of heredity in general, and genes in particular (Jones, 2009 p.3) is an 
exploding field, described by some as not only the science of the 21st Century but also and in 
equal measure as big business, with applications from medical diagnosis to drug production, law 
enforcement to chicken breeding (Jones, 2009 p.ix). The genome contains the sum total of 
genetic information of an individual, which information resides in each cell of the body and is 
encoded in the structure of the DNA (ibid p.28). 6  The DNA sequence of each organism consists 
of the particular arrangement of bases along the DNA strand, and the science of genomics, as 
described by one commentator, now allows the metaphor of life-as-information to become 
material reality, that can be commodified (Rajan, 2006 p.16). How this specific form of 
information is utilised by research for eventual commodification is discussed in more detail 
below.   
Genetic information, which relates to families as well as to individuals, is the research target of 
all genetic research, and has been differentiated by Zhou into three different types. Firstly, non-
differential human genetic information, secondly, individual human genetic information, and 
thirdly, group/collective human genetic information (Zhou, 2006 p.113). Non-differential human 
genetic information is the genetic information shared by each human being, namely the 
approximately 99.8 per cent of the information on the human’s approximately 30 000 genes that 
is entirely uniform. Neither states nor individuals could claim any proprietary rights over this 
wealth of shared information, which is potentially of great benefit to humankind, and could aptly 
                                                          
6The Human genome, like the genome of all other living animals, is a collection of long polymers of DNA.  These 
polymers are maintained in duplicate copy in the form of chromosomes in every human cell and encode in their 
sequence of constituent bases (G, A, T and C) the details of the molecular and physical characteristics that form the 
corresponding organism. The sequence of these polymers, their organisation and structure, provide the genome with 
the capability to replicate, repair, package and maintain itself.  
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fall into the category of common heritage of humankind, which will be discussed later.  
Individual human genetic information refers to the 0,02 per cent, which determines the diversity 
of the human race, from outward appearance to susceptibility to diseases, and is unique to each 
human.  Bio-banks collect this type of genetic information, and it is highly prized, being the 
particular focus of forensic databases, relationship testing and genetic research on diseases 
(Richards, 2001 p.674). According to Annas, this form of personal information is, in some 
countries at least, the subject of a right to privacy (Annas, 1999 p.7). 
With regards to community or group/collective perspectives human genetic information is a 
combination of the first two types described above, namely non-differential and individual 
human genetic information, but in addition concerns the genetic properties of groups. As 
McGregor explains, a group of people living together for a sufficiently long period of time are 
likely to share genetic properties, which become a research tool to explore variations that can 
lead to knowledge about genetic disorders, and the origins and migration patterns of peoples 
(McGregor, 2007). These communities can become dispersed, such as the Ashkenazi Jews who 
share genetic mutations predisposing them to certain diseases, but nevertheless retain their 
collective association as a genetic group (Weijer, 1999 p.502). This form of genetic information 
is the research target of human population genetic research (HPGR) and is arguably the subject 
of certain group as opposed to individual rights (Wang, 2011 p.10). 
Genetic research examines how genes relate to environmental factors and the health of humans, 
whilst genomic research studies focus on the whole genome, usually across selected populations 
(Gibbons et al., 2007). As might be anticipated, the rapid expansion of the interrelated fields 
described below has exposed the need for regulatory systems relating to research use of human 
tissue to adapt to changing circumstances (Slabbert et al., 2010). According to Knoppers et al. 
(2007), there has been a move in biomedicine from genetic to genomic research, which operates 
at the level of the whole genome, and studies ‘normal’ genomic variations across whole 
populations (Knoppers et al., 2007 p.291).  
Functional genomics aims to characterize the many different genes that constitute these genomes 
and their variability of action (WHO, 2002 p.4). Pharmacogenomics aims to develop therapeutic 
interventions individually tailored to the biochemical makeup of the patient.  Monogenic 
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diseases resulting from mutations from a single gene, such as the most common forms, 
Thalassemia and sickle cell disease, provide particular challenges as they are generally incurable 
and require a lifetime of medical treatment.7 Techniques have been developed for carrier 
detection, which are incorporated into the public health system. Most common diseases, heart 
disease, stroke, diabetes, the major psychoses, result from more complex environmental factors 
as well as the effect of ageing, together with variations in individual susceptibility reflecting the 
actions of several genes. Public health genomics has thus emerged as a distinctive field, which 
grapples with the challenge of positioning the practice and applications of genomics so as to best 
advance medical science and public health (Brand, 2008 p.5). Pathogen genomics is another 
related branch of medical science that studies pathogens –viruses, bacteria, parasites – and their 
vectors, in order to understand the dynamics and ecology of infectious diseases. 
Both predictive and preventative knowledge is sought in all these interlinked fields.  Genome-
Wide Association Studies (GWAS) map complex disease susceptibility and leverage the 
composite information in order to test for disease association.  Genomic variation worldwide is 
explored in studies such as the International HapMap Consortium,8 a project that is in the process 
of developing a haplotype map of the human genome that describes the common patterns of 
DNA sequence variation (International HapMap Consortium, 2005). Haplotypes are genetic 
markers, which are used to seek patterns of genetic variation in order to illuminate the linkages 
between genetics and disease. 9  In 2008, an international consortium announced the 1000 
Genomes project, a major human sequencing effort aiming to produce the most detailed map of 
human genetic variation in order to support disease studies. 10  
In the words of Richard Durbin of the Wellcome Trust Sanger Institute, “such a project would 
have been unthinkable only two years ago. Today, thanks to amazing strides in sequencing 
technology, bioinformatics and population genomics, it is now within our grasp” (NIH, 2008 
                                                          
7There are about 5000 diseases classified as monogenic, such as inherited haemoglobin disorders, cystic fibrosis, 
haemophilia, with the global prevalence being about 10 per thousand at birth (WHO, 2002 p.43). 
8The HapMap project website is http://www.hapmap.org and publishes up to date information on the status of the 
project.  
9Haplotypes are defined on the Human Genome Project website as, “groups of closely linked alleles that tend to be 
inherited together… and which can be used to map human disease genes very accurately”.  [Online] Available at 
http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/en/genome/thegenome/hg04b002.html  
10The project is comprised of the Wellcome Trust Sanger Institute in England, the Beijing Genomics Institute in 
China, and the National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI) part of the National Institutes of Health, 
America. [Online] Available at http://www.1000genomes.org   (NIH, 2008) 
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p.4). The choice of populations for genome sequencing targets, those with particular ancestry, 
are described as,  
Yoruba in Ibadan, Nigeria: Japanese in Tokyo, Chinese in Beijing: Utah residents with 
ancestry from Northern Europe, Luhya in Webuye, Kenya: Maasai in Kinyawa, Kenya, 
Toscani in Italy, Gujarati Indians in Houston, Chinese from Denver, people of Mexican 
ancestry in Los Angeles, and people of African ancestry in the United States. (NIH, 2008 
p.3)  
1.2 Human population genetic research 
As Sheremeta and Knoppers (2007) point out, human population genetic research (HPGR), in 
which the DNA from thousands of research subjects, is linked to medical records and 
genealogical data and seeks to identify susceptibility genes for common diseases, is viewed as a 
‘next step’ in the evolution of research based on the human genome. Databases containing 
medical and genealogical information resulting from such research are anticipated to provide 
insight into etiology and prevention of complex human diseases (Sheremeta et al., 2007 p.157).  
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to describe the entire evolving field further.  Fujimura 
comments on how a reductionist genetics of the past forty years has given rise to new fields in a 
post genomic era, namely systems biology and development systems theory, which attempt to 
grapple with the complexity of life (Fujumura, 2005 p.196). 11  
Uses of the above have powerfully entered public health systems of developed countries.  For 
example, susceptibility genes have been discovered for a number of diseases such as Crohn’s 
disease and type 2 diabetes, which enable identification through genetic testing (WHO, 2002 
p.56). Certain populations are more susceptible to particular diseases, for example the Ashkenazi 
(Eastern European origin) Jewish population was discovered some thirty years ago to be 
significantly more prone than others to be stricken by two inherited and fatal conditions, namely 
the Tay-Sachs and Canavan diseases. 
Approximately one in thirty individuals carried the former gene, and one in thirty-eight the latter. 
Research initiated by family groups who worked with geneticists led to the establishment of 
effective genetic screening of individuals, which has resulted in isolating the genetic causes not 
                                                          
11These new fields of study include Rnomics (for RNA) proteomics, Systeomics and Physiomics. (Fujimura, 2005 
p.197)  
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only of the above two diseases, but of nine others, including Familial Disautomia, Gaucher 
disease, and Cystic Fibrosis (Levene et al., 2004). A New York Times article titled Using 
Genetic Tests, Ashkenazi Jews Vanquish a Disease praised the collaborative efforts that have 
resulted in the virtual elimination of the Tay Sachs and Canavan diseases amongst the vulnerable 
population, quoting a certain Doctor Schriver as saying, “the Tay-Sachs and Thalassemia carrier 
screening programs over their 30-year existence in Montreal have resulted in an almost complete 
absence of new cases of these two diseases” (Kolata, 2003 p.1).   
Some branches of HPGR are non-medical and non-commercial in their focus, which does not 
make them immune from controversy. Population genomics is a broad field that carries out 
studies of normal genomic variation across whole populations, collecting bio-samples and data 
on a longitudinal scale (Khoury, 2004). Comparing sequences of groups from different 
continents allows scientists to define relationships and the ages of different populations. Public 
ancestry projects benefit from this research, enabling individuals to trace the continental origins 
of their ancient ancestors. By combining genetic data with archaeological and linguistic 
information, anthropologists have been able to discern the origins of Homo sapiens in Africa, 
and to track the timing and location of the migrations from Africa that led to the eventual spread 
of humans across the world (Jones, 2009 p.30).  
The Human Genome Diversity Project (HGDP) conceived in 1992 was an ambitious global 
research project to investigate human genetic diversity, and to survey variations in the human 
genome across the entire human population (Roberts, 1991).  Genome-wide association studies 
were to be carried out to study human genetic variation and common complex diseases, using the 
alternative category of genetic ancestry rather than former notions of race and ethnicity for 
genetic analysis, which led to the use of the term genome geography within this branch of 
research (Fujumura et al., 2011 p.5). 
The misunderstandings and political predicaments that arose were an indication of the potential 
sensitivity attached to the entire field of genomic research, and a caution to those that enter the 
field.  As MacIntosh put it,  
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Genetic research involving indigenous populations provokes many legal, ethical and 
cultural issues. Like any genetic research project, it incites questions about ownership of 
genetic samples including the information gleaned from those samples and, of course, 
about whether human genetic material is or ought to be patentable. (MacIntosh, 2005 
p.214) 
Fears by many of the discrete groups selected by the project for inclusion by reason of their 
being unique, historically vital populations in danger of dying out, led to attacks on the HGDP 
becoming so virulent in nature that it acquired the sensational title amongst its many critics of the 
“vampire project” (Lock, 1997 p.79). The Indigenous Peoples Council on Biocolonialism (IPCB) 
was formed in 1993 in response to the HGDP, in order to create an active voice on behalf of 
indigenous peoples. 12 At least ten collective statements were subsequently made by indigenous 
peoples rejecting the HGDP, including the Mataatua Declaration on Cultural and Intellectual 
Property Rights of Indigenous People of June 1993, which was formulated by 150 indigenous 
participants from 14 member states (Thambisetti, 2002a p.21). 13   
Seeking to overcome the negative press associated with the HGDP, the Genographic Project14 
was launched by National Geographic and IBM in 2005 with its primary aim to gather DNA 
samples from 100 000 indigenous peoples across the globe in order to try and track human 
migratory pathways over past millennia. Clearly, much trust had been lost in previous processes, 
for as stated by Fujumura et al., it is the population differences in the field of genetic research, 
especially where populations are selected because of their genotypic properties that have been 
shown to have the potential to evoke discord (Fujumura et al., 2008 p.645).   
Whilst some authors have argued the extreme position that the likelihood of indigenous peoples 
being exploited is so high that they should generally resist participation or involvement in 
genetic research,15 an emerging and more balanced view is that with appropriate consideration of 
benefit sharing in the interaction, just relationships can be formed between researchers and 
                                                          
12[Online] Available at http://www.ipcb.org  
13Other declarations including the World Council on Indigenous Peoples, Maori Congress Indigenous Peoples 
Roundtable of June 1994: Latin and South American consultation of Indigenous Peoples Knowledge, September 
1994: Declaration of Indigenous Organisations of the Western Hemisphere, February 1995: Asian Consultation on 
the Protection and Conservation of Indigenous (Peoples Knowledge, February 1995: National Congress of American 
Indians, Resolution No NV 93-118): These and more are listed on the website of the Indigenous Peoples’ Council on 
Biocolonialism, http://www.ipcb.org  
14The Genographic Project official website is http://www.nationalgeographic.com/genographic   
15 Debra Harry IPCB Action Alert to Oppose the Genographic Project 
http://www.ipcb.org/issues/human_genetics/htmls/action_geno.html>Harry  
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communities in furtherance of genetic research (MacIntosh, 2005 p.215; Sheremeta et al., 2004 
p.89). According to Wang, the HGDP which targets specific isolated, indigenous, and often 
vulnerable, peoples is an important form of human population genetic research (HPGR) exposing 
those groups to particular concerns and distinctive risks which justify better forms of regulation 
and protection (Wang, 2011 p.14). 
1.3 Population bio-banks 
The term population bio-banks is used to describe large repositories of human DNA or gene 
banks from which genomic databases can be derived, and which may include extracted DNA, 
body fluids, cells, sections of tissue, and information encompassing molecular genetic data. 16   
Bio-banks form novel globalized research infrastructures that hold special promise for research 
and clinical medicine. Whilst genetic registers have existed for much of the past century, since 
the Second World War they became focused primarily on research and on providing genetic 
services to people with particular genetic diseases (Hook, 1976). The first significant attempts to 
create ambitious national bio-banks for population-level genomic studies, such as those in the 
United States, Iceland, the United Kingdom, Latvia, Estonia and Sweden share ambitious aims to 
further genomic research. These have thrown up new ethical and legal challenges relating to 
issues of consent, property rights, access to data, privacy and protection against discrimination 
that are subject to much academic scrutiny (Williams, 2005; Winnikoff, 2003; Chadwick, 2011; 
Simm, 2005 and Arnason, 2011). 
Whilst many developed world bio-banks make it clear to research participants that they have no 
property rights in their bio-samples or data (Uranga et al., 2005 p.62), and that they should have 
no expectation of personal financial gain,17 Knoppers et al. (2007) provide a reminder that there 
is currently no single mandated form of international institutional control over population bio-
                                                          
16Population bio-bank is defined in A 17 as, “a collection of biological materials that has the following 
characteristics: (i) the collection has a population basis (ii) it is established, or has been converted, to supply 
biological materials or data derived there from for multiple future research projects (iii) it contains biological 
material and associated personal data, which may include or be linked to genealogical, medical and lifestyle data and 
which may be regularly updated, and (iv) it receives and supplies materials in an organized manner”. (Council of 
Europe, 2006, Article 17).  
17The UK Bio-bank Ethics and Governance Framework provides in Section 1(B) 1 under ‘Consent’ that, “UK Bio-
bank will be the legal owner of the database and sample collection, and participants will have no property rights in 
the samples”, and under Section 1(B) 8 that participants may have no expectation of personal financial gain. 
[Online] Available at www.ukbio-bank.ac.uk/wp-content/2011/05/EGF20082 
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banks (p.294).  They also make the important point that no bio-banks have excluded the 
possibility that some research may lead to biomedical products that return a profit, which can 
function as sources of income, and of re-investment in the databases (ibid p.302). 
The question of the most appropriate distribution of risks as well as benefits across the entire 
spectrum of stakeholders that will be described subsequently as the legal neighbourhood, which 
includes researchers, human research participants, funders, medical institutions and private 
sector partners, has given rise to a wealth of academic commentary.  A recent study of bio-banks 
singled out consent, confidentiality and commercialisation as the central and enduring issues 
requiring development and consensus (Knoppers et al., 2008). 
Concerns noted by Williams and Schroeder include the fact that whilst founding partners of such 
bio-banks determine the research priorities, their commercial partners are well placed to exploit 
sample collections in these bio-banks selectively; even if some benefits do emerge, such 
exploitation should be regarded as inequitable (Williams & Schroeder, 2004 p.100). The 
associated issue of eventual commercialisation flows from the question of ownership of tissue 
samples, or of data derived there from, which has been treated in different ways by different bio-
banks. For example, the Icelandic Acts on Bio-banks explicitly provided that the bio-bank was 
not to be considered the owner of the biological sample (Boggio, 2005 p.46), whereas the UK 
Bio-bank is the legal owner of the database and the sample collection, where participants 
explicitly do not have property rights in the samples.18 
An additional complication is the fact that ownership of a DNA sample is separate and distinct 
from the issue of ownership of, and intellectual property rights to, commercially viable products 
derived from the information contained in that sample, which is seldom explicit in bio-bank 
policies (Andanda, 2008 p.173).  Whilst the right of control over one’s body based upon notions 
of personal autonomy is well established, a property approach to human tissue is stated by many 
as being legally unworkable (Knoppers et al., 2008 p.11) and is discussed together with aspects 
of commercialisation below. 
 
                                                          
18UK Bio-bank: Frequently asked Questions [online] Available at 
http://www.ukbioibank.ac.uk/about/faqs.php#anonymous 
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1.4 Global biomedical research 
Knowledge is stated by some to be the archetypal public good (HUGO, 2000a) as evidenced by 
phrases such as, “research produces knowledge that serves the Greater Good” (Parry, 1986 
p.486). Global research seeks to contribute towards this broad aim of knowledge for all, this 
higher purpose frequently made explicit by use of terms such as the common good or the public 
interest (Simm, 2011 p.556).  The aspirational notion of a right to health, first incorporated into 
international law in article 25(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN, 1948), was 
followed and strengthened by article 12 of the binding International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1966) of 1966, which enjoins states to strive for this 
objective which underpins much of the global research endeavour. 19  
Genetic and genomic research, often associated with public and private bio-banks, constitutes an 
increasingly important component of global research, not only changing the landscape of 
possibilities, but also influencing the field and discourse in research ethics (O’Neil, 2004).  It is 
often argued that a major tension in bioethics is between protecting the private interests of 
individuals on the one hand, and contributing towards the common good on the other (Arnason, 
2011 p.563). The common good is a phrase with numerous relatives such as public interest, 
common interest and public good all of which attempt to capture an essence of public rather than 
private good (Simm, 2011 p.554).  
Contemporary population research bio-banks are designed to accomplish indefinite linking 
capacities with associated research infrastructures, resulting in what Karlsen et al. describe as a 
quantitative leap in terms of data. For example, the 1000 Genomes Project anticipated generating 
60-fold more sequence data in two days than had been added to public data bases over the past 
year (NIH, 2008 p.3).  Whether this enhanced research capacity will however facilitate an 
epistemic leap of equal size, expanding humankind’s scientific and medical knowledge, remains 
to be seen (Karlsen et al., 2011 p.574).   
The global advance of medical science depends upon the free flow of data between numerous 
players, including scientists, academic institutions, multinational corporations and states, and the 
                                                          
19Article 12 of ICESCR states, “Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of 
the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health”. (ICESCR, 1966 p.7)  
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manner and degree of access to research data remain of central importance.  Non-profit research 
organisations, small specialized companies, and government agencies all interact and play roles, 
with research benefits as well as public and private finances freely crossing international borders. 
For example, the long-enduring research project on the Majengo sex workers of Kenya has 
involved at least three universities (Manitoba, Oxford, Nairobi) two of which are from the 
developed world (Canada, UK) as well as the Kenyan Medical Research Institute. The 1000 
Genomes Project referred to earlier which links research institutes from China, the UK and the 
USA is another example of the globalised nature of research.  These international collaborations 
provide a virtual location for the research endeavour, defined and constituted by transferability, 
capacity, efficiency and accessibility of information (Karlsen et al., 2011 p.574).  
1.4.1 Funding and collaborations in research  
According to the World Health Organisation, there is a danger that global spending on health 
research, already skewed at a 90:10 ratio in favour of the developed world, will become more 
skewed by the genomics revolution, and also that private company spending on genomics is 
already substantially higher than that from public sources. The concern is thus that the central 
role of entrepreneurial or risk capital will result in research priorities being driven purely by 
market considerations and the profit motive, aimed at satisfying demand for diseases prevalent in 
the developed world (WHO, 2002 p.127). For example, the United Kingdom alone spent over 
$200 million on cancer research in 1993,20 whilst global research on Malaria, which kills over a 
million children a year, received a mere $84 million (Macklin, 2004 p.9). Population genetic 
research is by its nature truly global in its reach, and population databases require a high level of 
capital investment.   
Whilst public bio-banks are largely funded from public sources, for example, the UK Bio-bank 
by the Wellcome Trust, the Medical Research Council and the Department of Health (Bio-bank 
UK, Online) and the H3Africa project by the NIH (NIH, 2012), others are funded by partnerships 
often involving private companies and risk capital. For example, DeCODE Genetics Inc entered 
into a partnership with the Icelandic government for the Icelandic Health Sector database with an 
exclusive license to exploit the database for twelve years (Greely, 2000). The Estonian Gene 
                                                          
20 All dollar amounts in this thesis refer to US Dollars unless otherwise specified. 
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Bank Project (EGP) a not for profit organisation founded by scientists, physicians and 
politicians, provided an exclusive license to the corporate EGeen, a US for-profit entity, with the 
aim of exploiting intellectual property rights in drugs and diagnostic targets emerging from the 
project (Habeck, 2002).  
Similarly, the Tonga population database project was meant to be a collaboration between the 
Tongan Ministry of Health and an Australian biotechnology company, Autogen (WHO, 2002 p. 
116). The private sector is thus deeply implicated in the global research venture, fuelled by the 
drive to commercialise the results of research that is often funded from public sources (Caulfield 
& Chapman, 2005). Many universities form spin-off biotechnology firms in order to benefit from 
their research (Statistics Canada, 2002b), as scientific developments in the fields of 
biotechnology, biochemistry, molecular biology, cell biology, immunology and information 
technology as well as genetics and genomics contribute towards a lucrative field of drug 
discovery and development. 21  
The sequencing of the human genome opened a new world of genetic biomarkers to be used in 
the search by pharmaceutical industry for new drugs (Economist, 2008), which development was 
described by some as the “corporatisation of research” (Rajan, 2006 p.4). Genetic data are in 
many cases in and of themselves potentially lucrative, even before any medical products have 
been developed. For example, Incyte Parmaceuticals reported $220 million in profits in 2001 for 
merely selling access to genes on which it held, or had applied for patents (MacIntosch, 2005 
p.217).  
A more recent analysis by Matthew Herper (2012) compared the twelve largest pharmaceutical 
companies’ spending on research over the past fifteen years. He found that AstraZeneca at the 
top end had spent $11 billion for every new drug approved, whilst GlaxoSmithKline had spent 
$8,1 billion, Pfizer had spent $7.7 billion, and Amgen had spent just $3.7 billion per new drug.  
In an in-house report of the Pharmaceutical industry entitled The Big Pharma Recession Report 
at least 71 per cent of companies predicted that the global recession was bringing about massive 
structural changes in the industry, and that the cost of bringing a drug to market was reported as 
                                                          
21 In 1999, three of ten biotechnology firms in Canada were spin-off companies, have with 91 per cent were formed 
by universities or teaching hospitals. (Statistics Canada, 2002b)  
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having risen to $1.048 billion in 2011 (Pharma, 2012). This cost per new drug shows a 
remarkable disparity with the $4 to $12 billion dollars calculated by Herper above.   
A sobering statistic to place this global drug research enterprise into context is the fact that out of 
thousands of compounds screened, few are likely to become an approved drug.  One estimate 
states that for every 10,000 molecules screened, an average of 250 enter pre-clinical testing, ten 
make it through to clinical trials, and only one is approved by the regulator (Economist, 2008). 
For another example, the Drug Discovery and Development Centre of the University of Cape 
Town spent eighteen months analysing over six million chemical compounds, narrowed the 
search to 15,000 active compounds for use against malaria, and finally announced that it had 
found one, named MMV 390048, which would enter clinical trials (Price, 2012 p.5). 22  
New ways of sharing data, conducting research and forming cross-disciplinary teams thus affect 
the path of contracts, titles, reward and intellectual property, in order to deal with, as a Time lead 
article described it, “the paradigm shift necessitated by the torrent of data pouring forth from 
genomics” (Saprai, 2009 p.22).  For example, NIH head Dr Francis Collins currently leads no 
fewer than 27 institutes collaborating in projects exploring genomics and gene expression in the 
study of cancer, grouping all manner of disciplines in the joint quest (ibid p.23). The 
transformation of institutional research is required in order to, 
[…] take advantage of the dazzling scientific and technological advances that have taken 
place in just the past three years - advances in bioengineering, nanotechnology, drug 
compounds and data gathering, including protein data, splicing data, and mutation data, 
all hoisted into view by ever cheaper computational muscle (ibid p.24). 
Progress in genome sequencing has led to pharmaceutical leaps, hundreds of drugs are in 
development for therapies targeting identified genetic mutations (ibid p.24), and the search for 
drug discoveries remains at the epicentre of global health research. 23 Within this wide spectrum 
of possibilities, multiple stakeholders collaborate in ever more novel ways, involving a large 
number of possible alliances between state, public donor, university, researcher, private 
institution and various levels of community. Amongst these multiple stakeholders, indigenous 
                                                          
22The UCT Drug Discovery & Development Centre, H3D, is a consortium of Griffith University of Australia and 
Medicines for Malaria Ventures (MMV), which is funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.  
23Sequencing the first human genome took more than a decade and an estimated $ 2.7 billion, whilst today 
sequencing of a human genome can be done for a few thousand dollars in a few hours.  
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and other vulnerable peoples are of particular interest, given that they are often the target of 
HPGR, and in view of the fact that exploitation claims (see below) are frequently raised by their 
representatives or those speaking on their behalf in the context of genetic research.   
1.4.2 Indigenous peoples in genetic research  
The term indigenous peoples referred to above alongside Aboriginal peoples and related 
descriptions is frequently used in discussions on HPGR and other genomic research in the 
developing world, and calls for a brief explanation. Whilst the term has become part of the 
United Nations lexicon, no United Nations body has ever adopted a definition. The International 
Labour Organisation had defined the term in its Convention 169 Concerning Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, as those peoples, 
[…] who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations 
which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the 
time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present state boundaries and 
who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, 
cultural and political institutions. (ILO, 1989 Article 1) 
The United Nations General Assembly has subsequently placed indigenous peoples firmly on the 
map as a significant and identifiable grouping in world affairs, and after declaring two official 
decades of indigenous peoples commencing in 199524 as well as creating the Permanent Forum 
for Indigenous Issues (UNPFII) in 2000.25 It finally adopted the Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples in 2007, describing the document as setting, “an important standard for the 
treatment of indigenous peoples that will undoubtedly be a significant tool towards eliminating 
human rights violations against the planet's 370 million indigenous people” (UNDRIP, 2007).  
Indigenous peoples are frequently referred to as epitomising vulnerable populations in need of 
particular levels of protection from exploitation (Chennells, 2009; Weijer 1999 and Weijer et al., 
1999), a recurring theme being the concern that they tend to have a weak bargaining position due 
to poverty and associated factors, making them particularly vulnerable to exploitation (Dutfield, 
2004 p.48). The fact that they are generally lacking in literacy as well as experience regarding 
engagement with the modern world has given rise to much literature on the complexity of 
                                                          
24Proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 48/163. 
25Proclaimed by UN Economic and Social Council resolution 2000/22 [2] on 28 July 2000. 
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obtaining informed consent from such communities not only in the CBD (the Convention on 
Biological Diversity) context, but also in genomic as well as other forms of research (Upshur et 
al., 2007; Weijer 1999, 2004 and Kegley, 2004).  
Utilisation of the traditional knowledge or genetic resources of indigenous peoples without 
having obtained their prior informed consent was a central component of the allegations and 
perceptions of exploitation that influenced the formation of the CBD, and the issue remains 
equally relevant for genomic research.  Both of these topics receive further attention below.  
Indigenous peoples, frequently sought after for participation in genomic and other scientific 
research, have in recent years begun to articulate their own concerns more assertively, recent 
examples of which are the IPCB described above, and the Waitangi Tribunal of New Zealand, a 
legal commission which published the beliefs and policies guiding bioprospecting and research 
on the Maori peoples (Waitangi Tribunal, 2011).  In Australia genetic research with indigenous 
communities has been the focus of much attention (Kowal, 2012), and in Africa the interests of 
indigenous peoples are represented by the continent-wide organisation Indigenous Peoples of 
Africa Coordinating Committee (IPACC). 
The cosmology shared to a large degree by indigenous peoples has frequently resulted in what 
Dutfield terms the politicising of issues such as commercialisation of research (Dutfield, 2004), 
as reflected in the following extract from a statement issued in opposition to the prevailing 
intellectual property system:  “patenting and commodification of life is against our fundamental 
values and beliefs regarding the sacredness of life and life processes, and the reciprocal 
relationship, which we maintain with all creation” (Tauli-Corpuz, 2003 p.25). Indigenous 
peoples provide an important source of material for genomic research, as will be further 
explained during this thesis. They have, however, experienced the demand for their DNA with 
considerable mistrust, caused not only by cultural and other misunderstandings but also 
influenced by their history of domination by more powerful peoples. Their particular concerns 
which include mistrust of research objectives, the fairness of the exchange, as well as the 
collective risks associated with genetic research justify better forms of regulation and protection 
than that presently available (Wang, 2011 p.14). These concerns will be addressed during the 
thesis and particularly in chapter eight below. 
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1.4.3 Setting research priorities 
As is now apparent, a significant proportion of global research is funded by the private sector, 
which in most cases formulates the research priorities and seeks a commensurate return on 
investments. States also remain critical role players in global research, not only as the locus of 
domestic legislation and policy regarding scientific research and the public health, but in addition 
as funders of universities, bio-banks and specific research projects. They are encouraged in this 
regard by UNESCOs’ Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, which holds that 
states should, 
[…] promote equitable access to medical, scientific and technological developments as 
well as the greatest possible flow and the rapid sharing of knowledge concerning these 
developments and the sharing of benefits with particular attention to the needs of 
developing countries. (UNESCO, 2005 Article 2f)  
Whereas human population genetic studies are largely focused on finding cures for diseases, the 
arrangements between research bodies and other stakeholders describe and govern the particular 
research objectives, including possible patenting and commercialisation of innovations, and also 
determine the advantages or benefits that accrue to all parties. Concerns have been raised about 
many aspects of these research arrangements, including the fact that research objectives are 
predominantly driven by the commercial viability of the intended health discovery. All of these 
concerns emerged in the objections against the Human Genome Development Project (HGDP) 
discussed further below, which was an attempt to research selected indigenous peoples 
worldwide.   
The HGDP erupted in controversy during which indigenous peoples demanded a role in defining 
research agendas, as well as in interpreting the facts and accruing the monetary and other 
benefits of the research itself (Reddy, 2007 p.442). In the words of Paul Brodwin (2005), this 
resulted in a new politics of recognition that affected global research and rendered human 
population genetics forever politically vulnerable (ibid p.148). The concerns expressed during 
these and subsequent debates included the fact that research priorities are driven by the health 
aspirations of the relatively affluent developed world, ignoring the more urgent health needs of 
developing countries (Williams & Schroeder, 2004).  
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An additional and serious level of unfairness is entailed in the allegation that in the process of 
genetic research across borders, large profits are made from research on human tissue whilst the 
contributors remain unaware of and barred from sharing in the benefits (Annas, 1990). With so 
much research going on, with so many stakeholders and organisations joined in the race to 
discover valuable properties of our genetic makeup, it is not surprising that a range of problems 
have reached the public domain over the years. Most concerning are the continuing perceptions 
and allegations of unfairness or exploitation which have followed such genetic research.  
1.5 Perceived unfairness in the exchange of human genetic samples? 
Within the field of international genomic research, a number of cases have raised questions and 
given rise to uncertainty or public concerns.26 The avian flu crisis that erupted in Indonesia in 
2006, where the first human infections had occurred, centred on allegations of unfairness and 
provided controversy on a global scale. The Indonesian government had decided to withhold 
further virus samples from the WHO after it discovered that an Australian company had applied 
for a patent based on earlier samples, complaining about the unfairness of the system involving 
the exchange of virus samples which enabled private companies and developed countries to 
exploit and benefit from the development of vaccines, whilst Indonesia remained excluded.  It 
claimed sovereignty over its genetic resources as the basis of its stance, and rejected the then 
prevailing system as being exploitative and unfair (Sedyaningsih et al., 2008).  
Amongst the arguments raised by the Indonesian government was firstly, the assertion that the 
CBD provides states with sovereignty, thus ownership over all its biological and genetic 
resources (ibid p.485). Secondly, that this gave Indonesia a right to ‘prior informed consent’ over 
its resources, and thirdly, a ‘reciprocity’ argument pointing out the extreme unfairness in the 
exchange (ibid p.487). The controversy resulted in negotiations towards an entirely new virus 
exchange system under the auspices of the World Health Organisation which was concluded in 
                                                          
26 Some cases have become infamous as examples of wrongful exploitation, such as the Tuskegee studies on 
untreated syphilis in poor African American men in rural Alabama (Angell, 1997). In addition to this is the case of 
Henrietta Lacks where cancer cells from a terminally ill black woman were obtained in order to develop highly 
successful cell lines which were then used freely in research for over twenty five years without the knowledge or 
consent of her or her family (Skloot, 2010). 
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2011, and addressed the concerns of developing world states that had previously felt exploited 
while balancing the interests of researchers and innovators (Wilke, 2012 p.12). 27 
Controversy has dogged many cases of human genomic research, in most cases involving 
selected groups of relatively isolated research participants described variously as indigenous, 
Aboriginal, rural or tribal peoples from the developing world.  For example, the curious genetic 
history of the islanders of Tristan da Cunha had made them the objects of much genomic and 
other research over the years, for the reason that the approximately 275 inhabitants were all 
descended from no more than fifteen original families at the time of settlement in 1816. Their 
genealogy has been well documented (Soodyal et al., 2003) but it was an academic research 
project by a University of Toronto affiliate (MacIntosh, 2005 p.218) entitled, In search of the 
genes of asthma on the island of Tristan da Cunha following discovery of the high incidence of 
asthma on the island that led to a race to discover the genetic cause of asthma (Zamel, 1995 p.6; 
Zamel et al., 1996). 28  The research institute worked in conjunction with a genomics company 
Sequana Therapeutics, which promised to provide islanders contributing their DNA samples free 
pharmaceutical treatment in the future if drugs were ever to be developed based on their research 
(MacIntosh, 2005 p.218). 
Sequana Therapeutics announced in 1995, that it had identified the gene, which predisposed 
people to develop asthma, and then promptly sold the rights to develop a genetic diagnostic test 
to a German company, Boehringer Ingelheim, for $70 million (Cunningham, 1998 p.18). 29  
Many commentators criticised the vast disparity between the realized benefits in the hands of 
Sequana and Boehringer and the potential future benefits to the islanders who would only 
receive free pharmaceuticals if and when a drug based treatment were ever to be developed         
(Cunningham, 1998; MacIntosh, 2005 and Hamilton, 2001).  The case bore all the hallmarks of 
the claims of injustice relating to the exchange of non-human genetic resources that had led to 
the negotiation of the benefit sharing provisions of the CBD, namely the free provision of genetic 
material from naive developing countries to commercial entities, who then stood to make their 
profits downstream with no compensation offered to the original source.  
                                                          
27Resolution adopted by the World Health Assembly on 24 May 2011. Document 64.5 entitled Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness: Sharing of influenza viruses and access to vaccines and other benefits.   
28The Samuel Lunenfeld Research Institute of Canada. 
29A BBC press release entitled ‘Worldwide search for a cancer cure’ described the asthma gene as “ESE3” [Online] 
Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/7766656  
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Many genomic research cases that resulted in legal challenges revolved around the nature, 
content and validity of the informed consent that preceded the provision of human tissue.  The 
Havasupai Indians living in the Grand Canyon sued the University of Arizona for recovery of 
samples taken from the tribe in the early 1990s, claiming that the samples were being used many 
years later for unknown purposes beyond and outside the terms of the original consent. The 
University claimed no wrongdoing in pursuing research leads which may have led to important 
and lucrative discoveries without reference to the source of the samples (Davenport, 2010; 
Beauchamp, 2011 p.520).  After protracted legal action a settlement was reached in which the 
University agreed to return the blood samples, provide other forms of assistance to the tribe, and 
to pay damages in an amount of $700,000 to 41 of the tribe’s members (Harmon, 2010 p.1).  
One of the central factors emerging from the court papers was the fact that blood has a deep 
spiritual meaning to the Havasupai, which had been ignored in the research procedure (ibid p.3). 
The case was paradigmatic in its exposure of the difficulty of obtaining ethical, and legally valid, 
consent.  Not only was the broad consent obtained by the university inadequate and 
inappropriate, but also the university committee review of the research had proved ineffective 
(Beauchamp, 2011 p.520). Amongst the many disturbing issues raised by the case is the fact that 
the university researchers and review committee had all overlooked or failed to perceive the 
serious risks involved for the tribe, including discrimination and disrespect for cultural traditions, 
raising questions of exploitation and taking advantage of a vulnerable group (ibid: 521). This 
issue of the particular cultural and identity-related risks facing such indigenous groups when 
invited to participate in genetic research will be developed further in chapter eight below.   
In a similar matter, the Nuu-cha-nulth tribe of Vancouver Island in Canada publicly criticized the 
University of British Columbia for sharing human genetic samples that had been taken from 
them over twenty five years previously, specifically in order to investigate rheumatoid arthritis 
with a variety of other research institutions for varying purposes (Dalton, 2002). The research 
exposed the spread of lymphotropic viruses by intravenous drug use, stigmatising the tribe in the 
public arena. The Yanomami Indians of Brazil likewise claimed that researchers had misused 
their samples, a well-publicized saga that was documented in a book by Tierney entitled, 
Darkness in El Dorado: How scientists and journalists devastated the Amazon (Tierney, 2000).  
In both of the latter two cases, the controversy had revolved not only around the nature and 
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content of the original consent, but in particular around the subsequent unauthorised use in the 
developed world of their human tissue samples.   
Other claims of exploitation by indigenous peoples have carried a more directly commercial 
flavour.  For example, following genetic research on indigenous Guaymi tribespeople from 
Panama, the Secretary of Commerce of the US government laid patent claim to a cell line created 
out of the blood taken from a 26 year old indigenous Guaymi woman who had leukaemia.  If 
granted, this patent would have given the US government exclusive rights to decide who could 
use this potentially valuable cell line, and at what cost. Widespread objection was lodged against 
the patenting and commodification of the provided tissue without the tribe’s or the woman’s 
knowledge or consent, leading to renunciation of the patent (Christie, 1996). 
In yet another case, the Hagahai tribe of Papua New Guinea sought the help of a geneticist to 
discover why so many of their children were dying of a certain illness. Researchers found that 
the members of the tribe carried a certain gene, which predisposes humans to Leukaemia, whilst 
they remained immune to the sickness. Further analysis of the blood identified a rare virus with 
potential for development into a vaccine for certain types of Leukaemia. An agreement was then 
reached between the United States National Institutes of Health (NIH) and the tribe that they 
would share 50 per cent in the royalties of any breakthrough in Leukaemia research resulting 
from their genetic sample (Salopek, 1997 part 1). 
A patent was registered for a cell line drawn from a Hagahai donor, which was the first to be 
based on a human cell line taken from an indigenous population (Lehrman, 1996 p.500), leading 
to widespread claims of biopiracy flowing from the alleged lack of informed consent 
(Friedlander, 2006). Controversy erupted about the case, despite the fact that the tribe appeared 
to have consented to the research, with human rights groups nevertheless alleging injustice and 
unfairness. The core of the criticism focussed on the taking of a valuable item from an illiterate 
tribe from a poor country without acknowledgement of the commercial potential. “What 
government has the right to poach on a foreign country’s genetic heritage?” was the statement by 
human rights group Rural Advancement Fund International (Salopek 1997, part 2; Hanley 1996).  
The patent, which according to the NIH identified unique genetic traits relating to Leukaemia 
and was in every way fully justified, was nevertheless eventually revoked by this body in the 
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face of the widespread international outrage (Tokar, 2002). Indigenous peoples as well as 
supportive civil society organisations responded in a manner reflective of the anger addressed at 
the HGDP referred to above. One Aboriginal leader John Liddle expressed himself as follows, 
“Over the last 200 years, non-Aboriginal people have taken our land, language, culture, health, 
even our children. Now they want to take the genetic material that makes us Aboriginal people as 
well” (ibid p.3).  
A succession of other cases involving remote populations that received prominence in DNA 
research are listed in a series of reports by award-winning journalist Paul Salopek.30 The village 
of Limone Sur Garda in Italy, having been cut off from the road system and thus from 
civilisation until the 1950s, developed a particularly untouched gene pool regarded as valuable 
for that reason. Geneticists discovered a mutation in the villagers’ DNA, which appeared to 
render them immune to atherosclerosis, leading to their being heavily researched in pursuit of a 
cure. The Pima Indians of Arizona, a 6,000-strong tribe of former hunter-gatherers, developed 
health problems with the switch to a more sedentary lifestyle, including the highest diabetes rate 
of any ethnic group in the world. NIH researchers traced genealogies and researched the Pima for 
thirty years, trying to discover the genetic causes of a disease that affects millions worldwide. 
 Oklahoma’s Cherokees were researched for their remarkable resistance to Alzheimer’s. Israel’s 
Bedouin were being studied for clues to obesity and certain inherited forms of deafness, and the 
Amish for their apparent high rates of inherited depression (Rowe, 1996 p.1320). A French 
biomedical firm Genethon, discovered a remote population on Reunion Island in the Indian 
Ocean that appeared to be immune to multiple sclerosis (MS), even though they carried the 
disease genes. The thesis driving this kind of research was that the protective genetic factor 
might, if isolated, have led to lucrative new drugs for MS sufferers, making this population 
potentially of great value for the developed world (Salopek, 1997 part 2). Many other such cases 
are recorded (Tokar, 2002). 
As a prominent example of the urgency of the biomedical industry’s interest to discover genes 
leading to lucrative drugs, the international biomedical company Genset signed a deal in 1998 to 
                                                          
30Salopek won the Pulitzer award for explanatory reporting in 1998 for his article, Genes offer sampling of hope and 
fear, in the Chicago Tribune of 28 April 1997.  
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sift China’s 1.2 billion citizens for mutations, focusing on remote rural populations and its 
approximately 40 minority groups. The contract to prospect for lucrative genes in these 
populations was regarded as breath-taking in its extent, and of incalculable but immense value 
(Salopek, 1997 Part 3). Others have explored Chinese genes for a clue to the remarkable 
longevity of certain communities (Dang et al., 1999). A vigorous debate on the ethics of research 
in China included claims of exploitation of vulnerable populations by the Harvard researchers, 
one issue being whether Harvard research and consent protocols were appropriate for 
communities with desperate medical needs, or who culturally fear offending those in authority 
(Rose, 2004 pp.7-8). Finally, an article by Brian Tokar published by the Third World Network 
entitled Mining humanity describes how scientists have targeted tribes people in Saudi Arabia in 
search of genes linked to glaucoma; in Ghana and Nigeria to study diabetes; in Mongolia for 
studies on congenital deafness, and in remote Philippine islands to study the unusually high 
incidence of cleft lip and palate (Tokar, 2002 p.1). 
These cases have been described in some detail in order to highlight the concerns being 
addressed by this thesis, and which have alerted remote and indigenous peoples of the 
developing world to pay careful attention to the purposes of intended research, as well as to the 
details of the consent given (Pellekaan, 2002). It is without doubt that the DNA of such remote 
and indigenous populations has a significant value, and is likely to remain sought-after for global 
research. A central concern of this thesis is that in none of the cases described above was there 
any clarity as to what the rights of the indigenous research population would be in the event that 
the research led to a scientific breakthrough and lucrative drugs in the developed world.  
Anticipated outcomes and advantages for the research organisations were not adequately 
mirrored in any form of assurance of commensurate benefit for DNA donors, leading to 
perceptions framed variously as unfairness, exploitation, neo-colonialism and even of biopiracy 
(Staples, 2000). Admittedly, in some cases, the validity of claims of biopiracy was somewhat 
countered by the concern that the media’s creativity in seeking sensation might have 
inappropriately raised the profile of the issue (Pomfret & Nelson, 2000).  
In seeking a balanced view of the issue it needs to be emphasized that research on indigenous 
peoples is not necessarily problematic. Press coverage is largely provided to those cases that are 
disputed, ignoring the many that proceed in good faith, with due attention to best practices and 
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respecting the rights and sensitivities of the research populations.  In some situations the 
researched indigenous populations appeared to have sufficiently comprehended the nature of the 
transaction, and to have cooperated voluntarily with researchers in the hopes of contributing 
towards public health. The Hagahai referred to above, for example, willingly agreed to donate 
their blood samples for the creation of cell lines, as well as to allow their patenting if appropriate, 
in a negotiated agreement that allowed for financial benefits in the event of a commercially 
successful product being discovered (Ibeji & Gane, 1996). Furthermore, the Tristan da Cunha 
islanders negotiated a deal that would secure them future free asthma drugs in the event of 
success, even if the agreement failed to secure a share in the windfall profits generated 
downstream by the sale of the research discovery.  
1.6 Concerns about the fairness of exchanges of genetic material 
In each of the above cases, when these selected populations provided their samples for research 
purposes, the future and present value of their contributions would at that juncture have been 
speculative and therefore difficult to quantify. It is for that reason a legitimate and abiding 
concern that in each case the eventual value would normally be realized in developed countries, 
possibly years later, and far from the original exchange. An additional unease however, arising 
from a cursory glance at these cases, is the fact that the intrinsic value of samples is not limited 
to future commercial drug discoveries.  
A significant form of consequence associated with genetic research and one far more difficult to 
quantify is the sheer importance and thus coupled value of possession of the samples, creating 
the potential in developed-world institutions for academic recognition and associated 
institutional advancement to follow. For example, the 400 samples of Arizona’s Havasupai tribe 
formed the basis for 23 scholarly papers, articles and dissertations (Hendricks, 2004), and the 
833 samples taken from the Nuu-cha-nulth of Vancouver island formed the basis for the eventual 
promotion of the chief researcher Dr Ward as the head of the Institute of Biological 
Anthropology at Oxford University (Malik, 2005 p. 21).  Similarly, Harvard University’s joint 
project with Millennium Pharmaceuticals to gather tissue samples from a highly homogenous 
population of the Anhui region of China was brimming with this alternative form of research 
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value, described by one researcher as being, “more valuable than gold” (Pomfret & Nelson, 2004 
p.1).  
This research value was summed up in the extract below from an article on the project in the 
Washington Post entitled, An Isolated Region’s Genetic Mother Lode. It states that, “Harvard 
ultimately reaped millions of dollars in federal grants and private investment for the university 
because of its access to Anhui DNA, and Millennium was able to raise tens of millions of dollars 
from corporate investors” (ibid p.1). Where profits or other forms of value accrue to commercial 
entities resulting from research involving particular communities, it has been suggested that 
consideration should be given to the sharing of benefits with the broader community (Sheremeta 
et al., 2007 p.161). Such a sharing in the event of a windfall discovery, or of direct profits 
flowing from the research, would appear at face value to be fair to all parties in the exchange. 
This begs the questions as to how the value should be acknowledged, or properly compensated 
for, in cases where profits are visible such as in the Tristan da Cunha case, as well as the less 
ostensibly commercial circumstances such as the Harvard University project referred to above. 
Issues of fairness and justice in genomic research exchanges therefore range from the global 
level, involving developed and developing countries such as the Indonesian crisis, down to the 
local or community level where researchers engage with groups that are often isolated and 
vulnerable. Many commentators examining such genomic exchanges between researchers and 
indigenous or other developing-world rural communities have suggested that benefit sharing, as 
is legally required for non-human genetic resources under the Convention for Biological 
Diversity, is the mechanism most appropriate to establish fairness in this form of exchange 
(Merz et al., 2002; Hayden, 2007; Simm, 2005 and Schroeder & Pogge, 2009). Siva Thambisetti 
(2003) captures the alarm raised about genomic research in developing countries as, “ a concern 
that the full benefit of the medical advances that may result from the decoding of the human 
genome may not be realised if the genes become subject to privately owned intellectual property 
and are exploited solely for profit” (Thambisetti, 2002 p.12). 
Apprehensions such as these have drawn attention to the potential injustice, unfairness, or 
exploitation inherent in these types of transactions, and will receive further analysis below. The 
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unfairness captured by the examples and highlighted by the supporters of benefit sharing referred 
to above could be summarised in the following progression of statements: 
1. Genomic research places high value on accessing human DNA from particular and often 
vulnerable populations situated in the developing world. 
2. Research is intended not only to advance scientific knowledge, but also to seek 
potentially valuable medical discoveries. 
3. Significant value is received by research institutions not only due to possession of the 
samples enhancing research capacity, but also due to the potential for downstream 
commercial discoveries. 
4. It is appropriate for reasons of fairness and equity to consider some form of 
acknowledgement, reciprocation, and in some cases even financial consideration for the 
value provided by the donor community. 
5. Where no form of benefit sharing is contemplated in this exchange of human DNA, 
perceptions of injustice or exploitation are justly aroused. 
To conclude this introductory chapter, the exchange of human biological resources from the 
developing to the developed world as part of global research has been broadly described, 
emphasising the increasing scope and importance of genomic science for global health.  
Concerns that there might be unfairness in such exchanges have been made not only by countries 
such as Indonesia, but also by rural and indigenous communities targeted for genetic research. 
These concerns of unfairness in the exchange motivate the overall purpose of this thesis, which 
will be achieved by answering three research questions, recapitulated as firstly, whether and in 
what circumstances benefit sharing is appropriate for human genetic research. Secondly, whether 
benefit sharing runs the risk of unduly inducing or coercing research participants and thirdly, 
how the particular concerns of indigenous peoples are addressed by existing research practice 
and guidelines. 
Prior to examining the most significant objections that have been made against benefit sharing, 
chapter two will examine the meaning of the word that is arguably relevant to all discussions 
relating to justice, that is to say exploitation. Thereafter chapter three will analyse the first 
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objection to benefit sharing, namely the assertion that human genetic resources should be freely 
shared as part of the common heritage of humankind. Chapter four examines the second 
objection to benefit sharing, namely the altruism argument, which states that humans should 
share their DNA with no expectation or return, in solidarity with humankind. Chapter five 
discusses a further argument against benefit sharing, namely that human donors have not added 
value to their samples, and are thus not deserving of any benefits. Chapter six prepares for the 
discussion of undue influence and coercion as the final objection to benefit sharing, by first 
examining the contribution of justice and law to understanding exploitation, and then discussing 
the legal mechanisms that evolved through the law of equity to counter exploitation in such 
exchanges.  Chapter seven analyses undue influence and coercion as the final and possibly most 
persistent objection to benefit sharing in genomic research, and chapter eight examines the 
particular risks and concerns experienced by indigenous peoples who form an important category 
of genomic research participants.  The final chapter will draw out conclusions of this thesis.  
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CHAPTER TWO: EXPLOITATION 
 
As stated by Ruth Macklin in her study of double standards in medical research, concerns about 
justice in international research have, “focused mostly on worries about exploitation of human 
research participants or indeed of entire populations in the developing countries” (Macklin, 2004 
p.68). Many authors have claimed that research participants in the developing world are 
exploited, one of the key assertions being that they do not receive a fair share of the benefits 
(Brody, 2001 p.2857).  One of the primary aims of the CBD in its legal governance of the 
utilisation of non-human genetic resources was to prevent the perceived exploitation of 
developed countries. The term biopiracy, which has been coined to describe inherently unfair 
transactions involving genetic resources and is discussed in the next chapter, is predicated upon 
the concept of exploitation of individuals and groups, the prevention of which is the purpose of 
ethical guidelines for biomedical research. 
This thesis examines the exchange of human biological resources across national borders, and 
seeks in particular to determine how scientific and medical research should utilize human 
biological resources without exploiting individuals, populations and even countries. It is 
therefore essential at the outset to explore and establish the meaning of this term exploitation, 
used so freely whenever claims of injustice or lack of fairness are made. Starting with everyday 
meanings of the term, attempts to understand the concept by various authors will be traversed 
followed by a discussion of how exploitation is described and dealt with both in the legal and 
non-legal context. The three forms of exploitation proposed by Mayer (2007) will then be 
described and assessed, seeking to provide a practical platform from which exchanges of human 
genetic resources, and arguments both for and against benefit sharing, can be examined.  
2.1 Everyday use of the word exploitation 
Exploitation is at once an intuitively simple but also an ethically diffuse and unclear concept. 
The term is central to certain Marxist, neoclassical and liberal theories of economics, each of 
which contains firm assumptions about justice as well as a strong emotive component about the 
form of exploitation to be avoided. Activists such as Vandana Shiva utilised words such as 
piracy or biopiracy to denote a particular form of exploitation of developing countries by  
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Western nations, whilst Che Guevara referred to the plunder of the poor in a speech to the United 
Nations (Guevara, 1964).  The word implies one-sided transactions that are perceived in some 
way as wrongful and to be avoided, and is strongly associated with concepts such as 
vulnerability, dignity and fairness in research that are deeply implicated in the field of bioethics.  
Authors differ widely on its precise meaning, one for example calling exploitation a “moral red 
herring” which nothing but a context-specific or case-by-case analysis can adequately resolve 
(Carse & Little, 2008 p.207), whilst others use utilitarian or Kantian ethics to arrive at its 
meaning. 
Many of the definitions used are less than clear, such as Arnason’s, “exploitation is interaction 
that is stained by wrong” (Arnason, 2006 p.162). Dictionary definitions separate two primary 
forms of the word, the first being an unfair treatment of someone, or the use of a situation in a 
way that is wrong in order to get some benefit for oneself, and the second one being the process 
of making use of something so that you gain as much as possible from it.31 An example of the 
first form is the exploitation of illegal immigrant labour, and of the second is the commercial or 
economic or industrial exploitation of resources such as mining or timber extraction. Other uses 
of the word denote activities that are not necessarily ethically wrong. For example, the exploiting 
of one’s talent, of natural resources, or even of the slowness of a business opponent all seem to 
be morally permissible, whilst exploiting the vulnerability or ignorance of another person in a 
business deal is generally regarded as less so.  
2.2 Attempts at understanding the concept 
Hawkins and Emanuel (2004) propose that the proper meaning of the word exploitation requires 
that the advantageous use of something or someone by another is required to be in some sense 
unfair or “morally problematic” (ibid p.44). They note that there is general consensus around 
three structural issues (ibid p.46). Firstly, regarding voluntariness, there is consensus that 
exploitation can take place voluntarily between willing parties and yet still be morally 
problematic. In other words, it is not necessary that one party be coerced or forced for 
exploitation to have taken place, and the wrongfulness of the transaction, if any, might lie in the 
distributive unfairness of the transaction, or in the deep vulnerability of the exploitee, under 
                                                          
31[Online] Available at http://www.macmillandictionary.com  
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particular circumstances (ibid p.47).  An example of this would be an employer taking on child 
labour from an extremely disadvantaged community and paying excessively low wages.  
Secondly, regarding the presence of harm, they believe that there is consensus that exploitation 
can but does not need to be harmful for the exploitee, for one can be wronged without being 
harmed.  
Admitting that there is a loose sense of the word harm in which harm is just a synonym for 
wrong, they suggest that substantive criteria and reasons are required to determine the exact and 
contextual meaning of the word (ibid p.48). One example of this latter form of exploitation 
would presumably be secretly taking a photograph of an indigenous villager, with the intention 
of selling the photograph for a large amount of money.  On the one hand the villager has not 
suffered any overt form of harm. On the other hand, she has not had a chance to object.  
The famous case of Henrietta Lack, who died before the unauthorised utilisation of her tissue 
created highly profitable cell lines, was another example of no direct harm for the exploitee, 
whilst others subsequently denounced her treatment as being exploitative (Skloot, 2010).  
Hawkins suggests that this form of exploitation, in which wrongs occur in the absence of direct 
harm, are regarded by many authors as being the most troubling of all (Hawkins et al., 2008 
p.48). Thirdly, regarding prohibition of exploitation, Hawkins notes a consensus that despite the 
fact that a practice may be exploitative, it does not automatically follow that it ought to be 
prohibited. Not all morally troubling acts can be effectively regulated by the state or the law. An 
example of this form, according to Hawkins, would be clinical trials in developing world 
countries, where people are desperately poor and the health system virtually non-existent (ibid 
p.48).  
Carling adds another approach to determining the existence or otherwise of exploitation in an 
exchange, by asking two questions. Firstly, does one individual or group gain an advantage at the 
expense of another?  Secondly he asks a normative question, namely is this advantage unjustly 
obtained? (Carling, 1998 p. 220) The second question is more complex, and usually involves an 
analysis of what is meant by gain at the expense of another. One school of thought holds that 
such transactions are exploitative and wrong when and because they are coercive of the weaker 
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party (Buchanan, 1979; Schwartz, 1995), whilst others hold that the wrongfulness lies in its 
degrading of the victims; when they are treated simply as means, not as ends (Wood, 1995).  
This thesis examines concerns about exploitation between parties where one party is frequently 
more vulnerable, and where various power and other differentials exist, leading to the possibility 
of injustice in the exchange. This question is therefore examined at greater depth in chapter 6, 
which explores notions of justice, as well as contractual responses to the different forms of 
exploitation, which can take place between two transacting parties.   
2.3 Legal approaches to exploitation. 
The law on contract, discussed further in chapter six below, has evolved as a framework to 
regulate voluntary exchange transactions, during which parties of different power and resources 
negotiate or bargain and compete for advantage.  Bargaining is according to Fried an enterprise 
involving risks for both parties, which “lacks both written rules and the scrutiny of an umpire [...] 
Ethical constraints may therefore serve as a surrogate for procedural rules” (Fried, 1978 p.109). 
Justice during such exchanges is a relational concept, which balances one person’s interests with 
others.  Bigwood (2003) describes the evolution of the law against contractual exploitation, 
which can take place during a voluntary exchange between two (or more) parties. He explains 
that the underlying principle supporting such evolution, which was influenced by the law of 
equity and invariably involves protecting the weaker party, is captured in the sentence “other 
things being equal, we believe that a party should be excused from performing a contract that 
resulted from the other person’s exploitation” (Bigwood, 2003 p.1).  
Judges have been required to decide and achieve legitimacy in countless exploitation cases over 
the centuries, without the same metaphysical luxuries enjoyed by philosophers and other 
commentators on justice who do not have their theories tested in practice (ibid p.8). In other 
words the law provides an account of how those judges who were assigned the responsibility to 
decide on legality, which included the questions of fairness and justice in particular transactions, 
determined the cases placed before them. Bigwood describes how exploitation in contract law is 
conceptualised in different ways, some examining the mode of conduct of the exploiter in more 
detail, which focuses on the conduct of the parties or the procedural fairness, whilst others 
examine the quality of the outcome of a transaction, also termed substantive fairness. In making 
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the point that substantive unfairness in the form of an outcome that is bad for one party is not 
essential for exploitation to exist, he emphasises that to exploit someone in contract formation is 
to wrong her or treat her unjustly, regardless of how much she may lose, or her exploiter may 
gain, materially from the event. In other words, he holds that whilst exchange imbalance may 
vitally assist in the determination of an exploitation claim, the demerits of the bargain struck are 
not themselves objects of evaluation, and are not essential to the existence of exploitation (ibid 
p.6). As discussed below, exploitation can take place whilst improving the lot of the exploited 
person.  
2.4 Non-legal approaches to exploitation  
Returning to the basic meaning of the word exploitation, Wertheimer explains that exploitation 
can be used in a non-moral or non-derisive sense when it means simply to use or take advantage 
of, and that it is necessary to determine precisely the grounds upon which exploitative 
transactions may be prohibited (Wertheimer, 2008 p.66).  Using taking unfair advantage as a 
yardstick, he states that exploitation can be determined in one of two ways. Firstly, some 
dimension of the outcome of the exploitative act needs to be assessed, which consists of an 
analysis of (1) the benefit to A and (2) the effect on B.  The second dimension or test of unfair 
advantage examines whether there is some defect in the process whereby the (unfair) outcome is 
reached.  
The process might be exploitative for example, where A unduly coerces B into giving consent, or 
deceives B, or fails to provide B with relevant information, or B is unable to understand the 
information adequately, all which are components of the informed consent process. In the latter 
case, where B is unable to understand the information, the unfairness if any would presumably 
reside either in A having known of or being able to predict B’s lack of understanding, or 
alternatively where B indicated an inability to understand the information. Exploitation in the 
form of wrongful coercion might include a seductive offer that for some reason distorts the 
judgment of B, or which induces a lack of voluntariness in response, both modes of conduct 
which deserve and will receive more detailed analysis in chapter six below. 
It is noted that the above analysis of exploitation as taking advantage does not deal with the 
situation where there is a moral defect in the process rather than the outcome, for example where 
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A unduly coerces B into consenting to a transaction, but where the outcome is in fact 
advantageous to B. This would entail some version of benign or patronising dominance of 
another, for B’s own good. An example might be a company forcing a tribe to sign an agreement 
to provide traditional knowledge about a plant for commercial purposes, by withholding certain 
information deemed to be likely to cause confusion and prevent the contract, leading to an 
eventual commercially beneficial outcome, which helps the community significantly and does 
not infringe any of their cultural values. Still a moral assessment of such a process and outcome 
– a disrespectful process leading to a good outcome – might well be acceptable to a utilitarian, 
but is likely to be unacceptable to a Kantian analyst.   
Where both parties benefit from a transaction, no matter how exploitative, Wertheimer describes 
such a mutually advantageous transaction as being Pareto superior (Wertheimer, 1996 p.14).  He 
acknowledges that finding an acceptable standard of exploitation is no simple matter, and 
suggests,  
We appear to be stuck. Although I cannot produce a non-problematic theory of fair 
transactions, I remain convinced that some mutually advantageous transactions are quite 
unfair and exploitative. I am reluctant to mimic Justice Potter Steward’s view of 
pornography with respect to exploitation, namely “I shall not attempt to further define 
pornography, but I know it when I see it. (Wertheimer, 2008 p.73)  
Consent is subjected to rigorous examination in Wertheimer’s analysis, defects in consent being 
critical to an enquiry into the fairness of a transaction.  The importance of such an enquiry 
resonates strongly with the law of equity discussed in chapter six, where the validity of a contract 
is determined entirely by the procedure surrounding and quality of the consent.  Proper or 
authentic consent is an essential component of procedural justice that is required to defeat 
exploitation.  Support for this focus on consent comes from Carse and Little, who avoid the red 
herring surrounding the concept of exploitation by conducting what they term an essentially 
contextualist enquiry into all the norms, facts and options surrounding the transaction (Carse & 
Little, 2008 p.207). They contend that morally asymmetrical exchanges take place when consent 
is for some reason, vulnerability or otherwise, wrongfully obtained (ibid pp.211-214). 32  
                                                          
32Carse & Little (2008) refer to marketplace norms, which denote a transaction as morally permissible as long as 
both parties are competent, fully informed and sufficiently instrumentally rational, and there is no deception, fraud, 
manipulation, threat, coercion or force. 
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A final and useful aspect of Wertheimer’s analysis is his Principle of Permissible Exploitation, 
which he refers to as PPE (Wertheimer, 2008 p.83).  PPE holds that we should allow a 
transaction whenever it would be better for all parties to the transaction and worse for nobody 
else.  That we should not interfere where mutually and consensually the parties agree to an 
exchange that is in some way disadvantageous to one. This is a consequentialist and practical 
approach to deal with lesser forms of imperfect transactions that are acceptable to the parties.  
Finally Wertheimer admits that PPE arouses concerns, and suggests that it is a plausible principle 
of non-ideal moral theory.  
As opposed to Rawls, who restricted himself to developing an ideal theory of a just society, non-
ideal moral theory aims to provide principles whereby individuals should act under the unjust 
and non-ideal conditions that pertain (ibid p.84).  As shown above, some genetic research in 
developing countries is carried out in non-ideal circumstances, for example a lack of local 
research ethics committees (RECs), or an extremely vulnerable population, that are to some 
degree tainted with perceptions of unfairness. The research projects described above all involved 
the taking of genetic samples from rural and often illiterate populations from the developing 
world, such as Tristan da Cunha and China as well as indigenous tribes such as the Hagahai, the 
Havasupai, the San, and the Australian Aborigines. Such cases call for reliable assurance that the 
research participants, obviously vulnerable in so many ways, are treated fairly.   
Cori Hayden in an analysis of the complexities of the exchange of human DNA for genetic 
research, proposed an even simpler formulation in relation to consent for research, namely that 
research should “include people well” (Hayden, 2007 p.746).  In a more just world, the present 
disparity between the power and fortunes of nations and peoples that led to exploitation of the 
weak by the strong would simply not exist.  We are however, saddled with the fact that the 
concept of exploitation is central in the non-ideal environment that does exist, and remains 
difficult to constrain within a single definition.  
2.5 Mayer’s three forms of exploitation 
Exploitation remains a puzzling concept, complicated by the fact that under the principles of 
PPE, it is regarded as being sometimes permissible. We are left with the unanswered question, 
namely when and under what circumstances it can be identified or prohibited?  Bearing in mind 
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Wertheimer’s admission on the futility of finding a unified theory of fair transactions, as well as 
the numerous scenarios within which genetic research is conducted, this thesis needs a clear and 
practical definition of exploitation that can be applied to evaluate the fairness of genomic 
exchange transactions involving humans. Robert Mayer (2007) addressed this question in a paper 
entitled, What’s Wrong with Exploitation? in which he first singled out two terms, namely the 
“failure of reciprocity,” and “wrongful gain” as being at the heart of what the distinction tries to 
achieve (ibid p.139). Wrongful gain, according to Mayer is the broader term, which is not always 
called exploitation. A thief who exploits one’s carelessness and enters an open window to steal 
has broken the law and is called a thief, not an exploiter. Exploiters are those who gain 
illegitimately, or take advantage in a way that is wrong, not necessarily illegal, at another’s 
expense, failing to reciprocate or benefit the disadvantaged party as fairness requires.  
Under the broader criterion of wrongful gain therefore, a thief, an extortionist and a blackmailer 
are guilty of named offences, which whilst including elements of exploitation, do not benefit 
from being defined as such. The law defines these acts as criminal acts.  The term exploitation 
would according to Mayer more appropriately describe the actions of free riders, drug pushers, 
slave masters, monopolists, usurers, sweat shop employers and so forth, who exact advantage in 
a morally dubious manner without necessarily breaking the law (ibid p.139). In other words, 
whilst many criminal (theft) or illegal (blackmail) acts contain an element of exploitation, the 
proper meaning of the word should reside outside of such particular forms of wrongdoing.  
Using the word fairness as the touchstone, Mayer identifies three classes of exploitation, namely 
the first class, where the exploiters do not benefit their victims at all, the second class, where 
they do not benefit them sufficiently, and the third class, where they do not benefit them 
authentically (ibid p.143).  In returning to the question of what fairness requires, Mayer reminds 
us firstly, that the loss suffered by an exploited party is always relative, rather than absolute (ibid 
p.141), and secondly, that “exploitation […] is a thoroughly political concept because 
contestable ideas about what fairness requires determine whether taking unfair advantage is 
recognized or not” (ibid p. 144).   
Returning to Mayer’s classifications, class 1 exploiters fail to benefit the disadvantaged party at 
all, the free rider being the classic example. A free rider is a person who enjoys the donuts 
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purchased for all at the office, but fails to provide her financial contribution when the hat is 
passed around for contributions. Or one who enjoys the entire performance of a street performer, 
then walks away without making payment. Notably, this first class of dealing does not take place 
in the context of an explicit exchange, and is therefore not relevant for this thesis which deals 
with the exchange of human genetic resources.    
Class 2 exploiters, who fail to benefit their victims sufficiently, are according to Mayer always 
involved in an exchange, in which the exploited party gains in relation to the status quo ante, but 
loses from the standpoint of fairness. She gains, but not sufficiently. Fairness in this sense is 
determined by an enquiry into a just value for a particular good, namely whether there was 
fairness in exchange. An example would be where a rich man fails to pay a starving man’s 
asking price for a box of apples, knowing that the poor man has few other options and will 
accede to the low offered price. The power differential combined with the vulnerability of the 
weaker party is usually apparent to an objective observer, and arouses feelings of unfairness.  
Finally, class 3 exploiters fail to benefit the exploited party in an authentic manner. This type of 
transaction also involves an exchange between two parties, but one that is regarded as 
inauthentic in that it should not, according to publicly accepted rules or norms, take place at all.  
An example of class 3 exploitation suggested by Mayer is the drug-pusher who sells to an addict. 
The addict chooses to purchase the drugs and the price is reasonable, but society would regard 
the drug-pusher as being exploitative, the transaction being harmful and wrongful, and one that 
should be prohibited (Mayer, 2007 p.145). This thesis proceeds from the assumption that the 
exchange of human genetic resources for research purposes is indeed an authentic, or legitimate 
practice, and for that reason Mayer’s class two form of exploitation is primarily relevant to the 
enquiry into the fairness of genomic research exchanges.  
How then to apply Mayer’s second-class test?  After exploring the slippery nature of the term, it 
can be concluded that the second class of exploitation identified by Mayer, which involves 
reciprocal exchanges where fairness is being questioned, where the exploiter fails to benefit their 
victims sufficiently, is entirely germane for the first part of this study, and will provide a useful 
framework for analysis of exchanges in genomic research.  All of the complaints and concerns 
relating to bioprospecting discussed above had at their core accusations of exploitation, in the 
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form of transactions, which are legally unassailable, but are redolent of short-changing, cheating, 
or some form of cheapness. 
A closer look at the Tristan da Cunha case informs a simple assessment of fairness.  In the initial 
transaction, the islanders gave consent to the company for the use of their DNA samples in 
exchange for a guarantee of access to a cure for asthma in the event of a possible future cure. 
When the company sold the rights to their subsequently discovered research lead for $70 million 
to another company, none of this benefit was shared with those who had provided the research 
samples. Application of Mayer’s second class of exploitation test would simply enquire whether 
the first company, Sequana Therapeutics, benefited the islanders sufficiently. 
Implementation of this test would admittedly require access to credible norms and standards in 
order to evaluate the fairness, or the equivalence of the exchange. Opponents of this test might 
therefore argue that no such generally acceptable criteria exist, or alternatively that the wide 
variety of circumstances surrounding such exchange transactions would make the application of 
such a test inoperable. Moreover, they might suggest that exploitation in an exchange can be 
determined by the application of a different set of criteria. A further objection might suggest that 
an examination of the actual process of engagement, namely the dealings, interactions and 
motives of the parties, would contribute more usefully towards an assessment of exploitation. 
Whilst a clear standard against which the outcome of an exchange is not readily available, it is 
suggested that an examination of the facts of a case on the basis of generally accepted standards 
does provide an observer with the ability to formulate an opinion as to whether the weaker party, 
the islanders in this case, were benefited insufficiently, and thus exploited.  
2.6 Conclusions 
During the discussion on the legal meanings of exploitation above, it was explained that the law 
of equity favoured an altogether different approach to exploitation, namely one, which 
emphasised the mode of conduct or unfair manner, employed by the exploiter, rather than the 
outcome or negative result suffered by the exploitee. This latter and more procedurally structured 
enquiry into the fairness of transactions will be further discussed in chapters six and seven 
below. As every transaction comprises procedures, motives and relationships on the one hand, as 
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well as substance and material outcomes on the other, both of these approaches are necessary and 
need to be integrated during an analysis of exploitation in the research exchange of human DNA.  
To conclude this discussion, avoidance of Mayer’s second and third forms of exploitation in the 
exchange of human genetic resources based upon considerations of fairness requires ensuring 
that the providers of genetic resources should be benefited sufficiently, and authentically, 
respectively.  The former leads back to the proposal made by a range of commentators referred 
to in the first chapter, namely that benefit sharing is necessary in order to satisfy justice and 
avoid exploitation in research exchanges involving human DNA. This proposal for benefit 
sharing, the subject of the first research question of the thesis, now needs to address four 
objections in order to secure legitimacy. The first of the objections to be addressed below is the 
suggestion that human tissue should be shared freely as part of the common heritage of 
humankind. 
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CHAPTER THREE: COMMON HERITAGE OF HUMANKIND 
 
The case has been made in a broad and general manner for benefit sharing to bring about fairness 
in genetic research transactions. However, commentators opposed to benefit sharing in genetic 
research have raised a range of objections to this suggestion, the first of which is the assertion 
that human DNA should be regarded as part of the common heritage of humankind. 
The common heritage of humankind assertion holds that there can be no question of exploitation 
or of unfairness in the exchange of human DNA for the simple reason that it forms part of the 
common heritage of humankind.  As discussed in the first chapter, an estimated 99.8 per cent of 
human genetic information is non-differential, in other words is shared between all humans. This 
supports the argument that it should be available for the benefit of all humankind (Wang, 2011 
p.8). The argument continues to hold that human DNA is shared by all, such as the air we 
breathe, therefore no individuals have the right to withhold it. This argument will be examined as 
follows. Firstly, the history of the common heritage concept will be briefly examined, and 
secondly, the CBD will be discussed, being the 1992 convention initially providing for 
international governance of both human and non-human biological resources. Thirdly, the 
exclusion of human DNA from the CBD in 1995 is considered together with the responses of 
relevant international bodies, and fourthly, the profile of bioprospecting is compared between 
non-human and human genetic resources in order to examine the underlying argument for benefit 
sharing in both cases.  
3.1 A history of the concept 
When should resources that occur in nature, such as air, land, the sea, water, timber, and minerals 
be enclosed or owned by some to the exclusion of others, and when should they be free for the 
communal or public benefit of all?  
John Locke described the common nature of natural resources as follows: 
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God […] has given the world to men in common [...] the earth and all that is therein is 
given to men for the support and comfort of their being. And the fruits it naturally 
produces and the beasts it feeds belong to mankind in common, as they are produced by 
the spontaneous hand of nature: and nobody has originally a private dominion exclusive 
of the rest of mankind. (Locke, 1690(1988) para 26) 
Under certain circumstances, including lack of abundance, common property can indeed become 
divided, allocated and exclusive dominion claimed. David Hume referred specifically to the sea 
and the air as being seemingly inexhaustible and not subject to any separate or exclusive 
dominion (Hume, 1751). The broader term natural resources encompasses the range of naturally 
occurring resources that humankind has contested for and utilised over millennia. Military might 
and the ability to subjugate weaker peoples led to enhanced bargaining power, and in a process 
described by Jared Diamond in his analysis of the fates of human societies over the past twelve 
millennia, competition between peoples over resources inexorably produced the unequal 
distribution of affluence that is currently observed (Diamond, 1997).   
The 19th and 20th Centuries witnessed a continuation in the colonialist endeavours of the more 
powerful states, some securing entire countries as legitimate sources of natural resources such as 
oil, minerals, timber and other commodities (Pakenham, 1991). By the mid-20th Century, when 
the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 1803 on Permanent Sovereignty over 
Natural Resources confirming that states have sovereign rights over their own biological 
resources, the developed countries had become firmly entrenched in the advanced levels of 
power and wealth that define their relative status today. The common heritage framework has 
been described by Knoppers as one that “argues against private appropriation in favour of 
sharing, administration in the common interest, benefits and burdens equitably distributed, 
equitable access, peaceful use and preservation for future generations” (Knoppers, 2003 p.2). 
The above shows that the common heritage of humankind is a well-known concept in 
international law, an attractive proposition both for those who argue against such private 
appropriation and for those whose priorities are the furthering of knowledge and medical science 
for humankind. It has a pleasing moral simplicity, and at first glance would appear to present a 
good argument for all human DNA to be made freely available in the interests of the common 
good. Each of the common heritage treaties have however commenced with similar exhortations 
for the subject of the treaty to be placed beyond individual appropriation, but have proceeded to 
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develop guidelines and frameworks to ensure that the utilisation and distribution of rights are fair 
to all. 
The common heritage aspiration contained in all of the above treaties was followed and 
superseded in each case by practical guidelines, norms and rules giving distributive effect to 
overarching principles of equitable sharing as set out in the Moon Treaty (UN, 1979). It will be 
argued below that the common heritage idea which similarly was an initial aspiration for the 
field of genetic resources, both the non-human and human form being originally included in the 
CBD, was not able to endure without adjustment in the face of the competition for the resources, 
and in the face of the need for distributive principles to ensure equitable sharing and fairness 
between parties. 
3.2 The Convention for Biological Diversity, state sovereignty and benefit sharing 
To respond further to the suggestion that human biological resources should continue to be 
regarded as common heritage of humankind, it is necessary to summarise some of the relevant 
controversies. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s an international controversy erupted over 
ownership of germ-plasm which became known as the ‘seed wars’ (Juma, 1989), the kernel of 
the controversy then being described as the prevailing state of affairs when “germ-plasm flows 
out of the south as the common heritage of mankind and returns as a commodity” (Kloppenberg 
et al., 1988 p.10).  It has been claimed that the value of plant genetic resources received over the 
years as free goods from the developing world has been exploitative, worth vast amounts of 
money to capitalist nations (Kloppenburg, 2004 p.169).   
3.2.1 Bioprospecting or biopiracy? 
During the decades preceding the Rio Earth Summit in 1992 many activists attacked the term 
bioprospecting as being altogether too bland, masking in their view the illegitimacy of centuries 
of unbridled plunder. Vandana Shiva (2005) stated that the term imposed a commercial view on 
the developing world and, 
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[…] assumes that prior to prospecting, the resources of desire were unknown, unused and 
without value. Using terminology derived from earlier “prospecting” for minerals and 
fossil fuels, “bioprospecting” obscures the fact that living resources are not non-
renewable and are not without value prior to exploitation by global commercial interests 
for global markets. (ibid p.15) 
Vocal critics of bioprospecting believed that the ongoing exploitation inherent in these 
transactions were better described by the more derogatory term biopiracy, which again in the 
words of Shiva, refers to the use of intellectual property systems to legitimise the exclusive 
ownership and control over biological resources and biological products that have been used 
over centuries in non-industrialised countries (Shiva, 2001). 
Other definitions of biopiracy include criteria such as the acquiring of exclusive monopoly 
control through use of intellectual property and in particular patenting,33 and the lack of prior 
informed consent for the transaction.34  In this arena, indigenous peoples are amongst those most 
visibly aggrieved by the outcomes of this centuries-old power imbalance, having been all too 
often on the receiving end of the pirate-like use of their knowledge relating to plant resources. 
The simmering anger of this grouping is hinted at by words of indigenous activist and academic 
Debra Harry. She states that, “Countries that historically have been robbed of their genetic 
resources by more powerful states are determined to establish level playing fields rules that allow 
them a fair share of the benefits arising from their use of the resources” (Harry & Kanehe, 2005 
p.101). 
3.2.2 Bioprospecting case studies 
The publicized allegations of biopiracy all depicted similar patterns of commodification, 
accompanied by patenting of promising genetic resources from the developing world.  For 
example, a patent was taken out by WR Grace and Co on the well-known Neem tree of India, 
which was famously revoked in 2000 after community opposition on the grounds of lack of 
novelty and inventive step. 35  This case was widely cited as, “the world’s first case against 
biopiracy” (Ugas, 2005 p.20) in a matter involving genetic resources of a developing country. 
                                                          
33The Action Group on Erosion, Technology and Concentration, 2005, Group web site, 
http://www.etcgroup.org/text/txt_key_defs.asp  
34Report on Biopiracy by the Edmonds Institute in cooperation with the African Centre for Biosafety; available at 
http://www.edmonds-institute.org/outofafrica.pdf.  
35 EPO Patent 436257 B1  
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Another example was the notorious application by the University of Mississippi for a patent in 
the USA for turmeric powder,36 which was a well-known wound-healing medicine in India. This 
patent caused considerable anger in the country of origin, and was similarly successfully revoked 
after objectors persuaded the patent office that the plant use was common knowledge in India 
(Ganguli, 2001 p.156).  
A plant related to mustard called Maca, cultivated and used for centuries by Andean populations 
for various medical purposes including sexual dysfunction, was patented by a US company Pure 
World Botanicals for sales in the US. 37  Dutfield questions whether this patent, which was not 
attacked or revoked, harms the Peruvian maca farmers in any way, claiming that the patent, like 
many others, was probably improperly awarded due to its lack of a genuinely patentable 
invention (Dutfield, 2004 p.50).  Another renowned biopiracy claim relates to the rosy 
periwinkle, which is native to Madagascar, amongst other countries. This plant was well known 
for centuries as a folk medical treatment for diabetes and other ailments. The company Eli Lilly 
researched and registered patents for treatment of leukemia in the 1950s, generating huge profits, 
estimated as being $100 million annually (Rosendal, 2006 p.4) by the worldwide marketing of a 
lucrative leukemia drug called Oncovin (Brown, 2003 p.136).  Whilst the country of origin 
received no recompense, the rosy periwinkle case has been regarded by many as a classic case of 
exploitation (Stone, 1992). 
3.2.3 The International response to exploitation and the CBD 
As the above cases show, biogenetic resources, whether from plants, animals, microorganisms or 
humans, were still being freely exchanged through the 1980s. Transactions were typically 
bilateral encounters, subject to no international supervision, with the resources being freely 
appropriated from the countries of origin in a manner consistent with their being the common 
heritage of humankind. The realization had however, dawned that bioprospecting was unjust, 
unsustainable and in need of regulation. Developing nations were no longer satisfied with their 
biogenetic resources being regarded as some form of common property, available for 
exploitation by the developed world.  As Dutfield comments, 
                                                          
36US Patent No 5401, 504 issued on 28 March 1995. 
37US Patent No 6, 267, 995 issued on 31 July 2001. 
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[…] there was a huge disparity in the way the commercial benefits from industrial use of 
these resources were distributed, with the lion’s share going to large corporations in the 
developed world. Resentment about this situation made developing countries resistant to 
pressure from the rich countries to conserve their biological diversity at their own 
expense for the enrichment, as they perceived it, of these corporations. (Dutfield, 2002 
p.5)  
This unregulated common heritage regime was finally brought to an end by the CBD, which 
provided the legal framework for the exchange of biological resources worldwide. 38 The CBD 
was negotiated over ten annual intergovernmental meetings commencing in 1988, during which 
period two interrelated themes had dominated the debates. The first was that developed countries 
needed continued access to the natural biological resources that were chiefly situated in 
developing countries, and the second was that provider states insisted that such access should no 
longer be deemed part of any form of global commons. In the end, it was concluded at the Rio 
Convention of 1992 that access to biological resources needed to be accompanied by a fair 
exchange in the form of benefit sharing, not only for the provider state, but also in some cases for 
indigenous communities. 39  
The formal objectives of the Convention were stated as being firstly the conservation of 
biological diversity, secondly the sustainable use of its components, and lastly the fair and 
equitable sharing of benefits from the use of genetic resources (CBD, 1992). Benefit sharing was 
thus made explicit as an “evolving concept that supports the conservation of and sustainable use 
of the world’s resources that are a collective and vital interest of all mankind” (Baslar, 1998 
p.278). 
3.2.4 State sovereignty over resources 
The CBD’s unequivocal placing of sovereignty over biogenetic resources in the hands of states 
was regarded by many as being a turning point in international law, marking a decisive shift in 
the power relations of stakeholders in international trade. It should be noted however that this 
was not as radical as it seemed, for the United Nations General Assembly had in 1962 confirmed 
the general principle that states have sovereignty over their territories including the natural 
                                                          
38 Genetic material is defined in article 2 of the CBD as “any material of plant, animal, microbial or other origin 
containing functional units of heredity” and genetic resources are defined as “genetic resources of actual or potential 
value” (CBD, Article 2). 
39Article 8J of the CBD sets out the obligations of states towards indigenous Peoples.  
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resources existing within them. 40  Whilst the CBD confirmed the latter fact explicitly, the words 
of the preamble affirming that conservation of biological diversity is a common concern of 
humankind nevertheless made it clear that this sovereign control was not an absolute right.    
All genetic resources, which at that time were deemed to include both human and non-human 
biological material, were thenceforth to be managed and controlled by states in their capacity as 
sovereign custodians. States were thus required under the CBD framework to enact laws 
domestically in order to give effect to the principles and commitments contained in the 
convention. Not only were states obliged to respect the need for their biogenetic resources to be 
made available for humankind, but they were also required to respect the rights of a significant 
other class of stakeholders, namely the indigenous peoples within their borders.   
The Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of 
Benefits Arising from their Utilisation to the Convention on Biological Diversity (Nagoya, 2010) 
placed practical flesh on the previously bare bones of access, benefit sharing and compliance 
constituted by the CBD framework, and linked the rights of indigenous and local communities to 
grant access, by means of prior informed consent, to associated genetic resources. States are 
obliged under the Nagoya Protocol to take measures to ensure that these rights, including those 
of indigenous peoples, are given effect by promulgating domestic legislation.   
3.3 Human DNA governance following exclusion from the CBD 
The human genome is an unusual and interesting form of resource; at once common to all and 
definitive of the human species, whilst at the same time being unique to individuals. As 
described above, the CBD had formulated a novel and decisive institutional response to the 
perceived exploitation of biological resources from the developing world.  The governance and 
utilisation of human genetic resources in global research, being included in the definition of 
biological resources encompassed by the CBD, was thus entirely subject to the binding 
international framework described above. However, the state parties to the CBD, after a process 
that was not clearly captured in the public record, decided after a mere three years of the 
convention’s existence to exclude human genetic resources from its scope. The formal resolution 
simply affirmed that human genetic resources are not included in the framework of the 
                                                          
40General Assembly Resolution 1803 on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources.  
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Convention (CBD, 1995); thereby bringing about the regulatory and legal vacuum that informs 
the purpose of this thesis. Why then were human genetic resources excluded?  
3.3.1 The first five years following the CBD exclusion. 
It would not be surprising to discover that the properties and distinctions that make the regulation 
of human DNA so different from non-human biogenetic resources contributed towards the 1995 
decision.  However, the following discussion makes it clear that the common heritage of 
humankind notion, so thoroughly rejected by the CBD, also continued in the initial years after 
exclusion to remain visible and explicit in the field of human genetic resources.   
In 1995, the year that human genetic resources were excluded from the remit of the CBD, the 
Ethics Committee of the Human Genome Organisation (HUGO), 41 an international organisation 
of scientists involved in human genetics, issued its first statement on the Principled Conduct of 
Genetics Research.  The introduction to the document referred to the primary concerns arising 
from the Human Genome Project, the Human Genome Diversity Project and other genetic 
research, singling out for emphasis the “loss of access to discoveries for research purposes, 
especially through patenting and commercialisation” (HUGO, 1995 p.1). The statement then laid 
down four principles upon which its recommendations were to be based, foremost of which was, 
“recognition that the human genome is part of the common heritage of humanity” (ibid p.1).  
This first statement on governance of human genetic resources was characterised by the concern 
that access to the human genome should be as unrestricted as possible; calling for example for 
collaboration between industrialised and developing countries for the reason that, “free flow, 
access and exchange of information is essential not only to scientific progress but also for the 
present or future benefit of all participants” (HUGO, 1995 p.3). It therefore seems more than 
likely that the reasoning underpinning this repeated aspiration, namely that open access to the 
human genome is essential for humankind, was behind the apparently associated decision to 
remove human DNA from the then untested CBD paradigm.   
The exchange of human genetic resources for medical research purposes has over the past 
decades been to some degree governed by the non-binding guidelines of the World Medical 
                                                          
41The Human Genome Organisation (HUGO) an international organisation of scientists involved in genetics, was 
formed in 1988 and currently represents 1 200 members from 69 countries.      
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Association’s Helsinki Declaration as well as of the Council for International Organisations of 
Medical Sciences, (CIOMS) as will be further discussed below. These two bodies are concerned 
with medical research involving humans, usually in the form of research participants, but also 
including donors of biological samples. However, the significance of HUGO referred to above 
resides in the fact that it is the only international institution dedicated to human genomic 
research, and for that reason its further pronouncements will be examined as both reflecting and 
influencing the changing state of the field. 
In 1997, the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) 
followed HUGO’s initial lead in its Universal Declaration of the Human Genome and Human 
Rights by declaring the human genome the heritage of humanity, emphatically endorsing 
HUGO’s appeal in 1995 for the creation of a global commons in this increasingly important 
research resource.  The UNESCO declaration emphasised in article 12 (a) that benefits from 
advances in biology, genetics and medicine, concerning the human genome “shall be made 
available to all, with due regard for the dignity and human rights of each individual” (UNESCO, 
1997).   The tone and wording of this instrument also supports the notion that advances or 
benefits from the human genome should be common property, to be made available to all, and 
not susceptible for any form of private gain.  
3.3.2 Benefit sharing for research participants introduced  
This common heritage approach proved however, to be short-lived, failing to provide balance 
and a sense of justice in genomic research. For reasons closely related to the interplay between 
research, intellectual property rights and commodification (discussed below) a gathering sense of 
potential and perceived injustice in developing world genomic research influenced HUGO to 
urgently address the issue of benefit sharing. In 2000, the Ethics Committee of HUGO issued a 
comprehensive Statement on Benefit-Sharing, in which it stated as follows, 
The Committee believes that the issue of benefit-sharing merits further discussion 
because expenditures by private industry for genetic research now exceed the 
contributions of governments. Many new products, including vaccines and drugs for 
common diseases, are now based upon genetic research. Much government or non-profit 
research will eventually have to be commercialised. Companies involved in human health 
may have special moral obligations. (HUGO, 2000a part 1) 
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The two motivations made explicit in this statement, namely that private industry is a major 
driver of research on the one hand, and that new products and commercialisation are unavoidable 
realities on the other, comprised an acknowledgement of the dynamics outlined in the discussion 
on global research above.  Whilst open access to a resource labelled as a common heritage of 
humanity might be a noble aspiration for global research, policy makers are required to address 
the stark reality which is that the entrepreneurial drive for commercial success forms an intrinsic 
part of the global research endeavour. Continuing in this vein, the statement describes the issue 
at hand as being, “whether and how to distribute profits that may accrue to commercial 
enterprises, governments, or academic institutions on the basis of the participation of particular 
communities” (emphasis added). The statement concludes with the words, “in the interest of 
justice, the last decade has witnessed an emerging international consensus that groups 
participating in research should, at a minimum, receive some benefit” (HUGO, 2000a p.2). 
The above extracts are significant in that they call for justice in the exchange of human genetic 
resources.  They remind the public that particular nations or communities provide access from 
time to time, and refer to the commodification that motivated the benefits required in the 
consensus of the CBD. Finally, the HUGO statement proceeds to define and discuss key 
concepts such as community, common heritage, solidarity and lastly justice, all of which are 
central to this thesis. In the latter regard, the phrases inequality between rich and poor nations, 
the direction and priorities of research, difference in power, and a possibility of substantial 
profit, resonate with the debates around exploitation that preceded the adoption of the CBD. 
They also reflect the adoption and transference of these key-motivating concepts into the world 
of genetic research. Moreover, in the paragraph on benefit sharing, the HUGO Ethics Committee 
describes the term benefit, and in a clear reference to the CBD proceeds as follows, “in genetic 
research in general, benefit sharing has also been established as a principle of international law in 
the area of biodiversity and genetic resources in food and agriculture” (HUGO, 2000a: 2).  
After a warning against undue inducement, which is dealt with later in the thesis, the HUGO 
Ethics Committee then proposed benefit sharing in genomic research in the following terms: 
1. That all humanity share in, and have access to, the benefits of genetic research 
2. That benefits not be limited to those individuals who participated in such research 
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3. That there be prior discussion with groups or communities on the issue of benefit 
sharing 
4. That even in the absence of profits, immediate health benefits as determined by the 
community needs could be provided 
5. That at a minimum, all research participants should receive information about general 
research,  
6. That profit-making entities dedicate a percentage (for example 1-3 per cent) of their 
annual net profits to healthcare infrastructure and/or to humanitarian efforts. (HUGO 
2000:2) 
This forceful, albeit not binding, statement resonates with and replicates the essential elements of 
the access and benefit-sharing regime instituted by the CBD. On the one hand, the need for 
access to the resource, representing the benefit to humanity, is strongly assured in the first 
recommendation. However, this is balanced by the clear contention, at that stage novel in the 
field of human genetic resources, that benefit sharing is required at a community or provider 
level. Whilst only a small percentage of genomic research endeavours result in actual profits 
(McClellan, 2003) the HUGO statement of 2000 nevertheless placed benefit sharing at the level 
of a requirement rather than a mere possibility, for which it received much scholarly support 
(Knoppers et al. 2000; Weijer 2000).    
HUGO proceeded shortly thereafter to issue a further statement, namely the Statement on Human 
Genomic Databases of 2002, which again asserted common good priorities such as the global 
public good arising from genetic research, and the need to secure rapid access to primary 
genomic sequences for the benefit of humanity by placing them in the public domain (HUGO, 
2002). 42 This document is remarkable for the manner in which it frequently refers to the 
distribution of benefits amongst the wide range of stakeholders, and for its unabashed 
acknowledgement of the commercial realities of global research. After a range of practical 
recommendations for the ethical conduct of human genomic databases, the sixth detailed 
recommendation states that, “researchers, institutions and commercial entities have a right to a 
fair return for intellectual and financial contributions for databases, there should be reciprocity 
                                                          
42Global public goods are defined in HUGO 2002 as goods, “whose scope extends worldwide, are enjoyable by all 
with no groups excluded, and when consumed by one individual, are not depleted for others”. 
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and exchange of information with fair return". In the same breath it reaffirms that, “any fees 
should not restrict the free flow of scientific information and equitable access” (HUGO, 2002:4). 
For those who might well have proposed that human genetic resources should continue to be 
governed and exchanged as part of the common heritage of humanity, the professional guidance 
emanating from HUGO would have given pause for thought. After the early pronouncements of 
both HUGO of 1995 and the UNESCO Declaration of 1997, which had declared the human 
genome the heritage of humanity, the subsequent statements and documents represented a 
reversal on the issue.  In the absence of other explanations, it has to be assumed that it was the 
reality of the global research endeavour involving human DNA, namely the inherent unfairness 
of the bioprospecting process that led to their proposing the very same elements of a just 
exchange as had been advocated for in the CBD.   
UNESCO subsequently issued two final documents relevant for the field of human DNA.  First 
was the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data, which was formulated in 2003 by its 
international bioethics committee after wide consultation, aiming to guide states in the collection, 
processing, storage and use of human genetic data (UNESCO, 2003)?  Article 19 of this 
Declaration provided a broad description of various possible benefits to groups taking part in 
genetic research, and specific mention is made of the need for states to collaborate, as well as to 
assist the capacity of developing countries to collect and process human genetic data.  The need 
for benefit sharing was more evenly balanced between the requirements of humankind for 
benefits resulting from the use of human genetic data, and the limited medical and collective 
deserts of providers of samples. Secondly, UNESCO followed the above declaration on human 
genetic data with its Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights of 2005, the aims of 
which reflected the balance between access and reciprocity as set out in the CBD.  Article 2(f) 
states as one of its aims, 
[…] to promote equitable access to medical, scientific and technological developments as 
well as the greatest possible flow and rapid sharing of knowledge concerning those 
developments and the sharing of benefits, with particular attention to the needs of 
developing countries. (UNESCO, 2005 Article 2). 
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To summarise, the Ethics Committee of HUGO followed by the participating states in two 
subsequent declarations of UNESCO recognised that in order to secure equitable access to a 
valuable resource namely human genetic material in a just manner, benefits need to accrue to the 
provider communities as well as to humanity. The trajectory of events since 1995, as described 
above, presents support for the assertion that the idea of DNA as common heritage of humankind 
is no longer broadly supported and that considerations of benefit sharing, in one form or another, 
are necessary. 
3.4 The profile of bioprospecting: non-human and human genetic resources 
We have now seen that the CBD, HUGO and states members of UNESCO all firmly proposed 
benefit sharing in order to bring about justice and to prevent exploitation in the research 
exchange, confirming after a brief hiatus that human genetic resources are no longer part of the 
common heritage of humankind. As far as international governance is concerned, research 
exchanges of both non-human and human genetic resources were by these processes decisively 
removed from the common heritage of humankind. 
One could argue that ethical guidelines such as those issued by HUGO or the UNESCO cannot 
replace a valid argument in favour of benefit sharing. Hence, before proceeding on the 
assumption that benefit sharing is required in the exchange of human genetic resources with 
developing countries because HUGO says so, a further argument will be provided. The argument 
also has a legal base. It will be assumed that the legally binding CBD, adopted by 193 State 
Parties, has a significant moral force, similar to other legally binding human rights legislation. 
By showing the equivalence between non-human and human genetic resources in relevant 
respects, the force of the CBD will therefore be used to justify benefit sharing for human genetic 
resources. Bioprospecting is therefore under the spotlight. The two essential components of 
                                                          
43Article 15(1) Benefits resulting from scientific research and its applications should be shared with society as a 
whole and within the international community, in particular with developing countries. In giving effect to this 
principle, benefits may take any of the following forms, a) special and sustainable assistance to, and 
acknowledgement of the persons and groups that have taken part in the research, b) access to quality health care, c) 
provision of new diagnostic and therapeutic modalities or products stemming from research, d) support for health 
services, e) access to scientific and technological knowledge, f) capacity building facilities for research purposes, g) 
other forms of benefit consistent with the principles set out in this declaration. 
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bioprospecting namely the genetic resources that are accessed for research, and the utilisation or 
commercialisation thereof, will be briefly compared in regard to non-human and human genetic 
resources.  
3.4.1 The genetic resources, human and non-human 
In order to compare the two forms of genetic resources, their essential nature and properties, 
their value for research, and modes of access need to be examined. 
The nature and properties of biological resources for purposes of genomic research would 
appear at first glance to be similar, whether performed on the tissue of plants, animals, humans, 
or on any of the pathogens, viruses and other microscopic organisms that are associated with the 
functional units of heredity of life. The fact that human DNA carries special significance 
associated with its personal origins, giving rise to a range of moral and spiritual issues does not 
affect the intrinsic structure at the microscopic level (Pullman & Latus, 2003 p.20). What is 
further evident from the patenting process in respect of genome sequences is the fact that at the 
microscopic level non-human and human genetic resources are virtually indistinguishable from 
one another, DNA being a universal genetic code across all species.  Studies have shown how 
few genes are uniquely human, and as convincingly argued by Andanda et al., (2013) it is 
practically impossible to separate the origins of genetic resources in the innovation process. 
Human and non-human DNA is virtually indistinguishable in physical form.  
The value of genetic resources for research provides a second area of comparison. An editorial 
for the publication Nature, headed genetic benefit sharing, discussed the implications of human 
genomic research, suggesting that the potential for injustice between developed and developing 
countries was equally likely, and added that, “huge profits are expected to accrue from genetic 
research” (Berg et al., 2000 p.49). Commercial gain was thus accepted as the inevitable reality in 
human genetic research, in the same way as it had been shown in non-human genetic resources. 
In his book entitled Biocapital: The Constitution of Postgenomic Life,44 Rajan confirms this 
conclusion by describing how biotechnology has become a form of enterprise inextricable from 
contemporary capitalism (Rajan, 2006 p.3). Both forms of genomic resources aim to contribute 
                                                          
44Biocapital according to Rajan involves the circulation and exchange of money and commodities, but in addition a 
new form of currency namely biological material and information emerges. The information is decoupled from its 
material biological source, such as the tissue or cell line, and holds a separate value.  
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towards drug development as a primary driver of scientific research, which process “inextricably 
integrates use of human and non-human resources into the same discovery programmes, even 
into the same molecules” (Andanda et al., 2013 p.15).  
Genetic material stored in bio-banks becomes a repository of informational wealth, described by 
the Norwegian Research Council as being metaphorically comparable with “gold mines” and 
even equated with other natural resources such as oil, waterfalls and gas (Karlsen et al., 2011 
p.572). Value is not only commercial in nature, and authors such as Russell Barsh (2003) have 
described the heightened academic standing and advancement of academic institutions associated 
with research data in their possession as one of the broader forms of value that flow from 
successful genetic diversity research with indigenous populations (ibid p.375). As a final 
component of value, Andanda describes a range of examples of what the authors term the 
Inextricable Utilisation of Plants, Human Genetic Resources and Microbes in Drug 
Development (Andanda et al. 2013 p.15). For example, a drug target for malaria was discovered 
in one study using human samples, whilst another study arrived at similar conclusions using 
samples from Shitake mushrooms native to East Asia (ibid p.17). Genetic data of both human 
and non-human origin are lucrative even before medical products have been developed 
(Mackintosch, 2005 p.217) but it is the existence of patents, discussed below, that boosts 
commercial value.   
Access to genetic resources is a final realm of comparison, human and non-human resources 
being similarly and easily obtained.  No more than one tiny sample is required, and once the 
genetic information is encoded, access is complete and the original sample is no longer required. 
Drawing together this analysis of genetic resources in research, described as the first essential 
component of bioprospecting, it is clear that human and non-human genetic resources are 
virtually indistinguishable in nature, in their essential value for research, and also in regard to 
their general means of access from indigenous or vulnerable communities in the developing 
world.  
3.4.2 The utilisation of genetic resources 
The second component of bioprospecting encompasses utilisation. A large proportion of research 
and development for genetic research is funded by the private sector, which seeks commercial 
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rewards in addition to useful discoveries that serve public health. In order to understand 
utilisation, we will need to examine briefly the intellectual property rights regime and 
biotechnology patents, the latter described by John Meyer as representing, “the most dramatic 
step to date in the commoditisation of life itself” (Meyer, 2000 p.156). In this process, we 
examine whether in this second component of bioprospecting, there is any logic behind the 
differentiation of non-human and human genetic resources. This brief analysis will commence 
with an introduction to the intellectual property system, which operates for the protection of 
innovation generally, including the role of patents and persistent attempts to ensure open access 
to the results of scientific research.   
a) The intellectual property system  
The underlying purpose of all bioprospecting is the scientific quest for and the acquiring of 
knowledge, which in some cases results in what are termed “intellectual property rights” to the 
important genetic resource fruits thereby harvested. It is these intellectual property rights (IPRs) 
to knowledge, defined simply as creations of the mind (Wunsch Vincent, 2012), that enable 
ownership and commercial exploitation of research discoveries, and which require further 
scrutiny in the context of genomic research.  
IPRs can be owned and protected like any other form of property, and are designed to protect 
human creativity and inventiveness by means of a range of specific mechanisms which include 
patents for all forms of inventions, copyright for the form of a creation, as well as trademarks, 
industrial designs and others. IPRs are in the words of the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation45 (WIPO) at the heart of business strategies, and IPR policy “has moved to the 
forefront of innovation policy” (ibid p.1). Demand for patents has grown from a global estimate 
of 800,000 applications in the early 1980s, to an estimated 2 million in 2010, whilst global 
trademark and industrial design applications over the same period have risen from 1 million and 
290,000 per year to 3.7 million and 650,000 respectively (ibid p.12). 
                                                          
45 The World Intellectual Property Association, based in Geneva, was formed in 1974 as a specialized agency of the 
United Nations, with the primary task of coordinating intellectual property issues worldwide. 
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Patents, as the primary instruments for the protection of human inventions, grant monopoly 
rights for a fixed number of years to the inventor46 in the country of registration. Applicants must 
satisfy a national patent-issuing authority that the invention, process, device, idea, compound or 
subject meets three criteria. These are novelty, non-obviousness, that is, it must contain an 
inventive step and not be an obvious variation of a known technology and usefulness in that it is 
capable of being applied (ibid p.2).  
The peculiar aspect of the right is that it relates to information, which can be incorporated in 
tangible objects, and therefore results in control over products and markets (South Centre, 2000 
p.1). The IPR regime had its origin in the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property of 1883 and it developed predominantly in the Western economies of the USA, Europe 
and Japan. It was universalised by means of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), whose Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement of 1994 had as its purpose to 
provide a uniform international framework for the promulgation of IPRs within individual 
member states (Maister et al., 2012 p.17).    
Many authors have challenged the fairness of TRIPS (Correa, 1998) with some opposing the 
impact in particular on indigenous peoples (Tauli-Corpuz, 2003; Harry & Kanehe, 2005) and 
also opposing the patenting of life (Shiva, 2001 p.41). Others object primarily to the dominance 
of the economies of the industrialized North (Correa, 2001) and others still object to the impact 
on prices of patented essential drugs in developed countries (Maister et al., 2012 p.28). Schroeder 
and Singer (2010), examine the role of the IPR system in hampering access to and availability of 
life saving drugs in the developing world, concluding that the death of 10 million people each 
year due to high monopoly prices and lack of access to life-saving drugs is one of the “stains on 
humanity’s conscience” (ibid p.9).   
For patents based on genetic discoveries, it makes no difference whether the research process 
involved human or non-human DNA. And the exploitation claims of developing countries as 
well as the criticism of the patent system are also equivalent in respect to both forms of DNA.  
 
                                                          
46 This is usually 20 years. 
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b) Open access 
One could ask whether the patenting system is not losing ground, given the increasing emphasis 
on open access. Open access has long been an aspiration in opposition to the commodification 
process described above. The resolve to protect the public domain from the privatisation and 
commercialisation associated with patents has remained a powerful theme in publicly funded 
scientific research, such as the Human Genome Project, the SNP consortium47 and the 
International HapMap project (Rajan, 2006 p.15).  The Bermuda Rules48 (Cooke-Deegan, 2010 
p.19) were intended to ensure rapid release of sequencing data into the public domain, and to 
thereby prevent sequence-based patents. Patent pools, clearinghouses, exchanges, open source 
models and liability regimes are all part of the drive to harness or mitigate the unbridled 
workings of the profit motive (Wunsch Vincent, 2012). Efforts to reverse privatisation are thus 
numerous, under the influence of motives described as defending the public domain (Lange, 
1981), or creating a new commons (Benkler, 2004).  
A WIPO report on the changing face of innovation, however, concludes that despite evidence of 
a greater openness and collaboration in the innovation process, IPR ownership nevertheless 
remains at the forefront of business strategies (Wunsch Vincent, 2012). This confirms a 
proprietary business model, 49 which is founded on the normative belief that science and 
innovation are best served by IPRs and financial profit (Ziman, 2002). Many authors agree with 
Ziman that commercialisation is here to stay (Reddy, 2005 p.449; Raj & Eisenberg, 2001 p.310), 
and that despite the open access movement, privatisation of knowledge remains a core 
component of scientific research. 
To conclude this comparison of the profile of bioprospecting, it is apparent not only that genetic 
resources of human and non-human origin are entirely alike in nature, form and inherent value, 
                                                          
47The SNP consortium, a public-private partnership consisting of universities and private companies, devised an 
elaborate IPR process to avoid a scramble for patent rights relating to single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPS), and 
to ensure that the discovery and characterization of SNPs remained in the public domain.  
48The Wellcome Trust spearheaded a 1996 meeting in Bermuda between the high-throughput sequencing centers, 
who agreed inter alia to make sequence data available within a day, once a contiguous stretch of 1,000 nucleotides 
had been assembled.  
49 According to Ziman the proprietary model is guided by the principles Proprietary, Local, Authoritarian, 
Commissioned, and Expert science. 
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but also that their utilisation in research follows an entirely similar trajectory. In the latter regard, 
the intellectual property system is an essential component in the privatisation of research 
discoveries, in a commercial reality that persists despite all efforts to bring about open access. 
This examination of the profile of bioprospecting has shown the close similarity between human 
and non-human DNA both in their nature and their utilisation, enabling the conclusion that 
benefit sharing is appropriate in order to prevent exploitation in the research transaction. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter had as its overall purpose an examination of the argument that human genetic 
resources should continue to be governed as part of the common heritage of humankind, and that 
human DNA should consequently be free from considerations of benefit sharing.   
Perceptions of exploitation and unfairness in the exchange of non-human genetic resources had 
led the nations of the world to remove these resources decisively from the previously unregulated 
common heritage regime, and to institute fair and equitable benefit-sharing as a mechanism to 
correct the imbalance, notably in respect of both human and non-human genetic resources. 
Benefit-sharing, being one of the novel and important stipulations contained in this binding 
international convention, was thus introduced by the CBD as part of international law in 1992.  
Benefit sharing for human DNA was after a hiatus of some years first proposed as a mechanism 
by HUGO in 2000, followed by UNESCO and other international institutions, albeit in the form 
of research ethics guidelines and not in a legally binding international convention. These 
guidelines unequivocally reflected the inherent value of human genetic resources, and proposed 
consideration of various forms of benefit-sharing in exchange for their access, consistent with 
their decisive removal as a common heritage resource. 
In order to deal more thoroughly with the original objection to benefit sharing described at the 
commencement of this chapter, it was required to go one step further: namely to analyse whether 
the profile of bioprospecting that had motivated the institutional responses set out above, was 
comparable to that pertaining to the human form. If so, the legally binding provisions of the CBD 
should apply to human DNA. 
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Regarding the resource, it was found that the nature of both forms of genetic resources is 
inextricably comparable and virtually indistinguishable at the microscopic level. In addition, the 
value and importance of these resources for scientific advancement were shown to be similarly 
significant and to a large degree interchangeable, whilst as a final point of congruence both 
forms of genetic resources are similarly accessed, in many cases from indigenous or rural 
communities situated in the developing world. Similarly utilisation of both forms of genetic 
resources within the parameters set by the intellectual property system showed that privatisation 
of knowledge for commercial gain remains the central component of scientific research for both 
types of genetic resources, despite the impressive advances of the open access movement to 
create a scientific commons. Calls for human DNA to continue to be regarded as a common 
heritage resource, therefore, disregard the realities of the profit motive and IPRs in the world of 
genomic research, and have in the view of this thesis been correctly ignored by the prevailing 
research ethics guidelines. It is suggested on the basis of the arguments presented above that the 
common heritage of humankind notion no longer applies in any meaningful way to human 
genetic resources. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE ALTRUISM ARGUMENT 
 
The argument which can be referred to as the altruism argument objects to any benefit sharing 
with human research participants for the broadly stated reason that it is simply inappropriate if 
not morally wrong for humans to benefit from their DNA. This argument would deny that there 
is a need to address the potential of exploitation of research subjects, and would claim on the 
contrary that humans should be altruistic in providing samples of their tissue for the common 
good: they owe such a duty to the public as part of their solidarity with fellow human beings.      
Proponents of this argument have challenged the notion of a right to benefit sharing for research 
participants, suggesting something closer to a duty to participate in genetic research. In an article 
entitled, Solidarity and Equity: new ethical frameworks for genetic databases, the authors argue 
in favour of human participation in research for the benefit of others, stating as follows, 
[…] it is not obvious, however, why a right to refuse to participate in genetic research, 
when it could be to the benefit of others, should be overriding. On the contrary, it could 
be argued that one has a duty to facilitate research progress and to provide knowledge 
that could be crucial to the health of others. The principle of solidarity would strongly 
contradict a view that no research should be conducted if it would not directly benefit 
those participating in a study. (Chadwick et al., 2001 p.320) 
Karen Berg supports this notion in an article dealing with the ethics of benefit sharing.  After 
first stating that a nation, company or person should not make money on another’s resources 
without paying for them, he goes on to question the rights of individuals to shared benefits, 
holding that they should participate on the basis of an ethical principle of solidarity with their 
own group, which should be a “generous gift to science” (Berg, 2001 p.242). 
The above sentiments contain an attractively simple postulate in opposition to benefit sharing. 
The altruism argument states that human beings, out of a sense of altruism and solidarity with 
each other, should contribute to research for the common good, without any expectation of 
return.  In order to address this argument I shall examine the related concepts firstly of altruism, 
and then secondly of solidarity. Finally, the altruism/solidarity argument will be discussed in 
order to assess its applicability to genomic research.  
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4.1 Altruism  
Altruism, in its broadest sense meaning, but not limited to, promoting the interests of the other 
(Scott & Seglow, 2007 p.1), is an interesting concept. At its essence it is a simple, or elemental 
moral idea, regarding the interests of the other as one’s own, and according to Scott and Seglow 
is often identified with the golden rule framed by Hobbes as, “do not that to another, which thou 
thinketh unreasonable to be done by another to thy selfe” (ibid p. 2). Presumably one’s wish for 
others to be altruistic towards one would, in this sense, motivate one’s own altruism towards 
others. Under scrutiny, whether such actions would be deemed to qualify as altruism, as well as 
many other tricky questions of morals and ethics emerge.  For example, would it be morally 
questionable, in addition to being altruistic, to agree to donate one's blood only to those of your 
own race?  
Scott and Seglow explore many aspects of such deceptively simple questions, including the place 
of the competing drives of self-interest and egoism in humans (ibid p.14). The economist Adam 
Smith stated that egoism, or self-interest rather than altruism was what would lead to the general 
welfare, stating that it was not from,  “the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker 
that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest” (Smith, (1776) 1976 
edition pp. 26-7). Auguste Compte, on the other hand, who invented the term “altruism,” 
believed that altruism was centrally about promoting other people’s interests, morality being the 
triumph of altruism over egoism (Scott & Seglow, 2007 p.15).  
Kant also provides useful guidance on the morality or motive behind altruism. Kant 
distinguished between beneficence, which is understood as doing good, and benevolence, which 
is wishing good, beneficence being benevolence in action and acting in accordance with a, 
“maxim of making other’s happiness one’s end” (Kant, (1797) 1996 edition chapter 6). Whilst 
this appears to be noble in essence, according to Herman, Kant regarded it as a duty to be 
beneficent, for the reason that it would not be rational to not do so, and thereby risk not receiving 
similar assistance from others in the future. According to Herman, Kant regarded benevolence as 
an imperfect duty, namely a duty to act only by maxims that we would wish to be universalised.  
Benevolence according thus carries a lesser obligation than a perfect duty, and this scenario of 
individuals mutually acknowledging their human needs and duties can be termed a duty of 
mutual aid (Herman, 1993). 
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This brings the discussion to reciprocity, which according to the latter argument is what to some 
degree at least encourages the altruist, even though it might provide a less than noble motive for 
her good deeds. Reciprocal altruism is altruism that is performed with the hope of obtaining a 
future reward from the person one benefits, in keeping with the above interpretation of the 
Golden Rule, and is something of a hybrid between altruism and self-interest. You scratch my 
back and I will scratch yours, is a term for this somewhat conditional offering of assistance, 
which many would claim falls short of altruism.  Scott and Seaglow describe a range of other 
forms or definitions of altruism which include reciprocity as well as forms of other-regarding 
behaviour without the need for self-sacrifice, all of which forms are potentially compatible with 
the notion of benefit sharing proposed in this thesis. (Scott & Seglow, 2007 pp.21 to 38). 
Reciprocity was famously examined by Marcel Mauss in his anthropology classic The Gift 
(Mauss, 1950, 2002 edition) in which he examined gift-giving from ancient times in indigenous 
tribes, as well as in the more recent legal systems such as those of the Roman, Semitic, Germanic 
and other Indo-European societies. The seemingly ubiquitous practice of gift giving in all these 
societies existed separately from commercial transactions. Mauss defined a gift as, “a voluntary, 
unrequited, surrender of resources” (Mauss, 1950 p.3). The apparent generosity of the gifting 
practices seemed to indicate levels of solidarity, charity and trust far greater than identifiable 
today, but he famously concluded on the contrary that in all such societies there are no free gifts.   
The giving of gifts engages the giver and the receiver alike in finely woven if implicit obligations 
and commitments that reflect and resonate with the institutions of the day. Morality did not enter 
the transaction, and the society’s (unwritten) norms and expectations framed what was required 
in certain circumstances.  Mauss established that the entire notion of a free gift is based upon a 
misunderstanding of the nature of such a transaction, and concluded that a gift that expects no 
return, that does nothing to enhance solidarity, is a contradiction in terms (Mauss, 1950 p.xii).  
Mauss’s work encourages us to consider that material things, whether sold or given, always 
retain something of the identity of the giver, and always require reciprocation of some form.  
This notion surely applies to a tissue sample, which retains its original identity, in the sense that 
it can be traced back to the original donor, long after it has been reduced to scientific forms of 
digital and other non-physical information.  
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Finally, the work of Richard Titmuss added significantly to the understanding of altruism. In his 
book, The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy, he attempted to counter 
policies that promoted the commoditization of blood, in which donors would be remunerated 
with a fee. Invoking anthropologists such as Durkheim, Mauss and Levi-Strauss, the central 
question that he sought the answer for in the process of developing his theory was, why do 
people give to strangers?  His primary aim was to motivate for voluntary blood donation, in 
which ordinary people had the moral choice to give blood as a “symbolic gift of life to an 
unnamed stranger” (Titmuss, 1973, 1997 edition p140). What was particularly altruistic was that 
the gift of blood was not to known individuals in a close relationship, as in Mauss’s societies, 
and that the donor’s reward, apart from a cup of tea and a biscuit, was purely in knowing that she 
had contributed towards the public good. 
Reciprocity, however, seems to be present in all communities, in some or other form.  The 
unnamed strangers that would one day benefit were likely to be citizens, perhaps even relations, 
and the donor’s contribution was towards the public health of her own country.  According to 
Scott and Seglow, who support the latter notion of reciprocity, rather than regarding the donation 
of blood as a true gift that expects no return, such donation should be understood as an act of 
creative altruism, namely an essentially reciprocal exchange relationship that fosters a sense of 
community (Scott & Seglow, 2007 p.111). In other words, the fact that Titmuss identified the 
benefit of choosing to give to unnamed strangers as being a valuable right in itself, shows that 
this right had the capacity to provide the donor with some of the satisfaction, which in turn is a 
form of reciprocation, that motivates otherwise selfless acts of altruism.  
Seeking empirical support for the motivation behind blood donations, a recent study on 12 bio-
banks in six developed countries indicated that donors were primarily motivated by altruism, 
trust and a sense of duty (Johnsson et al., 2010). As is discussed below, the form of altruism 
espoused by Titmuss, whereby people are encouraged to donate blood for little overt reward 
other than the knowledge that one is choosing to give for the benefit of humankind, is thus still 
relevant and applicable to research participants in the affluent or developed world. To what 
extent it can be evoked for developing world or less affluent research participants however 
remains an open question, which will be addressed later. 
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4.2 Solidarity  
The association of the term solidarity with altruism is at once understandable, yet potentially 
misleading.  In the words of Max Pensky (2009), solidarity is a strong candidate for the most 
challenging of all concepts in modern political thought, functioning across a startling array of 
discourses. It is invoked as an essential component of community, as the political value without 
which freedom becomes hollow, and is strongly associated with the 18th Century republican 
term of fraternity, intended as a sibling to the ideals of liberty and equality (ibid p.1). In the 
fields of moral philosophy and normative ethics, solidarity can refer to the concept of 
membership in a moral or other community, or the collective bonds that hold autonomous moral 
agents together.  The origin of the term is traced to Roman law, in which the term obligatio in 
solidum defined the assumption of joint liability for a financial debt, an obligation often taken to 
denote a person’s moral virtue in being prepared to act in support of the extended family (ibid p. 
6).   
Seeking a more practical application of the term, Paul de Beer describes solidarity as the 
willingness to help others or to support the group one belongs to, without immediately getting 
something in return, and then defines it more generally as, “the positive bond between the fates 
of different people” (De Beer & Foster, 2008 p.15). There are many interpretations and meanings 
of solidarity, he warns, for example the term social solidarity is distinguishable from related 
concepts such as social cohesion and social capital, but it is solidaristic acts that in his view are 
more important than mere solidaristic attitudes (ibid p.18). He goes on to state that, 
The defining characteristic of a solidaristic act is that there is no equivalence between 
what one contributes to others or to the group as a whole and what one gets in return. 
Those who are best off will generally contribute the most, those who are worst off will 
benefit from the others. Acts of solidarity thus reduce the gap between the fortunate and 
the unfortunate (ibid p.18).  
Solidarity could, for example, have been simultaneously used both as an argument why the 
Tristan da Cunha islanders should, or why they should not have received any benefits for their 
valuable donations of DNA samples. Solidarity with the islanders by the rest of the world would 
have motivated for a system that ensured their inclusion in the benefits, whereas the islanders’ 
solidarity with humankind would have suggested that they should have expected no recompense 
in respect of the benefits bestowed upon the world. Using the term solidarity broadly without 
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defining which particular act or form is meant can thus be misleading and result in entirely 
different conclusions.  
Solidarity has somewhat predictably been used as an argument both for and against benefit 
sharing. As stated in an editorial for Science entitled, Genetic Benefit Sharing, solidarity was 
originally used as an argument for, rather than against benefit sharing. According to Knoppers, 
“there are … fundamental arguments in favour of benefit sharing. In the interests of human 
solidarity, we owe each other a share in common goods, such as health” (Knoppers, 2000 p. 49). 
The reason provided in this editorial calls for recognition of the vulnerability of the less powerful 
part of humanity, implying an altogether different component of solidarity, and requiring benefit 
sharing as a form of corrective action in order to bring about justice,  
When there is a vast difference in power between the organisation carrying out research 
and the people providing material for that research, and when the organisation stands to 
make a substantial profit (albeit taking the risk of investment) concerns about exploitation 
arise that benefit sharing can address. Considerations of justice require action to meet 
basic health care needs. (ibid p.50)  
This begs the question whether solidarity, in the form that implies the need for altruism by 
humankind in the arena of research, provides any sound reason why research donors from the 
developing world should not anticipate any form of reciprocation, or benefits? 
4.3 The altruism/solidarity argument examined  
Calling for solidarity under circumstances where it is in fact exploitative would be morally 
unacceptable, in the same way that one should not demand food in the name of solidarity from a 
starving person. The authors quoted at the outset of this chapter (Chadwick & Berg, 2001), who 
demanded solidarity in genetic research, would therefore need to show that the exploitation 
warned against in the Science editorial is not a concern, and that, to apply the test for Mayer’s 
second class of exploitation, the providers of such DNA would in all the circumstances be 
benefited sufficiently. No call for solidarity or altruism could succeed in the modern world in the 
face of knowledge that those being called upon to donate are being knowingly exploited.   
At the same time, one might well question why both forms of sharing should not co-exist, and 
why sharing of benefits with humankind out of altruism and solidarity with all should exclude 
consideration of benefits to participants. It is beyond dispute that the general call for altruism and 
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solidarity is a worthy plea, resonating with the idealistic motivations for creative altruism so 
persuasively expressed by Titmuss, and one that in a perfect world, or even in the wealthy 
countries, would be difficult to refute. It is proposed to examine and respond to this issue by 
answering the question, would such a call for altruism and solidarity suffice to satisfy the 
concerns of research participants in the developing world, or would such exchanges of human 
genetic material without compensation be exploitative? 
4.3.1 Is a call for altruism and solidarity in research appropriate in the developing world or is it 
exploitative? 
It seems clear that the call for altruism and solidarity resonates with the common heritage of 
humankind notion, as well as with associated calls for free exchange of and open access to 
research data in the interests of global health.  However, both of these visions are in tension with 
opposing arguments referred to above which point out the inherent differentials in health and 
wealth between the parties to the research exchange, and which propose benefit sharing in order 
to bring about justice. The perspective being developed in this thesis, which takes note of the 
potential for exploitation of developing world research participants in the context of a highly 
unequal world order, is that the settings and overall conditions for potential research participants 
in the developing and developed world are far from comparable. Attempts to alleviate this 
disparity in basic health and other indicators need to take into account the idea of a non-ideal 
moral theory as espoused by Wertheimer.  
Simm addresses this point by acknowledging the realization in the developing world that 
contributions made by these countries to research, namely by the provision of sought after 
genetic resources, are not matched by any identifiable form of altruism from the 
research/medical industry side; for that reason she describes what she terms an emerging 
consensus that some form of compensation is required to bring about a sense of justice (Simm, 
2005 p.8). This point resonates with the notion of wrongful gain, which Mayer described as 
exploitation at its most basic level: this occurs when acquisition or advantage is received by one 
party, whilst the other party is used instrumentally and in some manner wrongfully (Mayer, 2007 
p.139).   
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Gaining at another’s expense is at the heart of this type of exploitation, which requires the loss 
by the one party to be in some moral manner undeserved (ibid p.140). As described above, it was 
the widely acknowledged failure in reciprocity during exchanges of genetic resources that had 
motivated states to formulate the benefit-sharing mechanisms of the CBD, in order to bring about 
a more fair and equitable situation. The kind of justice referred to by Simm is termed justice in 
exchange, which requires reciprocity in an exchange between two parties, rather than what is 
termed distributive justice, which takes a broader view of and assesses the fairness of 
distributions of costs and benefits generally (Schroeder & Pogge, 2009). 
Schroeder and Gefenas examine what they term the existing fair exchange model that pertains 
between the health care industry and human research participants in the affluent or developed 
countries.  Most citizens in these countries benefit from a health care industry which produces 
new health products and services tailored to their health needs, increased knowledge about health 
which is conveyed to all, increased jobs in health and related sectors, and profits for research and 
pharmaceutical companies (Schroeder & Gefenas, 2010 p.4). People in these countries 
experience an inherent and tangible form of reciprocity for their participation in the complex 
social and economic network encompassed by the health care system, reminiscent of a Maussian 
society, ensuring the fairness of the entire exchange. An analysis of the Swedish general public 
for example, found that 86 per cent of those interviewed would freely donate blood samples for 
bio-bank research, motivated by altruism and their support for and trust in the public health 
system (Kettis et al., 2006).  
Donations of human tissue for research purposes in developed countries, often described as being 
altruistic in nature, take place within an entirely different paradigm to that pertaining to the 
developing world, where the tissue donor seldom receives any form of reciprocation such as 
nationally funded health care systems. It is therefore difficult to imagine how calls for altruism 
can be appropriate for donors of human tissue from developing world communities. This 
discussion has shown that no forms of exchange stand alone or free from the need for Maussian 
forms of reciprocity, which leads to the more specific question whether such exchanges 
motivated by calls on altruism are exploitative.   
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More succinctly put, would research donors from the developing world be sufficiently benefited, 
within the meaning of Mayer’s second class of exploitation, if they were persuaded to donate 
their tissue freely to developed world data bases out of a call for solidarity? Consider the case of 
the Tristan da Cunha islanders, referred to above, who entered into an agreement to provide their 
DNA for research into the genetic causes of asthma, in exchange for free access to any possible 
future cure.  The islanders’ donations of their DNA samples to the company were solidaristic in 
the most general sense, in that the research was ultimately dedicated towards a possible cure that 
might have benefited humankind as well as the islanders. The islanders thus acted in accordance 
with the proposition contained in Chadwick and Berg’s paper that they should donate their 
samples out of altruism and solidarity with others, and out of their “duty to facilitate research 
progress and to provide knowledge that could be crucial to the health of others” (Chadwick & 
Berg, 2001 p.320). However, despite such altruism on their part, the company sold the gene-
based discovery for $70 million without any compensation to the original donors (Cunningham, 
1998 p.18). The lack of reciprocation clearly indicated exploitation of Mayer’s second class.  
Somewhat less dramatic examples were provided by the indigenous and developing world 
communities referred to above who were research participants and donors in various research 
programs – the Chinese, Italian, San, Hagahai, and Havusapai amongst others. The question to 
be asked is not whether these communities were prepared to contribute their samples for the 
benefit of humankind. The more pertinent question appears to be whether the call for altruism or 
solidarity alone makes any sense in view of the overall distribution of research burdens and 
benefits, and the possibility of exploitation of developing world communities in the research 
exchange. Whether they were reciprocated commensurately in the exchange, and whether the 
gains made by the research organisation were inappropriate if not wrongful, need to be answered.     
4.4 Summary and conclusion 
In conclusion, this chapter has examined whether a call for altruism, motivated by the notion of 
solidarity with humankind, provides a cogent reason why benefit sharing should not be 
considered in the context of the taking of DNA samples from research participants in developing 
countries.  A brief explanation of the concepts of altruism and solidarity provide a glimpse into 
some of the complexities that surround these terms, and into their relationships with the notion of 
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reciprocity. Chadwick and Berg’s argument, to the effect that notions of solidarity and equity 
provide an ethical duty for participants to donate genetic samples rather than a right to expect 
benefits as a mechanism to ensure fairness and reciprocity, was tested by examining the practice 
of donations of human DNA for bio-banks and other research purposes in the affluent world, 
where altruism appears to be the prevailing ethos. 
The most powerful argument against the call for altruism was found to reside in the undeniable 
fact that adequate recompense in the form of an operational health care system does not exist in 
the developing world.  The fair exchange model described by Schroeder and Gefenas is simply 
inapplicable in the developing world, where tissue donors cannot rely upon the benefits provided 
by a functioning health care system. Without any form of compensating advantage in the form of 
health care benefits, requests that humans donate DNA freely in the developing world run the 
risk of ignoring the potential exploitation inherent in that exchange.  Cases such as the Tristan da 
Cunha islanders support the argument that where the research enterprise stands to benefit 
materially from donated human DNA samples, calls for altruism and solidarity on the part of 
tissue donors, unreciprocated in any way, simply lack the element or perspective of fairness.  The 
defining characteristic of Mayer’s second class of exploitation, namely insufficient benefit, 
would be present in such a situation.  It is therefore concluded that the call for altruism cannot 
succeed in the face of the need to consider some form of reciprocal benefits in order to 
ameliorate the exploitation inherent in accessing DNA samples from developing world 
communities. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE ‘NO VALUE ADDED’ ARGUMENT 
 
The no value added argument presented by Berg against the right for individuals to receive 
benefits holds that it is not easy to find specific arguments for such a right for the reason that the 
individuals themselves, “have not performed any act of competence to create DNA” (Berg, 2001 
p.242). Whilst admitting that provision of samples for genomic research can lead to significant 
revenue, Berg’s argument is that individual donors have not done anything to add value to their 
samples. He explains further, 
[…] thus they cannot have a right similar to that based on intellectual property or patent 
acts. Their body has simply synthesized a compound based upon hereditary instructions 
passed on from the parents. If a person’s DNA becomes valuable, it would be because of 
something that researchers have done with it or because of some pre-existing knowledge 
attained by the world of other scientists at an earlier stage (ibid p.242). 
According to Berg, individual donors, having done nothing, no act of competence or essential 
task, do not deserve any benefits.  There is therefore, no moral or other reason why they should 
be afforded any benefit in exchange for their DNA samples.  
As suggested by Chokshi, there are at least five different groups who could make a claim for 
benefits, for example in the case of the discovery of an anti-malarial molecule. These would 
include the subjects themselves, the health professionals who diagnosed and treated them, the 
epidemiologists who managed the study, the geneticists who produced the result, and the 
company that makes the end product (Chokshi et al., 2005 p.11). The question arises then if the 
subjects should receive benefits, in the light of all of the other contributions which do require 
competence and performance of essential tasks? 
Berg’s proposition of the no value added problem will be countered with two arguments 
intended to show that communities have the right to benefit from their DNA50 in circumstances 
where such DNA has value, which is not caused or provided primarily as the result of any effort 
on their part.  Firstly, by explaining how supply and demand operate in economics generally, 
assuming the legality of the exchange and secondly, by reference to the broad analogy of 
                                                          
50There may be other reasons why individuals should not benefit from their DNA, for example, the general 
prohibition against commodification of the human body. Here I will only deal with the no value added argument.  
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communities who acquire wealth in circumstances where the prospecting or discovery process is 
carried out by external parties.    
5.1 An economic argument 
In economics, the value of any commodity is primarily influenced by, and is set by the 
relationship between the supply and the demand (Besanko & Braeutigam, 2005). The laws of 
supply and demand are often graphically represented, expressing the dynamic relationship 
between the two, and showing if demand for a product increases, the price rises, and vice versa. 
To elaborate this point, the four basic laws of supply and demand according to Besanko & 
Braeutigam are, 1) If demand increases and supply remains unchanged, a shortage occurs, 
leading to a higher equilibrium price. 2) If demand decreases and supply remains unchanged, a 
surplus occurs, leading to a lower equilibrium price.3) If demand remains unchanged and supply 
increases, a surplus occurs, leading to a lower equilibrium price, and 4) If demand remains 
unchanged and supply decreases, a shortage occurs, leading to a higher equilibrium price. 
 Demand for products is however not necessarily created by the holder of a commodity, and can 
change dramatically due to extraneous events such as changes in fashion or advances in 
technology. The holder is not required to do anything in particular in order to be fully entitled to 
the market price. For example, Ostriches native to Africa were for many years harvested 
primarily for their meat, until the world of European fashion decreed the feathers a desirable 
commodity, setting off an insatiable demand for the product. The Kiwi bird from New Zealand 
was similarly only kept for its meat, until it was discovered that Kiwi oil extracted from the 
stomach of the bird is a highly prized beauty product.  
Prior to the era of genomic research, there was little demand for human biological materials other 
than for blood transfusions, forensic analysis and related practical matters. However following 
relatively recent radical advances in biomedical sciences it has now become a key ingredient in 
genomic research, where scientific advances coupled with their potential to lead to commercial 
value have been a rapid and relatively recent occurrence. 
Through no specific effort on the part of their carriers, human genetic resources have, as a 
consequence of the priorities of biomedical research together with the workings of the patent 
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system described above, acquired potential commercial value and have thus in the manner 
described in chapter three, become commodified (Hayden, 2007). Demand for DNA has 
increased from the fields of pharmacogenomics to population genetics. Consequently and in 
accordance with the laws of economics the value of human genetic bio-banks, driven ultimately 
by the requirements of the commercial sector market, has risen accordingly (Womack & Gray, 
2000 p.251)  
In summary, it would appear to be uncontroversial to state that individuals and groups have 
possession and control over their own genetic resources, subject to the laws of the land, which 
resources without any effort on their part have acquired undeniable commercial potential within 
the field of biomedical research. The demand for human DNA has increased and will probably 
continue to do so. Potential research participants clearly have the right to either refuse to 
participate in research, or alternatively to take note of the demand or need for their DNA, and to 
consider the possibility of receiving commensurate collective benefits in exchange for their 
participation. They might well have not contributed to the value now acknowledged in this 
resource, but they have the right to control access to its use, and the right to choose whether to 
participate or not.  It follows that any economic advantage which might arise from their decision 
whether to participate or not belongs to them alone, without any consideration of whether or not 
they have in any way added value to their genetic resources.  
5.2 The prospecting argument  
The second argument against the notion that individuals and communities have no right to 
receive benefits because they have added no value to their DNA is related to and builds to an 
extent on the preceding argument, but focuses upon the component of prospecting that is 
inherent in all genetic research. The Oxford dictionary definition of the verb to prospect means, 
“To search for, or to seek mineral deposits, especially by drilling and excavation”.51 A simple 
analogue is proposed for this argument, with acknowledgement that some aspects of the 
transaction are intrinsically different. Consider the example of a rural community that owns a 
tract of land which is suspected to have valuable mineral resources, where the value of the 
                                                          
51[Online] Available at http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/prospect  
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resource is hitherto unknown, and is not able to be established without an externally instigated 
exploration, or prospecting process.  
Indigenous (Aboriginal) communities of rural Australia, for example, own vast tracts of 
potentially mineral-rich land, and are customarily approached by prospecting and mining 
companies requesting the rights of access (Altman, 2009). The indigenous communities are 
required to have survived on and protected their land from generation to generation, which is a 
prerequisite for land ownership and entails intrinsic cultural and other values. This could 
however barely be described as falling within the meaning of any acts of competence or as 
adding particular commercial value to the land.  
A sceptic might argue that the indigenous communities own their land, which is not the case with 
individuals and their genetic constitutions. It is proposed not to engage with the notion of 
ownership as opposed to possession or custodianship of a resource; it is sufficient for this 
argument that both the indigenous community as well as the individual and collective research 
participants have legal control over the resource in question, which provides the commensurate 
right to approve or deny access. This ability to choose whether to enable or to refuse access to an 
outside party is regarded as a sufficient basis for the analogy.   
Such an indigenous community would typically lack the capacity to exploit the value of its land 
resource commercially, or to even ascertain the potential value of the minerals below the surface 
of the land.  It requires outside intervention from the world of industry and commerce, 
recognising that the tribe’s land might well contain valuable mineral deposits, to investigate and 
establish the presence of commercial value. In order to ascertain whether deposits of commercial 
value exist, a mining company is required to obtain permission from the tribe and thereafter to 
carry out a prospecting process.  
The prospecting process entails the exploring, researching and evaluating of the land for the 
presence of potential mineral wealth. A prospecting right to explore and evaluate is of 
considerable value in itself for the reason that it is indispensable for achieving the overall 
objectives of the company, and it is usually linked to the consequent right to exploit any possible 
leads or discoveries that may emerge. Competing companies customarily bid against one another 
or place competing tenders for the valuable prospecting rights, after which the landowning 
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community approves the bid of a suitable company, and a prospecting lease or agreement is 
negotiated. A prospecting agreement then typically awards the right to explore to a particular 
company, and provides for various negotiated communal benefits such as the development of 
roads and other facilities, in addition to cash payments. If valuable minerals are found in the 
prospecting process, a discovery analogous to the detection of a useful active ingredient in 
biomedical research, the mining company exercises its right to commence with proper mining, in 
which event a further substantive agreement is entered into with the community dealing with 
long term mutual rights, duties and benefits associated with the commercialisation process.   
In this type of case, the indigenous community, by granting access to the mining company for the 
purpose of prospecting, and agreeing to the prospecting process of the mining company, might 
find that their land resource has acquired considerable value in the commercial world.  Whilst the 
providing of access may well entail certain inconveniences, such as light drilling of test holes, 
the indigenous tribe will have performed no particular act of competence in relation to the 
emerging value other than legally and physically maintaining the land.  After a process of 
information sharing in relation to the risks and benefits associated with the intended prospecting 
and mining, analogous to the process leading up to the acquiring of informed consent in the 
biomedical research arena, the consent of the tribe enables the skilled mining engineers and 
chemists to apply their various crafts and establish the presence or otherwise of value.  
Compare the prospecting and mining example with the case of an indigenous or rural community 
whose genetic make-up has become of interest to research, and which is approached with a 
request that its members should participate and donate samples for some form of genomic, or 
population wide genetic project. The community might similarly have little scientific or 
commercial capacity, and would have done nothing in particular to enhance the value of the now 
sought-after and potentially valuable resource under its collective custodianship and control.  In 
the same way as the land-owning Aboriginal group described above, the indigenous community 
would have scant knowledge about the value of their DNA, other than the fact that it is now 
being sought after by researchers from the developed world.   
It is therefore suggested that such an indigenous community would similarly have the clear right 
to either refuse to allow access, and if the latter, to negotiate and enter into a simple form of 
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prospecting agreement with the institution of its choice, whereby its members provide the raw 
material of their DNA to the research group for research and evaluation.  Therefore in seeking to 
reach such an agreement, which would record the community’s informed consent in relation to 
the granting of access, it would similarly have the right to be fully informed about the intended 
use of the research, the likelihood of commercial utilisation, and the possibility of reaping 
present or future collective benefits for the community.   
To bring the discussion of prospecting for minerals to a close, it is suggested that the process is 
analogous to and comparable with bio-medical research. The value inherent in DNA is not 
immediately obvious, or even ascertainable at the time of exchange prior to and without a 
procedure of scientific exploration as required for mineral prospecting and described above.  
Despite having done nothing in particular to discover or extract the value, certainly no form of 
essential or overt contribution of the form envisaged by Berg, the communities described above 
in both cases –minerals and DNA – have every right and expectation to either refuse to 
participate, or alternatively to agree to participate upon fair terms which provide for appropriate 
mutual benefits in the exchange in the event of commensurate success. The latter process seeking 
agreement correlates with the informed consent process that precedes research.  In such cases, 
the act of competence is the prospecting, which is in all cases carried out by skilled third party 
specialists.  It is therefore sufficient for this argument, that the community holds a resource of 
indeterminate value, and has the crucial right to provide or not to provide access in a process of 
exchange, which takes into account the future potential value of the commodity.  
In conclusion, this discussion on the no value added objection has explored whether individuals 
or communities are required to do some essential tasks, or otherwise add value in any particular 
manner, that is to perform an act of competence, in order for them to have a legitimate claim to 
the value of their genetic resources. The two arguments drawn upon above would suggest not. 
The basic laws of economics dictate that a community’s simple right to approve and provide 
access to its members’ DNA, without any moral or other requirements, provides it with a 
complete entitlement to receipt of the full value. The mining analogy argued that a community, 
which is in possession of a resource of an entirely unknown commercial value, possesses an 
unassailable right to either allow or to refuse access, in the form of prospecting, in order to 
ascertain the inherent value of the resource.  
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It is lawful possession, together with the associated right to say ‘no’ to other parties, which form 
the essential link and basis of the comparison.  These two arguments support the conclusion that 
a community’s failure to have done anything or to have performed a significant act should not 
detract in any way from its right to ascertain, and to perhaps benefit collectively from, any value 
that may be associated with or flow from the DNA samples provided by its members for the 
benefit of biomedical research. 
Having addressed arguments against benefit sharing now, it is convenient at this stage to 
summarise briefly the trajectory of the thesis thus far, and to point towards the way ahead. The 
thesis commenced with a description of the problems within genomic research that motivated the 
overall topic of the thesis, and which led to proposals for benefit sharing in the research 
exchange of human DNA following the example set by the CBD. One of the purposes of 
research ethics guidelines being to avoid all forms of exploitation in biomedicine, the meaning 
and nature of the word exploitation was then explored in order to provide guidance for the 
further discussions. Thereafter, the thesis commenced with an investigation of the first research 
question, which was whether and in what circumstances benefit sharing is appropriate for human 
genetic research. This required a detailed analysis of the three most significant objections to 
benefit sharing, namely the common heritage of humankind, the altruism, and the no value added 
arguments. These three arguments against benefit sharing were in each case refuted, primarily by 
examining the unfairness in the exchange of human DNA where benefit sharing is not 
considered. Applying Mayer’s second class of exploitation, which is concerned with fair requital 
during a transaction, the mechanism of benefit sharing was found to be necessary in order to 
ensure justice.   
The second research question of the thesis encompasses the final, and possibly the most 
persistent obstacle in the way of benefit sharing, namely the objection that any benefit-sharing 
offered to research participants might fall foul of the prohibition against undue inducement or 
coercion. These latter two concepts are closely related, with their roots and meaning firmly 
sourced in the law relating to contracts. Noting that the overall purpose of this thesis is to 
examine equitable access to human biological resources, words which could be equated with the 
phrases just access or fair access during exchanges of human genetic resources for research, one 
could equally state the overall purpose as being to bring about justice in this bilateral exchange 
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between researcher and research participant community. Prior to examining the meaning of 
undue inducement and coercion, the following chapter will explore the origin and nature of these 
two legal doctrines that were developed to combat exploitation from within the broad realm of 
justice. 
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CHAPTER SIX: JUSTICE AND EXPLOITATION IN BILATERAL 
EXCHANGES  
 
The final impediment to benefit sharing now stands to be addressed, namely the bioethics 
concern that such benefits might coerce or unduly influence vulnerable research participants into 
providing their genetic resources for research, against their interests and without due 
consideration of the potentially harmful consequences. This objection states in effect that the 
benefit-sharing proposed in order to ensure justice in the research exchange is inappropriate, as it 
can under certain circumstances exploit vulnerable research participants by coercing or inducing 
them to accept inappropriate risks.  
The form of unfairness or exploitation being examined here relates to the manner or procedure in 
which consent to a transaction is brought about, rather than to the substantive or outcome-related 
aspects. The legal framework for such an enquiry is situated within the law of contracts, which 
governs all voluntary transaction, and which in turn belongs within the broader realm of justice. 
Justice will be briefly examined in order to understand and inform this analysis of procedural 
exploitation within exchange transactions.   
The broad concepts of justice and then of global justice will first be briefly discussed, in order to 
provide the context for the striving for fairness that informs international and national legal 
systems.  Justice and domestic law will be introduced by Thomas Pogge’s conceptual framework 
for justice, which will describe and situate the most relevant concepts for this thesis, including 
procedural and substantive justice. Thereafter, the Aristotelian origin and meaning of the two 
forms of justice relevant in bioethics, namely commutative justice – or justice in exchange –and 
distributive justice will be described, after which the discussion will turn to modern domestic 
law.  A particular emphasis will be placed on the ancient law of equity which evolved out of a 
perceived need for greater justice in the law, and which infuses modern legal defences against 
interpersonal exploitation.   
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Following this the discussion will turn to the law of contracts which governs all voluntary human 
exchanges such as consent forms and research agreements, with a final focus on the three forms 
of contractual exploitation, namely unconscionable dealing, duress (or coercion) and undue 
influence. These three legal doctrines all have their origin in the law of equity, and respond to 
concerns that mirror the endeavours of the ethical guidelines, namely to prevent exploitation of 
the vulnerable. The overall purpose of the chapter is to provide a clear understanding of the 
characteristics of contractual exploitation as understood by the law, in order to inform the 
discussion on undue influence and coercion that will follow in the next chapter.   
6.1 The concept of justice   
The famous question asked by Socrates in Plato’s Republic, namely what is justice? has been 
debated by philosophers for millennia. In ancient Greece two words were used that might be 
translated into English as justice, the first being dikaiosune, and the second being ison, the 
former meaning righteousness and the latter word translated more accurately as equality 
(Vlastos, 1962). On a personal level justice is to be aspired after as both Plato’s “summary 
virtue” for citizens, where “doing one’s own” is required by all members of a community, and 
where equality, desert and fair exchange are central themes in the discourse. Parallel legal 
philosophies emerged over millennia from the cosmologies of the East based upon concepts of 
equilibrium and harmony, focusing on natural justice and its political implications revealing the 
pervasiveness of humankind’s quest for justice (Chun, 2010 p.59). 
The durable metaphor of Lady Justice, a blindfolded woman holding a human scale in one hand 
and a sword in the other, illustrates the impartiality inherent in the concept. The scales represent 
the competing claims to be weighed; the blindfold indicates visible lack of bias, and the sword 
the coercive power of the judge or supreme power (Luban, 2001 p. 23). On a personal level, the 
golden rule ascribed to various sources including the Bible namely to “do to others as you would 
have them do unto you”, developing in similar forms from Confucius through all of the major 
religions and ethical traditions (Kidder, 2003 p.159), is a reminder of the everyday human 
touchstone that underlies the concept of justice and fairness. This rule or concept represents in 
the words of Ken Binmore a “fairness program within us that runs well below the level of 
consciousness” (Binmore, 2006 p.4).  
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Human rights as sources of justice have evolved during the past half century into a substantial set 
of laws and standards with pervasive jurisdiction in international law, providing an example of 
how the realisation of justice continues to develop and progress with time. Having laws in place 
is however no guarantee of justice, and whilst positivists believe the law is the law and should be 
strictly so applied (Weinreb, 1987 p.193), others of a liberal bent seek greater flexibility in the 
interests of justice. It is not the realm of this thesis to attempt to describe further all the extensive 
contributions towards justice, from utilitarians and consequentialists to those who base their 
analysis upon rights theories or some form of social contract (Halgarth, 1998). The latter, which 
included Locke, Rousseau and Rawls, also drew on natural rights, and drew inspiration from 
Aristotelianism, Roman law and Stoic views on the state of humankind in nature (Cooney, 
1998).  The social contract provided a theory of institution forming that is reflected by the way 
international law and constitutions, including the laws governing the domain of biomedical 
research, developed today. According to David Gauthier (1977), the idea of a social contract is 
now so engrained in modern consciousness as to constitute more than a modern ideology, 
providing a rationale for the way we behave towards each other. As he states, “the justification of 
rights and duties, institutions and practices, is to be found by regarding them as if they were 
contractual, and showing the rationality of this hypothetical contractual base” (ibid p. 115). 
6.2 Global Justice and international law 
Global justice aspires after justice in international affairs, including the distribution of rights, 
responsibilities and flourishings not only of states but also of peoples and citizens.  International 
law has evolved in a largely contractual manner in order to regulate these aspirations and 
dealings, now divided into numerous categories such as the law of treaties and contracts, 
international tort or criminal law, international resource law, human rights law, and many more 
(Franck, 1995 p.5). International law has been defined as, “a body of rules regulating the 
relations of states but also the relations of those other legal entities which are recognized as 
possessing international personality at any given time” (Wallace, 2005 p.2).   
Many of the principles of justice that embody international law have ancient origins, such as the 
jus cogens (the law according to thinking persons) which refers to norms from which no 
derogation is permissible, such as against genocide, racial discrimination, slavery, piracy and 
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which all states owe to the international community (Brownlie, 2003 p.515).  Prior to the Second 
World War international law comprised solely of relationships between nations, but since then 
other legal entities including multinational corporations, non-government organisations –such as 
the International Committee of the Red Cross and Amnesty International – indigenous peoples 
and even individuals have acquired certain forms of international personality under specific 
circumstances, and are thus to an extent included (Dugard, 1994 p.2). 
International law is founded essentially on consensus due to the lack of a higher authority, which 
is determined firstly by the practice of states known as customary international law and secondly, 
by agreements, treaties or conventions (Wallace, 2005 p.5). Consensus in this arena, as described 
in Section 39 of the International Court of Justice, is drawn from various conventions, customs, 
general practice and the like. This consensus is forged either out of necessity, or out of the need 
of states and their citizens to co-exist and respond to changing circumstances.52 For example, 
after 1945 the enormity of the atrocities committed by the Nazi regime led to a revocation of the 
prohibition on intervention in domestic affairs of states enshrined in section 15(8) of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations, and resulted in the United Nations Charter (UN, 1945). 
Article 1 of this Charter includes amongst the many purposes of the United Nations the 
“promotion and encouragement of human rights”, and article 56 contains a pledge by all nations 
to take “joint and several action” to achieve these purposes (Dugard, 1994 p.199).  
The previously unchallenged right of states to the privacy of their domestic affairs thus became a 
thing of the past. The human rights revolution continued with the Nuremberg trials, followed by 
the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 which laid a framework of principles 
consisting of broadly shared moral and ethical precepts. Many of the rights that are now regarded 
as part of customary international law were at that early stage optimistic or aspirational in their 
reach, and no enforcement mechanism existed to ensure compliance by states. Nevertheless the 
declaration inspired several increasingly stronger conventions,53 regional conventions and 
                                                          
52Section 38 of the statute of the International Court of Justice defines the international laws to which it shall apply 
as being a) international conventions whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the 
contesting states, b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law, c) the general principles 
of law recognized by civilized nations, and d) judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified 
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means of the determination of the rule of law. [Online] Available at 
http://www.icj.org 
53For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, both of 1966. 
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national Bills of Rights, which created a new human rights paradigm for international law 
(Dugard, 1994 p.204). 
The relevance of the above lies in the fact that all the conventions, declarations, laws and 
guidelines governing genetic resources and biomedical research are similarly evolving in a 
paradigm of continually intersecting influences of perceived law and morality (Boylan, 2011 
p.50). Most importantly, research, debates and proposals that attract sufficient support contribute 
towards and result in the development and evolution of such international law. As stated by one 
commentator, the broad principles of social justice that have been promulgated as ‘law’ in the 
arena of international trade of genetic resources generally, as laid down in the CBD and the 
Nagoya Protocol regarding access and benefit sharing, will increasingly intersect with, inspire 
and in turn be influenced by evolving norms governing biomedical research (Faunce, 2005).  
6.3 Justice and domestic law 
The broad overview of the concept of justice sketched above provides a framework for 
understanding voluntary human transactions of all varieties, including genomic research. In order 
to understand how justice is translated into practical or domestic law, this section will first 
describe Thomas Pogge’s (2006) theory of justice, which provides a framework for the 
discussions that will follow. Then procedural and substantive justice will be discussed, followed 
by Aristotle’s division of law into distributive and corrective justice. These will introduce the 
concept of the interpersonal forms of law that guide and limit the genomic research being 
discussed in this thesis, leading to an analysis of three forms of exploitation addressed in the law 
of contract.   
6.3.1 Thomas Pogge’s conceptual analysis of justice 
A single inclusive theory of justice remains elusive and perhaps not even necessary, supportive 
of Aristotle’s conclusion that to seek such a unified concept of justice is futile (Winthrop, 1978 
p.1201). However, a modern analysis of justice is useful to frame and locate this enquiry into the 
fairness of the exchange of human genetic resources. Thomas Pogge, in a treatise on Justice, 
provided such an analysis by first describing the four domains of application or judicanda54 
                                                          
54 From the Latin judicandum, that is that which is to be judged. 
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against which justice can be evaluated, namely a) individuals and collective actors, b) the 
conduct of such actors, c) the social rules, laws, institutions and conventions applicable, and d) 
the actual outcomes or states of affairs being observed (Pogge, 2006 pp.8-11). The first two 
judicanda namely the parties and their conduct have a certain primacy in that they influence both 
the social rules and eventual outcomes (ibid p.865). Above and overlaying these judicanda, each 
of which can be separately assessed and evaluated in a justice enquiry, such as a particular 
allegation by one party of exploitation in an exchange, Pogge then conceptually poses three 
dimensions or distinctions of justice. The first dimension is between first-order justice and 
procedural justice, the former describing the particular allocation of benefits and burdens, also 
termed substantive justice in jurisprudence, whilst procedural justice on the other hand is the 
formal procedure or manner in which the outcome was determined.  For example, an unequal 
division of spoils between two partners is first order or substantive injustice, whereas the fact 
that one party decided on the allocation without consulting the other would comprise the 
procedural unfairness. Procedure and substance are once again inextricably linked in justice.  
Pogge’s second dimension of justice, depicted as an enquiry overlaying and including the first 
dimension, is comprised of formal and material justice. Formal justice is the prevailing legal 
system, in which consistency of judgement is provided in the system of precedent; one that 
ensures similar treatment in former decided cases, that establishes clear principles and laws, 
which engenders confidence in its fairness, and that provides the metaphorical blindfold over 
Lady Justice. Material justice on the other hand, is again comprised of the substantive or material 
outcome of a case. Whether taxpayers are being fairly treated, whether certain classes of 
individuals are unfairly discriminated against, whether certain people or classes are short 
changed, exploited or aggrieved. 
The third dimension of justice envisages the investigation into the particular circumstances of 
material justice in each case into four distinct categories or domains, namely distributive, 
commutative, restitutive and retributive Justice. Distributive justice analyses the division of 
resources between people, groups or even nations, whilst commutative justice deals with the 
equivalence of value in exchanges between two or more parties.  Restitutive justice deals with 
restitution of violations of rules or laws, modern law of tort, whilst retributive justice deals with 
punishment for such violations (ibid pp.8-11). It should be noted that some scholars refer to the 
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latter three under the collective rubric of corrective justice, in that they all deal with injustice 
inflicted by one person on another, which stands to be corrected (Weinrib, 2002 p.349).   
Distributive justice on the other hand is not triggered by or dependent upon a wrong committed 
by one party on another. In each of these four categories or domains of justice, all of the 
foregoing dimensions are examined, and both procedural and substantive aspects apply. The 
procedure consists of the rules governing the processes and functioning of law, and the substance 
consists of the factual outcomes affected by law and guidelines affecting the allocations of 
benefits and burdens. Both the procedural and the substantive aspects of any one case may be 
found to be unjust for formal reasons or for material outcome-evident reasons, visible in the 
actual outcomes experienced by the parties (ibid p.10). In total, Pogge’s model identifies sixteen 
conceptual boxes for assessment of justice concerns, each of which can operate across all of the 
four judicanda described at the beginning of the analysis. The complexity of the composite 
conceptual framework is indicated by the fact that no less than 64 separate categories can be 
identified and assessed. 
Using this conceptual structure to examine and frame the Tristan da Cunha case for example, we 
start by placing the parties, their conduct, the prevailing laws and the final outcomes of the case 
within the judicanda that are to be analysed. The first dimension enquiry assesses to what degree 
first order justice pertains in the division of benefits between the parties, and whether the 
procedures, not just between the islanders and the researchers but also regarding all external 
institutions, were fair and just. The second dimension of enquiry takes into account the formal 
system of justice applicable to the transaction, whether the company and islanders complied with 
existing laws, and whether other role players – ethics committees, downstream research partners 
– complied with existing laws or standards. 
The material justice enquiry at this level explores the material aspects of the final outcome, the 
distribution of benefits, and would include perceptions of exploitation or injustice. The third 
dimension finally expands this enquiry into the four systems of justice described above, each of 
which has its own laws, rules and systems on both procedure and substance. At this third 
dimension of enquiry, the Tristan da Cunha case could, for example, be analysed both as a matter 
of distributive justice, in that at a broad level it concerns the distribution of a common property 
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resource for global research with potential impact across the world, and also as a matter of 
commutative justice in that the case began with an exchange between two primary parties, where 
justice in that particular exchange is most relevant. This cursory application of Pogge’s justice 
framework illustrates the sheer complexity of attempts to depict a unified theory of justice, and 
again emphasises the pervasive distinction between substantive justice on the one hand, in other 
words the perceived justice of the outcomes, and procedural justice on the other.  
6.3.2 Procedural and substantive justice 
These two components are present in every aspect of a justice enquiry (Franck, 1995 p.6).  The 
first aspect often described as due process provides good order and legitimacy, entailing rules of 
process rooted in a formal framework of how rules are to be made, interpreted and applied (ibid 
p.7), whilst the second involves the consequential material effects of the particular law under 
scrutiny, namely the application of both corrective and/or distributive justice (ibid p.8). Both 
procedural and substantive justice are relevant for example in an institutional process such as the 
evaluation by a REC, and need to be satisfied in order for any outcome to be deemed fair.  
Procedural justice, at once an inherent part of every system of justice as well as a field in its own 
right, has roots deep in the law of equity, and is an absolute requirement for any perception of 
fairness regarding a distribution of resources (Tyler, 1987). Empirical research on procedural 
justice in practice has supported the conclusion that the fairer the procedure used to determine 
outcomes, the more psychologically acceptable the outcomes will be (Folger et al., 1984).  Both 
Aristotle and John Rawls believed that without a fair institutional system, which creates fair 
laws, no justice could exist.  
Most constitutions expressly affirm for citizens the right to procedural fairness or due process, 
also defined correspondingly in reverse as the duty of the authorities to act fairly, based upon the 
principles of natural justice (ibid p.188). Procedural justice is then achieved when the rules and 
procedures brought to bear and which will determine matters of significance are infused with 
principles of natural justice, which ensure that all information, all sides of the situation are 
weighed up in a just process, fairly and without bias. Substantive justice on the other hand 
examines the material manifestation or distribution of benefits and burdens that affect all parties 
to the enquiry (Deutsch, 1985). Situations involving both distributive justice as well as justice in 
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exchange result in substantive or material outcomes, each of which are examined by one or other 
of the two forms of justice.  
6.3.3 Aristotle’s distributive and corrective justice 
Aristotle’s theory of justice is a good place to begin a brief exploration of the distributive and 
corrective justice of Pogge’s framework, bearing in mind this thesis’ preoccupation with 
commutative justice or justice in exchange.  His Nicomachean Ethics55 was intended to be a 
comprehensive investigation into the end or purpose of all human action, which he regarded as 
eudaemonia, namely the point of life, the human good, or happiness (Aristotle, 1094a pp.1-3). Of 
all the virtues dealt with in the Ethics, justice was described as the last of the virtues of character. 
Whilst he regarded “general justice” as being complete virtue, or “whatever produces and 
maintains happiness and its parts for a political community” (Aristotle 322(1985), 5.21, 5.23), he 
presented a theory of “particular justice” which is divided into two forms, namely distributive 
and corrective justice (Aristotle, 1130b, 30-1131a, 1).  
Distributive justice as the first of Aristotle’s two forms of justice is concerned with, “the 
distribution of honours or wealth or anything else that can be divided amongst members of a 
community that share a political system” (Aristotle, 322 (1985), 5.34). Describing the 
adjudication process Aristotle called this allocation of proportion a geometrical exercise, stating 
that, “what is just is proportionate and what is unjust is counter-proportionate” (ibid 5.43).  
According to Weinrib (2002), Aristotle means by these words a proportional equality, in which 
all participants in the distribution receive their shares according to their respective merits under 
the criterion in question (ibid p.349). 
In this evaluation of transactions involving research benefits and duties flowing from the 
exchange of DNA across continents, ultimately the system of rules and principles adopted by the 
various authoritative bodies will guide the final distributive outcomes. For example, the 
negotiations between states regarding the pandemic influenza preparedness (PIP) system, which 
resulted in a new procedural and legal dispensation for all states both providers and users of 
viruses following the withholding of samples by Indonesia, were described by Wilke as an 
                                                          
55The Nicomachean Ethics will be referred to as “Aristotle”, followed by the Bekker numbers named after the 
German Scholar Immanuel Bekker who published the most authoritative edition of Aristotles works in Greek. 
Where other references are used this is indicated.  
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exercise in distributive justice (Wilke, 2012). In other words the agreement provided rules that 
ensured legitimate dealing and fair distribution of various commodities and benefits – virus 
samples, rights and duties – in a multilateral system accepted by all participant states. Within this 
overall system, individual bilateral transactions between parties would include aspects of justice 
in exchange.   
Bearing in mind Rawl’s assessment following contractarians before him that justice can only 
take place within a consensually adopted institution, and as described in the procedural justice 
section above, clearly systems, procedures and laws are required to be agreed upon in order to 
give effect to the demand for distributive fairness. The mechanisms envisaged both by the CBD 
and Nagoya Protocol in respect of non-human genetic resources as well as the PIP agreement 
and the bioethics guidelines described above thus pursue a distributive justice agenda, setting 
laws, rules, standards and principles that aspire to bind stakeholders; ensuring a particular form 
of global justice in the distribution of the burdens and benefits associated with the utilisation of 
genetic resources in research.  
Corrective justice, as the second of Aristotle’s forms of justice, concerns bilateral injustice 
between two parties, what Aristotle termed, “rectification in transactions” (Aristotle, 322 (1985) 
5.34).  Corrective justice is according to many central to contemporary theories of private law 
(Weinrib, 2002 p.349), and is the overall term for the three subsidiary types known as 
commutative justice, restitutive justice and retributive justice. Weinrib describes Aristotle’s three 
subsidiary types of corrective justice as being essentially transactional justice, during which two 
bilaterally correlated parties are restored to the notional equality that they possessed before the 
disputed transaction (ibid p.349).  These were in addition described by Aristotle as being 
distinguished in two ways, namely being voluntary and involuntary (Aristotle, 322 (1985) 5.51) 
The category voluntary concerns exchanges between parties, namely commutative justice which 
is now contained in the field of contract law, whilst involuntary consists of wrongs performed on 
individuals without their consent such as tort, theft, adultery and assault (ibid p 5.52), which 
occur within the domain of a legal system enforced by a state.   
Commutative justice or justice in exchange, the form of voluntary justice most relevant for this 
thesis, was according to Aristotle assessed regardless of the morals or intentions of the parties, 
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and focussed purely on the transaction at hand.  “Hence the judge tries to restore this unjust 
situation to equality, since it is unequal” (ibid p 5.52). By illustrating what he had in mind as a 
fair voluntary exchange when parties engage in a transaction permitted by law, Aristotle 
continued, “for having more than one’s own share is called making a profit, and having less than 
what one had at the beginning is called suffering a loss...and when people get neither more nor 
less, but precisely what belongs to them, they say they have their own share, and make neither a 
loss nor a profit” (ibid p5.52).  Finally, addressing in a practical manner the focus of countless 
lawsuits that would be aimed at establishing the damages or requital to rectify the imbalance, he 
explained that all items in an exchange should be comparable in some way, requiring a 
“proportionate reciprocity.”  Aristotle believed that this, his proportion could be calculated with 
money, in which regard he enquired, “how many shoes are equal to a house” (ibid, p 5.64).    
To apply Aristotle’s analysis of justice, reciprocal exchanges such as the provision of human 
DNA for international genetic research, the subject of this thesis, involve principles of what he 
termed distributive as well as commutative justice principles. Distributive justice in biomedical 
research projects is concerned with the fair distribution of benefits and burdens between all 
stakeholders involved in the entire endeavour, including those not involved in the original 
exchange – the public, research partners, other states and institutions – seeking what Weinrib 
refers to as some form of proportional equality, which takes place by means of the laws, 
guidelines, contracts and policies that are applicable.  
Commutative justice, by contrast, as part of Aristotle’s overall system of corrective justice, is 
concerned with the bipolar exchange between two parties involved in a voluntary exchange, and 
features the restoration of a notional form of equality or a proportional requital for the original 
state with which the two parties entered the transaction. The latter is the domain within which 
exploitation between two parties, as defined by Mayer, takes place. Finally and in regard to both 
of these very different arenas of justice, Aristotle expressed the belief that equity was applicable 
in order to supplement formal law and to achieve justice. 
6.4 The law of equity 
The word equity has ancient roots, with its origin in the Latin word aequitas meaning just, 
impartial or fair.  Aristotle used the word to mean, “something which, although different from 
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legal justice, is another sort of justice, not generically different from it” (Aristotle, 1137a p.33-
34). Equity developed in the English common law as a set of legal principles separate from and 
supplementing the strict rules of the common law, the principles of which were then exported in 
some form to much of the Western world (Worthington, 2006 p.6).  In everyday terms, equity is 
said to “mitigate the rigor of the common law” (ibid p.7) and was introduced precisely to deal 
with the sort of unfairness between parties described earlier, and to ensure the presence of justice 
in the legal system. According to Hanbury’s Modern Equity, the origin of equity was said to be 
“in justice, beyond human control” and “older than any of its characteristics” (Hanbury, 1981 
p.5), both of which descriptions seek to express the inherent and ancient sources of the notion.  
The Judges of early England, educated in pure law, administered the law of the realm, but when 
judgments were regarded as unfair, litigants were entitled to appeal directly against unfair 
judgments to the King who as the supreme sovereign was regarded as the “font of justice” (ibid 
p.8). The King delegated such petitions for justice to the High Chancellor, regarded as “keeper of 
the royal conscience” and an important member of the King’s Council.  
 
The Chancellors were scholars of the classics well versed In Latin and French as well as in 
classical Roman law, which heavily influenced their rulings and the development of equitable 
principles designed to bring about justice (ibid, p 10). Soon the Chancery began to resemble a 
judicial body, even though it was not a law court as such, and it became known as the “Court of 
Chancery”.  By the 15th Century, the judicial power of equity law was firmly recognized, and by 
the end of the 17th Century only lawyers were appointed to the Chancery (ibid p.11). Equitable 
doctrines became codified as part of the law, and equity law began to rival and conflict with the 
common law, leading eventually to the Judicature Act of 1870 which fused the courts of equity 
and the common law, whilst their rules and principles remained separate.  The Judicature Act 
1873 contained a general residual clause, in section 25 which sums up the relationship between 
equity and common law generally, “generally, in all matters not hereinbefore particularly 
mentioned in which there is any conflict or variance between the rules of equity and the rules of 
common law with reference to the same matter, the rules of equity shall prevail” (Hanbury, 1981 
p.14).  
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As colonies gained independence from England and their legal systems began the inevitable 
process of drifting from the original blend of common law and equity, the rules of equity have 
nevertheless remained strong, whether codified into the laws of the country or continuing to exist 
as separate legal principles.  For example, in India the common law doctrine of equity had 
traditionally been followed even after it became independent in 1947.  In 1963, the Specific 
Relief Act was passed by Parliament in which most equitable legal concepts were codified and 
made statutory rights, thereby ending the discretionary role of the courts to grant equitable relief 
and making equity part of the law (Lewis & Lobban, 2003 p.306).   
 
The main difference between the law of equity and formal law is equity’s flexibility, its ability to 
fashion a specific form of remedy or relief in a case where the common law does not assist. 
Equity law was primarily concerned with unconscionable behavior, fraud, or untoward behavior, 
which tended to arise in mistake cases where one party is manipulated or tricked in a dubious 
manner (ibid p.308). One is reminded of Mayer’s (2007) categories of exploitation where he 
referred to dealings that had a certain cheapness or lacked authenticity in the exchange. Whilst 
the formal law of contract is limited in its response to a wrong, for example, being only able to 
award damages to a wronged individual, equity provides a more flexible remedy in those cases 
where simple contractual damages would not be sufficient to heal the wrong.   
 
Equity law is thus able to apportion damages in accordance with the degree of wrongdoing, to 
take into account the actions and motives of other parties, and to provide new forms of injunction 
to ensure justice. The court of equity even had the power to formulate new rules where none 
existed (ibid p.310). Lewis & Lobban provide, as an example, of an equitable injunction a 
situation where a farmer’s special cow is stolen by a neighbor. Contract law would only be able 
to award him damages, calculated in the amount of the value of a cow, which would not satisfy 
the farmer for the reason that the cow in question was special and normal damages would not do 
him justice:  equity was however able to order the return of that particular cow (ibid p.100).  
 
Lord Kames wrote his influential Principles of Equity in 1760, in which he recapitulated the 
theory of moral reasoning, and developed an influential jurisprudence based on equity to be used 
for the evolution and advancement of law in changing circumstance. He argued persuasively 
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against positivist and utilitarian views of the law, stating that utility in society could never trump 
justice (Lewis & Lobban, 2003 p.102). In legal systems that follow the English common law 
tradition, as well as in civil legal systems, the law of equity remains very much part of the law, 
whilst in continental legal systems, equity has been codified into the common law and judges are 
afforded greater liberty of interpretation (Ross, 1958 p.284). A number of maxims or principles 
of equity have become fully incorporated in law, including the well-known audi alteram partem 
(hear the other side) and nemo in sua causa iudex (no one may judge his own case), which 
underpin the essence of fair procedures (Hoexter, 2002 p.191), as noted earlier.  
 
Further comforting maxims for aggrieved litigants are ubi ius ibi remedium, meaning where there 
is a right, there is a remedy, and ex turpi causa non oritor actio, meaning no person may institute 
a legal action following on his own immoral conduct (ibid p.192). These equitable maxims have 
evolved in order to ensure that people do not profit from their illegal or unjust acts. In the words 
of Dworkin, equity ensures, “that no one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take 
advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property 
by his own crime” (Dworkin, 1981 p. 23). Equity thus looks to the intention of parties, and not to 
the mere outward form of a transaction (Bray, 2006 p.5).  As stated, this differs entirely from 
Aristotle’s views on commutative justice that ignored intentions and motives, and attempted to 
ensure substantive justice purely based upon the visible or material outcomes of the case.   
  
Equity law has provided these and many more remedies to contract law for the rectification of a 
variety of types of unfair or exploitative contracts, including where the contract came about by 
folly or mistake on the part of the grievant (Treitel, 1999 p.287). 56 The doctrines of undue 
influence and duress, which are to be discussed below, were developed by equity courts in order 
to assist parties who had been duped, coerced or influenced into detrimental agreements in 
situations that would otherwise have been termed legal according to the common law.  For 
example, where an individual entered into a contract under the excessive influence of another, 
equity provided the remedy of undue influence, whereby an aggrieved person could show that 
she was influenced against her own interests, and even where no illegal coercion or threat 
                                                          
56 The mistake can be one of law, or of fact, or as to the value of the item (Treitel, 1999 p.287). 
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(duress) existed, she would be entitled to cancel the contract (Treitel, 1999 p.375). In all cases of 
unlawful gain by one over another, the law of equity shines the light of enquiry onto the 
relationship or connection between the parties prior to the contract.   
 
Equity law thus infused and influenced the laws relating to all forms of exploitation by one party 
of another in transactions, as will be discussed further below. In every case the intention is to 
bring justice to and to assist vulnerable parties, in the process of which issues of influence and 
power were scrutinized as part of the relationship between the relevant parties. The flexibility of 
the equitable approach enables a court to protect the reasonable expectations of parties in a way 
that the formal law could not (Lewis & Lobban, 2003 p.310).  
 
To summarise, the word equity in its everyday usage can reasonably be interchanged with the 
words fairness and justice. The law of equity provided a body of principles and remedies that 
supports the most intuitive and elemental aspects of what ordinary people mean by justice and 
fairness, and its principles encourage judges to draw upon basic notions of fairness when the 
formal legal system fails to produce justice. Rawls might well have had notions of equity law in 
the back of his mind when he proposed reflective equilibrium as a method of arriving at a fair 
outcome, in which the formal principles to be applied are tested and balanced against ordinary 
moral beliefs, or intuitive perceptions of fairness (Dworkin, 1981 p.153). According to Dworkin, 
the task of moral philosophy is to provide a structure of principles that supports basic moral 
convictions relating to certain issues, and attempts to unify them with the legal or other relevant 
formal precepts (ibid p.155). Where RECs deliberate on complex ethical and practical matters, 
the reflective and holistic process embodied in the law of equity, examining all the judicanda and 
procedures in particular, could provide a useful method aimed at arriving at a just decision and 
outcome. 
6.5 The law of contract, and commutative justice 
Law is intended to be just, and the purpose of law is to provide a set of binding rules or standards 
that govern human interactions. Dworkin describes how rules as a form of law, such as codified 
criminal laws against theft or speeding, form legal standards binding upon the subjects, whilst 
principles, policies, and equitable legal maxims are interpreted and applied in execution of these 
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rules and laws (ibid p.84). Laws operate within a structure, for example a constitution, which 
determines how laws are made and adjudicated on, their reach, and the procedures that are 
associated with every aspect thereof (ibid p.16). Legal systems of today still reflect elemental 
principles that developed in ancient Rome, based upon the foundations of the praecepta iuris the 
foundations of law, which were firstly to live virtuously, secondly to injure no-one and thirdly, to 
give to each man his right (Bracton, 1968 p.199). Law is broadly defined into public law on the 
one hand, dealing with the law of institutions, of the state and of the administration of justice, 
and private law on the other hand, which is primarily the contract, tort (or delict) and other forms 
of law that prescribe conduct between citizens (Ross, 1958 p.204). Tort is the French term for 
wrongdoing, a civil wrong, or wrongful act, whether intentional or accidental, from which injury 
occurs to another, and which includes all negligence cases as well as intentional wrongs which 
result in harm. 
Contract law governs all voluntary transactions of exchange that give rise to legal rights or 
obligations, and a contract is defined as, “an agreement giving rise to obligations which are 
enforced or recognized by law” (Treitel, 1999 p.1). An agreement to play tennis with a 
neighbour, or a promise to offer a lift to a friend, or a gentleman’s agreement, are examples of 
mutual promises but not enforceable by law and therefore not legal contracts (Hutchinson & 
Pretorius, 2010 p.4). Every research project on the other hand rests on a foundation of contract, 
which exists whether written or unwritten, which includes the signed consent forms, and which 
governs the rights and obligations of the stakeholders. Where multiple parties are involved, the 
contractual relationships between them can be interpreted both from the formal documents that 
are signed, as well as from or supplemented by the informal, moral and/or unwritten 
undertakings between them. 
What distinguishes contractual rights and obligations is that they do not originate from an 
external source of the law, but are undertaken by the contracting parties (Smith, 2002 p. 2). In 
every consensual act by which something is offered in exchange for something else, whether 
buying a bus ticket, or borrowing an umbrella, or donating blood samples, the legal rights and 
obligations are thus based upon a foundation of contract law. The English Law of Contract 
evolved over centuries from early Continental, including Prussian, French and Dutch Civil Law, 
all of which were formerly influenced by the Roman civil law, which included the Law of 
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Obligations as enunciated by the early Roman jurists (Wessels, 1951 p.xvii). Over the past 
millennia the essentials of contract law have remained remarkably constant, replicated in 
different legal systems across the world and regulating all modern forms of exchange.  Of the 
original essentialia to a contract identified by the Roman law jurist von Savigny in his book, 
System of Modern Roman Law, the following basic elements remain relevant and underpin 
contract law to this day: 
1. Capacity: The parties must have the legal capacity to contract.  
2. Consensus: The parties must be of the same mind and intention concerning the subject 
matter of the contract. In other words there must be consent, termed concursus animorum 
(a meeting of the minds) regarding all the material aspects of the agreement.  
3. Formalities complete: Offer and acceptance for example must be expressed and 
communicated to each other, in ways that are sufficiently clear, certain and final. 
4. Consideration: There must be some form or valuable consideration, or prestatio, 
(present, future or conditional benefits) offered by each party.  
5. Intention to contract: There must be a serious intention to create a legal bond or animus 
contrahendi (intention to contract) on the part of the parties. (ibid p.15) 
Modern contract law adds to the above prerequisites of a contract the conditions that the subject 
matter of the contract should be legal, possible, in other words capable of performance, and 
certain in that it is a definite rather than vague content (Hutchison & Pretorius, 2010 p.6). Each 
party to a contract is both a giver and a receiver, as each are bound by duties as well as 
expectations of rights (ibid p.8). It is not intended to explore the further reaches of and schisms 
within contract law, which differs in certain respects for example between Civil, English and 
Roman Dutch legal jurisdictions (ibid p.12). The core principles as set out above guide all 
contracts, at the heart of which are voluntary exchanges or undertakings and/or promises made in 
order to bring about and define the terms of an agreement. Such an agreement is not complete 
and is thus neither valid nor binding until all the essential terms are clear and have been agreed.  
This formulation of essential or material terms becomes relevant in the realm of research when 
for example DNA has been provided for a specific purpose, as set out in the research protocol 
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and informed consent documentation. Where the informed consent form does not adequately or 
clearly envisage future use, for example in the Tristan da Cunha case where the contract did not 
cover the future sale of the DNA samples for profit, or the Havasupai case where the contract did 
not envisage further research on the tissue samples, such future use could be challenged as being 
in breach of and therefore not protected nor governed by the original terms of the contract. In all 
exchange transactions one of the essential terms must be the consideration or quid pro quo 
offered by the receiving party, which is colloquially referred to as the, “price tag on the 
promise,” or as “something of value” (Treitel, 1999 p. 64).  
This consideration constitutes the form of benefits that are promised or shared by one party, and 
which can be in any legal form whatsoever. Gordan emphasises the importance of this 
contractual element with the hyperbolic words, “consideration is to contract law as Elvis is to 
rock and roll: the King!” (Gordon, 1990 p.987). In Roman contract law the one party, the owner 
or possessor of a ‘res’ or a ‘thing’, namely the object to be exchanged, would negotiate for a 
reciprocal consideration, a term referred to in English contract law simply as the price, or as a 
“benefit to the promisor and a detriment to the promisee” (Smith, 2002 p.69). In other words, 
there should always be reciprocation, or value exchanged, in the form of a received benefit. This 
equates with Wertheimer’s view that an exchange should always involve mutual benefits 
(Wertheimer, 1996).  
Contract law is generally not concerned with the adequacy of the consideration namely, whether 
one party has made a good bargain or not. This contrasts with Aristotle’s view of justice in 
exchange, in which the equivalence and fairness, mathematically calculated, is at the core of the 
equality and thus fairness of the exchange. When all of the aforementioned elements are in place, 
that is when one party has consented to part with something she chose to part with, and has 
received what the other party undertook to impart, namely the promised consideration or benefit, 
the law of contract is generally satisfied.   
Consent, particularly the presence and validity thereof in respect of a certain transaction, remains 
a central element in legal analysis of contracts. Where consent is wrongfully obtained however, 
from a vulnerable party for example whose bargaining position is weak, and who enters into a 
disadvantageous transaction, contract law in its original form was not able to come to such 
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party’s assistance. Nor did the courts normally question the fairness or justice of a transaction, 
such as whether a contract is particularly one-sided, or where the parties were badly matched, 
unless certain proven circumstances –mistake, deceit, fraud, duress – were shown to be present.  
The law of contract evolved in this manner in order to support a policy of certainty and 
enforceability of contracts, and to enhance the stability or rule certainty of commerce. Pacta sunt 
servanda is a commonly used phrase in contract law judgements meaning that contracts in their 
original form should be binding (Bigwood, 2003 p.1).   
In the opinion of Treitel, a formal legal system could not achieve certainty in law and justice at 
the same time (ibid p.286). It is therefore sobering to reflect on the fact that the formal body of 
contract law was, prior to its assimilation of the principles of equity, generally not designed to 
deal with vulnerability, power or capacity differentials between parties. As stated by Goodin 
(1985) in an article entitled, Protecting the vulnerable, 
There is nothing wrong with contracting power per se, nor with its exercise. For to 
possess power is not necessarily to use it, and to use power is not necessarily to misuse 
(abuse) it. Vulnerability-dependency relationships are natural, inevitable, and immutable 
in this world, and the power that results from them is so often a desirable feature of our 
intimate, economic and political relationships. (ibid p.192) 
Another important aspect concerning consent is the fact that contract law regards all legal parties 
as fully autonomous legal persons that is persons, collectives or corporations entitled to enter 
into contracts in their own name, which assumes that they are capable of understanding, 
concluding, and consenting to binding agreements. The term freedom of contract describes the 
liberal notion that individuals should be free to enter into all and any transactions, whilst the 
law’s protection of individuals in society, for example laws designed to protect consumers, 
tenants, pensions, from unfair contracts, are understood and regarded as a form of justifiable 
paternalism (Kimel, 2003 p.118). The idea that humans have personal autonomy, namely full 
control over their destiny and free choice is affected by the existence or absence of such laws 
(ibid p.129). Proper informed consent where the one party may be an illiterate individual or 
community is notoriously difficult to achieve in exchanges involving complex issues, such as 
genetic research, an issue which has led to a vast body of bioethical research (Kegley, 2004; 
Knoppers & Chadwick, 2005).  
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Informed consent has been deemed the bastion upon which approval for the entire subsequent 
clinical or research exchange transaction is grounded, yet in most cases the descriptions of the 
intended research are inevitably and in so many cases incomplete (O’Neil, 2004 p.1134). Here 
debates within bioethics and contract law draw strongly upon each other. The quality of 
informed consent is indeed the touchstone of a fair contract, and what constitutes both adequate 
disclosure of all aspects of the intended research as well as adequate comprehension of the 
information, the scientific details, risks and benefits, intellectual property and other 
considerations, remains an elusive subject.  Suffice it to observe that what constitutes legal 
consent for the purpose of the validity of a contract is a far lower standard than an ethically 
satisfactory standard that would guarantee adequate comprehension in the eyes of a moral 
philosopher.   
6.6 Exploitation in contract law 
The purpose of this focus on exploitation in contract law is to assist with the discussion that is to 
follow in the next chapter on undue inducement and coercion as obstacles to benefit sharing, and 
in order to explain the legal underpinnings of these concepts. Following a brief overview of law 
and the role of contract law in governing voluntary exchanges, the three forms of contractual 
exploitation namely unconscionable dealing, coercion, and undue inducement will be examined 
in turn. Tom Beauchamp (2011) believes that the law is more influential than any other field of 
thought in the development of doctrines such as informed consent, yet he encourages readers to 
think beyond the restricted limits within which the law operates (ibid p.518). As he correctly 
states, whilst the law does not go far enough to guide morally nor to determine duties to patients 
and subjects regarding informed consent, it nevertheless provides the outposts and benchmarks 
against which the meaning of such terms are tested.  
This thesis, in examining voluntary exchanges of human DNA for genomic research, is 
interested in concerns relating to fairness and exploitation. As discussed above, the law of 
contract evolved over centuries in order to promote the utilitarian value of certainty within the 
dynamic variety and realm of possible encounters. The law assumes that parties are entitled to 
negotiate and even contest dispassionately with a view to extracting the most advantage for 
themselves within the outer boundaries set by the law.  Adam Smith famously opined that self-
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interest is the driving force behind society (Smith, 1776) and David Gauthier (1977), believed 
that a normal and rational person is one who seeks to appropriate as much as possible (ibid 
p.118).   
In Gauthier’s view, a person is a rational agent, “if and only if he acts to appropriate as much as 
possible […] and seeks more” (ibid p.118). Others have described normal human motivation 
during an exchange being to obtain, “more of the outcomes that they value and that others 
control” (Molm et al., 2006 p.129). This is not to deny that parties might be imbued with sound 
principles including of altruism and solidarity, but rather to suggest that self-interest of 
individuals and institutions in all forms of exchange, including biomedical research, should not 
be underestimated nor regarded in any manner as pejorative. How then was the law to manage 
and control this self-interest, and how to prevent exploitation of one party by another, in such 
exchanges? 
The word exploitation, as discussed in chapter two, is used more freely than it is fully 
understood, generally in a stigmatizing way, and directed at a party who appears in some or other 
way to abuse or misuse another.  One of the central aspirations of the law is to establish fairness 
in human dealings, and the conscience of the law as applied in the courts has strived to give 
effect to the precept of non-exploitation (Thomas, 2000; Saprai, 2011). Contract law as a branch 
of private law has evolved functionally in order to establish certainty in exchange dealings, 
whilst being averse to exploitation of one by another. With the assimilation and influence of the 
law of equity, contract law developed three defences against exploitative contracts, namely 
unconscionable dealing, duress, and undue influence (Bigwood, 2003 p.2). These will be dealt 
with below.  
Despite the fact that arguments persist amongst jurists relating to the taxonomy and legal 
pedigree of these defences, termed pleas in avoidance, their meaning and application has through 
centuries of application and legal judgements become increasingly clear (ibid p.2). Some legal 
jurisdictions frame these pleas differently. For example, those legal systems inspired by the 
Roman Dutch law group frame these pleas in avoidance under the headings of misrepresentation, 
including mistake, duress, and undue influence (Hutchinson & Pretorius, 2009). The autonomy 
of contracting parties to shape their obligations as they wish is thus continually tested in the law 
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by the evolving limits on voluntariness, namely the various ways in which the voluntary consent 
of parties might be restricted or constrained by the actions of others (Robertson, 2005 p.180).   
The task of this thesis is to delve into one of the realms of private law falling under Aristotle’s 
overall arch of corrective justice, namely the Law’s response to bilateral wrongdoing or breaches 
of duty in contract. The context of genomic research involving indigenous peoples results in two 
parties being envisaged; namely research representatives on the one side, and research 
participants, with a focus on indigenous peoples, on the other. The focus of the enquiry is some 
form of exploitation in this exchange, where one party wrongfully gains, loses or is harmed in 
the transaction. Note that wrongful actions by one party to a transaction that are criminal, such as 
theft, or that lead to liability in tort, for example, where negligence or a breach of duty causes 
damages to one party, fall outside this enquiry. Similarly, the law relating to fraud and mistake, 
which also falls under the broad description of improperly obtained consensus, and which can 
also give rise to an unfair contract enabling an aggrieved party to cancel the contract, resides 
outside the scope of this thesis.  
The objection to benefit sharing to be discussed in the next chapter holds that research 
participants might be wrongly treated, in one of these three ways. These defences operate in 
accordance with a principle expressed as legal neighbourhood, which describes the mutual 
responsibilities of parties belonging within a particular realm of activity, and rooted in a duty to 
protect the vulnerable (Bigwood 2002). According to the precepts of legal neighbourhood, the 
greater the power of one party, the greater the risk of exploitation of the other.  Mather described 
the principle as being founded on Aristotle’s concept of philia, which means, “a relationship 
between persons, each of whom care about the other’s wellbeing” (Mather, 1999 p.57). In the 
field of genomic research, biomedical or pharmaceutical companies, research institutions, 
researchers, research participants and their communities are all encompassed in such a web of 
legal neighbourhood and play roles in research transactions.   
6.6.1 Unconscionable dealing  
Unconscionable dealing, also called unconscionable bargain, means the unfair use of power in a 
contract. The doctrine emanates directly from the law of equity, and is the first of the three forms 
of exploitation that can occur within otherwise legal contracts. Based originally upon a notion of 
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equitable or constructive fraud, meaning the wrongful dealing is likened to a form of fraud, the 
doctrine is aimed at protecting the weak from the strong, and in particular where one party is in a 
position to exploit a specific state of vulnerability in the other (Treitel, 1999 p.381). The doctrine 
is epitomised by the words of Lord Hardwicke who stated that equity would intervene in any 
case, “to prevent taking surreptitious advantage of the weakness or necessity of another; which 
knowingly to do is equally against the conscience as to take advantage of his ignorance” (Earl of 
Chesterfield, 1751 p.82). 
Whilst no single settled formulation of unconscionableness has received general acceptance 
across all common law jurisdictions (Benson, 2001 p.185), it is clear that the doctrine focuses 
upon the dealing, meaning the manner in which the transaction was procured, rather than on the 
substantive results of the bargain (Bridgewater, 1998)57. Substantive unfairness of the outcome is 
thus not the decisive issue. Treitel (1999) describes it succinctly as a form of dealing where one 
party is in a position to, and exploits a particular weakness of the other (ibid p.386). Originating 
from a protective equitable jurisdiction concerned with safeguarding individuals from their own 
ineptness, misfortune or incompetence, it evolved towards the detection and prevention of 
victimisation of any form (Bigwood, 2003 p.234). Nowadays, it is used more to protect those 
under a disadvantage from stronger parties, who take advantage of that fact and abuse their 
bargaining power (ibid p.234).  
Inequality of bargaining power has resulted in a range of different kinds of cases all deserving 
equitable relief (Treitel, 1999 p.383). In the case of Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy (1975, p.339), the 
following words by Lord Denning showed the desire of equity to assist the weak, as well as the 
overlap between unconscionable dealing, duress and undue influence. He stated that, 
English law gives relief to one who...enters into a contract upon terms which are very 
unfair [...] when his bargaining power is grievously impaired by reasons of his own needs 
or desires, or by his own ignorance or infirmity, coupled with undue influence or 
pressures brought to bear on him by the other. (ibid p.339)  
As an example, in the Canadian case of Harry v Kreutziger (1978), the owner of a boat was 
allowed to rescind a contract for the sale of his boat and fishing license for a nominal amount.  
Unknown to the seller, his fishing license was worth a great deal of money, and could have been 
                                                          
57 See list of Legal cases in References. 
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mortgaged to finance a new boat. The court ruled that the buyer had taken advantage of the 
seller's lack of knowledge of the value of the license, and refused to allow the contract to be 
enforced.  In deciding this case, in addition to examining the communication between the parties, 
the courts enquired into the range of acceptable practices and prices in the industry, in order to 
establish community standards, and whether true advantage was taken (ibid p.241). 
In order to formulate a case based upon unconscionable dealing, the complaining party would 
according to the famous case of Commercial Bank of Australia v Amadio (1983, p.463), have to 
show that unconscientious advantage was taken by the other party based upon the former’s 
disabling condition or circumstances. 58 Stated more emphatically by Lord Dawson in the same 
case, relief is dependent upon, “exploitation by one party of another’s position of disadvantage in 
such a manner that the former cannot in good conscience insist on the benefit of the bargain” 
(ibid p.489). The Amadio case confirmed that an aggrieved party claiming unconscionable 
dealing is required to show that she was a) by some reason or circumstance placed at a special 
disadvantage vis a vis another, and b) that unfair or unconscientious advantage was taken of the 
opportunity thereby created (ibid p.462). It was expressly stated by Judge Mason that the relief is 
applicable, “where an innocent party’s will is overborne so that it is not independent and 
voluntary” and he “ is unable to make a worthwhile judgment as to what is in his best interests” 
(ibid p.462). 
Once a charge of unconscionable dealing is made against the allegedly stronger party, the onus is 
immediately placed upon the person who receives the benefit of the transaction to show that the 
transaction is fair (ibid p.474). The conditions or circumstances which might make one party 
more vulnerable are many and varied, however in the case of Blomley v Ryan (1983 p.405), 
Judge Fullagar proceeded to list a few: “poverty or need of any kind, sickness, age, sex, infirmity 
of body or mind, drunkenness, illiteracy or lack of education, lack of assistance or explanation 
                                                          
58The Amadios guaranteed their son’s indebtedness to the Commercial Bank of Australia, but when the Bank sought 
to enforce the guarantee, the Amadios claimed that it was unenforceable because it was unconscionable. They 
claimed to be at a "special disadvantage" as an equitable doctrine in Equity Law. The court ruled in Amadios’ 
favour, taking into account the facts that the Amadios had a limited understanding of English, were not offered 
independent advice, and the bank knew of the Amadios’ situation at the time the guarantee was signed (ibid p.462). 
The court held firstly that when the mortgage was executed the bank was aware of the Amadios' son's financial 
situation and knew the Amadios were not so appraised, and secondly that the bank did not advise the Amadios that 
there was no limit on their liability under the guarantee - the Amadios believed the liability was limited to $50,000. 
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where assistance or explanation is necessary” (ibid p.392).  In essence, it applies where the 
vulnerable party is unable to judge properly for himself. The cases also protect groups such as, 
“the elderly and debilitated, the muddle headed, the emotionally infatuated, the tense and 
nervous, and the exceptionally gullible” (Bigwood, 2003 p.241), and the doctrine, triggered by 
an asymmetry in power advantageously used by the one, is clearly applicable to indigenous, rural 
or economically challenged communities from the developing world.   
This form of protection is remarkably wide. It is not surprising that concerns about its scope are 
frequently mounted by those requiring certainty in contracts, who note amongst their complaints 
that judges often differ on whether a party is under a special disadvantage. For example, in both 
the cases of Bridgewater vs Leahy (1998) and Diprose vs Louth (1990) the judges differed from 
one another throughout on the question of special disadvantage. According to Bigwood, whether 
a party suffered from a special disadvantage is one of those concepts, such as good faith and 
foreseeability, that judges will continue to debate and differ on, as such concepts require careful 
interpretation based in each case upon known facts (ibid p.246).  
In summary, intention and state of mind remain central to the proof of wrongdoing. It is a crucial 
determinant of unconscionable dealing that the stronger party knowingly and intentionally 
proceeds to secure advantage against the weaker party. Regarding whether the stronger party 
could or should have known of the other party’s weakness, for example, judges in the case of 
Baden (1992) developed five possible levels of cognitive awareness applicable to the stronger 
party. These levels were described as first, actual knowledge of such a weakness, secondly wilful 
shutting one’s eyes to the obvious, thirdly wilfully and recklessly failing to make such enquiries 
as an honest and reasonable person would make, fourthly knowledge of circumstances that 
would indicate the facts to an honest and reasonable person, and fifthly knowledge of 
circumstances that would put an honest and reasonable person on enquiry (ibid p.61).   
In addition to the intention of the stronger party, the cases of unconscionable dealing all have 
another thing in common, namely that they need to show the advantage taking complained of to 
be unconscionable.59 This word means, “serious, and arousing a sense of shock, reprehensibility 
or unreasonableness, so as to be sufficiently divergent from community standards of morality” 
                                                          
59 Unconscionable is also described as ‘not morally right’ and ‘excessive’.  [Online] Available at 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/unconscionable 
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(Bigwood, 2003 p.248). In other words it cannot be used by the weak to simply evade all 
responsibility for their dealings. As a final note on the applicability of this equitable doctrine in 
bringing about justice in exchange, it should be noted that the primary focus on the procedural 
fairness evident in the dealings of the parties is balanced with and influenced by an analysis of 
the substantive unfairness in the case (ibid p.271). 
6.6.2 Duress (Coercion) 
The second of the three forms of exploitation that can take place within legal contracts is called 
duress, also referred to as wrongful coercion. It is clearly wrong for one party to force another to 
enter a contract by means of an improper threat or pressure, and the law recognises that consent 
derived under such circumstances is inauthentic. A contract is therefore voidable if it was made 
under duress, for coercion of the will vitiates consent (Treitel, 1999 p.375). When an agreement 
is made as a result of improper pressure that amounts to intimidation, there is no lack of 
consensus, because the intimidated party decides, under duress, to consent. The problem 
however is that the consensus or agreement was improperly obtained by the making of some 
form of unfair or illegal threat. Under these circumstances the agreement thus obtained is 
deemed initially valid, based upon both parties consent, but it is voidable by the innocent or 
aggrieved party (Hutchison & Pretorius, 2009 p.136).  
As an example, a party might be coerced by the threat “If you do not sign this agreement, I will 
ensure that harm will come to your family”. The threatened party in such a case can claim to 
have acted under duress, as a result of improper coercion, and apply for cancellation of the 
contract.  Duress involves coercion of the mind and the will of the victim, termed vis compulsiva 
in Latin, meaning a verbal or non-physical threat. This is distinct from vis absoluta, which means 
overwhelming physical force such as when one twists a person’s arm or forces her hand to sign a 
contract (ibid p.138).   
The doctrine of duress is activated by the improper threat of harm, rather than the harm itself, the 
threat of which constitutes the element of coercion. To qualify as coercive a threat needs to be 
directed at the life, bodily integrity or property of the person concerned, or her immediate family 
(De Wet & van Wyk, 1992 p.50), the fear should be reasonable, and the harm threatened should 
be imminent (Wessels, 1951 p.1167). Finally, the threat of harm should be unlawful, for duress is 
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not based upon the presence of fear per se but constitutes the obtaining of consent by improper 
means (De Wet & van Wyk, 1992 p.49). The issue of coercion in relation to the voluntariness of 
consent, from perspectives of law, ethics and morality, is the subject of a vast body of literature 
(Hughes, 2001; Von Savigny, 2012 and Largent et al., 2012), much of which lies outside the 
scope of this thesis. 
Freedom of contract is not prevented or curbed by the doctrine of duress, which does not prohibit 
the use of pressure in human transactions. In fact it is accepted that some form of pressure, 
inducement, or even forceful persuasion is an endemic feature of contract bargaining activity. In 
an article entitled, Bargaining, duress and economic activity, Hale (1943) noted that all 
contracting involves a measure of coercion, but not necessarily duress. The former is termed the 
rough and tumble of hard bargaining, whereas the latter term involves pressure constituted by a 
threat of harm that is in some way unfair or improper. An offer of payment or an inducement to a 
research participant for example that contains no actual improper threat cannot be termed duress 
(Grady, 2005 p.1683). The classic case of duress, described by Feinberg as the “model coercer” 
is constituted by the person with the gun who creates an exploitable situation by using the 
weapon to back up the threat implied in ‘your money or your life?’ (Feinberg, 1983 p.208). The 
recipient certainly consents to hand over the money, but the consent is forced, thus not authentic.  
Some, for obvious reasons, also describe this form of coercion as active exploitation (ibid p.208).  
However, where the stronger party does not in fact create the exploitable situation, what is 
termed lawful act duress comes into play. This is where the threat is to carry out an act which is 
clearly legal, such as a threat to report a person to the authorities for driving a motor car without 
a licence, or a threat to publish truthful information that will discredit, expose or embarrass the 
other. This threat might indeed be forceful and even unpleasant, but is in no way unlawful or 
improper. This lawful act duress is thus not illegal per se under the doctrine of duress, but the 
innate and moral wrongness of such conduct still constitutes an exploitative contract protected by 
unconscionable dealing; namely the previous defence against exploitation where a vulnerable 
person’s particular weakness or situation is specifically targeted (Bigwood, 2002 p.23).  
The law relating to duress has developed through legal scrutiny of countless examples of 
different forms of coercive pressure. In all these cases involving varying degrees of improperness 
 
  
 106 
on the part of the coercer, as in all the cases influenced by the law of equity, the enquiries turned 
on the state of mind or bilateral intentions of the parties. For example, Grantham and Rickett 
(2000) argue that, “the law intervenes in a case of duress, not solely because of the defendant’s 
conduct, but because of the effect of that conduct on the plaintiff’s ability to exercise a free and 
independent choice” (ibid p.185). However, they conclude that any involuntariness in the 
consent of the aggrieved party can only be judged relative to the wrongfulness of the conduct of 
the party accused of coercion (ibid p.187).  
These conclusions are further reminders of the correlativity of exchange transactions, and the 
bilateral nature of justice in exchange as envisaged by Aristotle. The defectiveness of the 
resulting consent, or otherwise stated the impaired volition of the coerced party caused by the 
wrongful pressure, remains the principal justification for law’s interference with an agreement 
between the two parties (Bigwood, 2003 p.286). Normal commercial pressure that constrains 
one’s choices is thus legitimate, whilst it is the nature and type of pressure or coercion that the 
doctrine of duress regards as illegitimate. This is aptly summed up by the words of DM 
Campbell in Peanut Marketing Board v Cuda (1984), “duress is not a matter of a person being 
left no choice- it is a matter of the pressure applied being of a kind which the law does not regard 
as legitimate” (ibid p.378).   
This thesis is concerned with the question, when does an offer that is highly persuasive and 
applies pressure on a clearly weaker party, such as a research proposal that contains a certain 
degree of risk but carries attractive benefits, amount to a wrongfully coercive proposal?  When is 
such pressure illegitimate due to coercion? The two pronged theory of duress proposed by 
Wertheimer states that such pressure is only unlawful if the proposal places the weaker party in 
such a position that she has no reasonable alternative (Wertheimer, 1987 p.172), and most 
importantly if the proposal itself is unfair, illegal or otherwise wrongful, “A coerces B if and 
only if A’s proposal creates a choice situation for B such that B has no reasonable alternative but 
to do X and it is wrong for A to make such a proposal to B” (ibid p.172).   
Where a research proposal is not wrongful, and is duly approved by the relevant regulatory 
bodies, an offer made within the approved parameters of the proposal to elicit participation 
cannot be termed duress, for the proposal is lawful.  If the effect of the lawful offer is however 
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coercive and manipulative in effect, it might well be judged as lawful act duress and an 
exploitative contract under the unconscionable dealing doctrine. Threats and pressure of all 
forms, whether express or implied, legitimate or otherwise, thus still have the ability to compel 
compliance. Borderline examples of coercive language that is not obviously illegal might be 
threats such as – “you had better watch your back!” – or in the context of genetic research – “if 
your community does not agree to participate in this research project I predict that you will regret 
it”.  These words might on their face appear innocuous, or at the least not illegal, but the context 
of who is making the threat to whom is at the crux of the bipolar relationship which comes under 
the scrutiny of commutative justice. Such words issued from a person of known influence would 
form relevant factors in establishing the exploitativeness, under the doctrine of duress, and thus 
the illegality of the resultant contract.   
Commutative justice cases involving inter alia duress generally entail an examination of the 
notional baseline of parties, seeking to correct the fact that one party has gained more than she 
should have in the exchange (Weinrib, 2002 p.355). The baseline is intended to be a description 
of a person’s situation in life, which she should attempt to enhance or improve. Attempts to set 
what is termed a baseline for the person receiving the threat or offer, in order to establish 
whether she became better or worse off after acting on the basis of the coercion, have included a 
variety of standards. This includes what Wertheimer describes as, “moralised or normative, 
subjective, non-moral/empirical, objective, rights based, “standards, including attempts to 
establish what is referred to as a “statistical baseline” (Wertheimer, 1987 p.207).  
According to Weinrib Aristotle’s account for the parties’ baseline was their initial notional 
equality, which was his way of referring to the entitlement of each of the parties to have what 
was rightfully theirs rather than actual equality (Weinrib, 2002 p.354). Whilst no single test has 
emerged to establish clearly such a notional baseline for parties in such exchanges, courts have 
not been embarrassed to acknowledge that often the best they can do is to focus on the distinctive 
facts and features of the case in hand in order to arrive at a just conclusion (Bigwood, 2003 
p.301).  
The law sustains a liberal conception of contract – the freedom to contract – and coercion takes 
place in many forms. Defective consent on the part of a vulnerable party due to strong persuasion 
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is on its own not sufficient to excuse that party from the contract. The application of 
commutative justice –a form of corrective justice – through the doctrine of duress requires the 
unhappy party to show how the coercion of the other party was wrongful and brought about her 
defective consent (ibid p.288). The modern doctrine of duress focuses on both the coercive 
conduct of the first party, as well as on the conduct’s effect on the contractual assent of the 
second, acknowledging their respective roles in the bilateral transaction (Grantham & Rickett, 
2000 p.187).  
Wertheimer takes this further, after an analysis of US contract law, and suggests that such duress 
has less to do with freedom and voluntariness, and more to do with wrongfulness and unfairness 
(Wertheimer, 1987 p.53). He would therefore imply that it is the eventual effect on the weaker 
party’s baseline rather than the coercion itself that is the ultimate test of wrongful duress. One 
could categorise Wertheimer’s emphasis on the baseline test as focussing on the substance of the 
outcome, rather than on the procedure that led to the outcome.   In other words he would 
conclude that if the end result is beneficial for the weaker party, there should be no concern 
about employment of coercion or other wrongful conduct. When the doctrine of duress is 
invoked in order to correct the injustice that exists within a voluntary exchange, it is however not 
necessary to decide between those two processes.  
As Pogge’s framework shows, material outcomes and procedural facts are in any event 
inextricably linked in justice. Following the precepts of equity, the procedural facts of any 
particular transaction in which coercive and wrongful pressure by one party results in assent 
which is less than voluntary and free, that is defective, should first be examined in their entirety. 
If the coercion is wrongful or illegal, the doctrine of duress comes to the assistance of the 
aggrieved party. Where the coercion is not wrongful in the form of being illegal, but it is 
nevertheless exploitative in essence, the victim can nevertheless be protected through the 
doctrine of unconscionable dealing described above.  
6.6.3 Undue influence 
Undue influence as the last of the three doctrines needs to be examined, in order to understand 
when it is a problem or concern in genomic research. The expression, “the shepherd must not 
become a wolf” used by Judge Robert Megarry in Tito v Waddell (1977 p.241), summarises the 
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essence of this third form of legal protection against an unfair contract, which puts the trust 
relationship between two parties, the shepherd and the sheep, at the centre of the enquiry. Here 
the wrongful form of power exercised by the one who brings about the contract is not the 
manipulative or coercive power discussed in the previous two sections, but what is termed 
inducive pressure or power (Wertheimer, 1996 p.134).  
As stated above, parties are entitled and even expected to exert persuasion on each other in the 
process of bargaining, and the precise limits of such lawful persuasion are, as in the coercion 
test, often difficult to determine. Judges have in undue influence cases continually resorted to 
what Bigwood (2003) terms, “pseudo-psychological terminology” similar to that used in 
coercion cases, using words such as “dominated, controlled, subordinated, subverted or 
overborne” to describe the effect of such power on the induced wills of the weaker party (ibid 
p.374). In cases of both undue influence and coercion, there is a superior party who wrongfully 
persuades the weaker party to act in a certain way.   
What distinguishes undue influence is however the absence of coercive persuasion and the 
exploitative use or breach of a special trust or relationship. Alternatively put, there is an 
exploitation of misplaced trust or reliance where self-denial would be both expected and required 
by the influential party (ibid p.375).  Issues of power are interchangeable with influence, and as 
an abstract concept, influence can be described interchangeably with the notion of power.  One 
person exerts power over the other whenever the former coerces, misleads, exploits or 
manipulates and thereby influences that other (ibid p.180). Influence itself is not frowned upon in 
the law, as stated by Kekewich, J. in the case of Allcard v Skinner (1887), 
Nay, it recognises influence as natural and right. Few, if any, men are gifted with 
characters enabling them to act, or even think, with complete independence of others... 
But the law requires that influence, however natural and right, shall not be unduly 
exercised. (ibid p.193) 
Whereas in coercion, the will of the victim is altered and affected by the coercive threat, in true 
cases of undue influence, the victim believes she is acting in her own best interests. Rather than 
being motivated by fear, she believes that the influencing party is acting in her best interests, 
rather than his own (Fingarette, 1985 p.105). The victim of undue influence is to an extent naive 
or innocent, and her consent is both real and voluntary, albeit wrongly induced. The unduly 
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influenced party thus enters into the agreement apparently voluntarily, rather than feeling under 
threat, in protest or even aware of being wrongfully influenced. For that reason, and following 
Aristotle’s insistence on the relational core of corrective justice, the investigation of the court is 
focussed upon the particulars of the relationship between the parties, and the opportunities that 
the relationship might provide for abuse, rather than on the material aspects of the transaction.  
As stated by Judge Dixon in the early case of Johnson v Buttress (1936 p.134), the foundation of 
the setting aside of such a transaction lies in, “the prevention of an unconscientious use of any 
special capacity or opportunity that may exist or arise of influencing (P)’s will or freedom of 
judgement in reference to such a matter” (ibid p.134). 
As stated earlier, the origin of undue influence lies in the English law of equity. The more 
narrow doctrine of duress only assisted victims in cases of wrongful coercion, and exposed the 
need for equitable relief where no overt and wrongful pressure was involved. The courts of 
equity consequently developed the more elastic doctrine of undue influence (Hutchison & 
Pretorius, 2009 p.141), the nature and rationale of which is based squarely upon the fiduciary 
relationship, the elemental quality of the sheep and the shepherd image referred to above.  In the 
early and famous case of Allcard v Skinner (1887 pp.157 &168), which provided many of the 
key principles underlying the doctrine, Judge Kekewich stated,  
The law does not prohibit persons making gifts or conferring benefits upon other persons 
standing in a position of trust or confidence towards them, whether from affection, 
gratitude or otherwise, as long as the gifts or benefits are the voluntary and well 
understood acts of such persons. (ibid p.157) 
This focus on the right to donate, altruistically or otherwise, as well as on the fiduciary nature of 
the relationship, are both important aspects of the issues being explored in this thesis, namely the 
provision of human tissue for genetic research. What is at the core of justice in all these 
transactions is the necessity of such exchange to be, in the words of Judge Kekewich, fully 
“voluntary and well understood” by the weaker party.  In the same case, Judge Bowen added the 
following words, indicating the true focus of the entire enquiry being on the elusive realm of the 
conscience of the more powerful or inducing party and his or her potential to influence others, 
“the undue influence jurisdiction is not a limitation placed upon the action of (P): it is rather a 
fetter placed upon the conscience of (D) and one which arises out of public policy and fair play” 
(ibid p.190).  
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This confirms the focus of the enquiry on the influential power of the stronger or trusted party, 
and the use of that power to the detriment of the influenced, or trusting party. In undue influence 
cases, and reflective of the aspirations of the law of equity to seek fairness in its reach into 
private transactions between consenting adults, the word undue is freely interchanged with 
similarly pejorative adjectives such as wrongful, abusive, unfair or improper, used to describe the 
exercise of influence. This again requires the enquiry to go beyond the mere outward or material 
form of the contract and the facts of a case, and to explore the complex internal arena of morals, 
motives and conscience. In supporting an analysis of all relevant facts, Lord Clyde suggested 
that, “undue influence is something which can be more easily recognised when found than 
exhaustively analysed in the abstract,” (Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Etridge, 2001 p.1050). Of 
the many attempts to provide a workable test for undue influence, it was concluded in the case of 
Patel v Grobelaar (1974 p.532), that a party that seeks to set aside a contract on the grounds of 
undue influence must establish three facts, namely: 
1. That the other party obtained an influence over him or her 
2. That this influence weakened his or her powers of resistance and rendered his or her 
will compliant 
3. That the other party used this influence in an unscrupulous manner to persuade him or 
her to agree to a transaction that a) was prejudicial to him or her and b) which he or she 
would not have concluded with normal freedom of will.   
In the case of Allcard v Skinner (1887), the development of the law of undue inducement into 
two distinct heads or classes was classically expounded by Lord Lindley. In the first class, 
namely actual undue influence, the opportunity to exert influence is not located in the status of 
the relationship per se, but is located in a particular situation brought about by the wrongful 
party. In this case Miss Allcard joined a religious order that required poverty, chastity and 
obedience, and was introduced to Miss Skinner (a lady superior of the religious order) who 
encouraged her to donate all of her property in her will into Miss Skinner’s name. One of the 
rules of the order was that the voice of the superior is the voice of God.   
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When Miss Allcard left the religious order, she claimed return of her property, on the basis that 
the lady superior had unduly influenced her. The court was satisfied on the actual facts, rather 
than on the basis of a presumption based on the formal relationship between the parties, that the 
gift was the result of influence, “expressly used by the done for the purpose” (ibid p.181). Miss 
Skinner denied having expressly influenced Miss Allcard, but the judges held that the facts 
showed that she did. This form of undue influence is very closely linked to the other two, but the 
key distinguishing factor is the actual reposing by one party of confidence in the other (Treitel, 
1999 p.379), where “some overreaching, some form of cheating, and generally though not 
always, some personal advantage obtained” (Allcard v Skinner, 1887 p.181). Lord Lindley also 
added, “insidious forms of spiritual tyranny” to his descriptions of conduct to be guarded against 
(ibid p.182).   
The second form or class of undue influence expounded by Lord Lindley, termed presumed, or 
relational undue influence, is the one perhaps more strongly associated with the legal doctrine’s 
classic origins.  Relationships were a particular concern in the Chancery courts of equity, and 
justice was brought to rectify unsatisfactory transactions particularly where relationships bore 
some relation to the shepherd and sheep image described above. As was set out by Lord 
MacNaghten in the Bank of Montreal v Stuart case (1911 p.137), where such a relationship 
existed, the law would presume that any questioned gift of immoderate or irrational size from the 
victim to the person in the position of trust or power was wrongful, and the burden of evidence to 
remove the presumption would immediately shift to the influencing party.  Such relationships 
that would lead to a presumption of undue influence in any disputed transfers include parent and 
child, clergy member and communicant, physician and patient (Farnsworth, 1999 para 4.2). 
These groups have also included teachers, doctors, lawyers, bankers, trustees, priests, investment 
advisors, spiritual leaders and more (Treitel, 2003 p.409).  
As an example of this form, in a case where a client purchased an asset from her solicitor, the 
onus was on the solicitor to show that the client was fully informed of all the relevant facts, that 
the client was separately advised, and that the transaction was a fair one (Wright v Carter, 1903). 
Sometimes termed status based fiduciaries, such a presumed relationship of trust is as a 
consequence of a formal role and function which results in them being automatically trusted, 
such as trustees vis a vis their beneficiaries, physicians and their patients (Finn, 1989 p.33). 
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Shepherd describes this sort of fiduciary relationship as existing, “whenever any person acquires 
a power of any type on condition that he also receive with it a duty to utilise that power in the 
best interest of another” (Shepherd, 1981 p.96). The law thus presumes, from the combination of 
the fact of the relationship and of the transaction, that the opportunity for unfair advantage taking 
was in fact real. Lord Herschell set out the basis of this assumption in the case of Bray v Ford 
(1986, p52), where he stated that fiduciaries could be devious, furtive and shrewd.  
It is also important to note that it is no excuse for the person charged with undue influence to 
state that the dealing was in the victim’s interests, or that she being the accused party had not 
received benefit from it (Treitel, 1999 p.377). Such well-meaning paternalism is of no benefit to 
the party accused of undue influence.  The fact that the victim’s will was subverted, even 
unknowingly, means that even substantively fair commercial transactions entered into as a result 
of relational undue influence should be set aside, not only as a matter of right but additionally as 
a matter of justice (Allcard v Skinner, 1887 p.183). In summary, substantive unfairness in the 
form of a bad outcome is not integral to a case of relational undue influence, and it is no defence 
in such cases that the disputed transaction might have turned out well for the victim. As Deane J 
stated,  
In such cases, we do not ask whether it was a good bargain or a bad bargain before we set 
it aside. The mere fact that you, being in circumstances which made it your duty to give 
your client advice, have put yourself in the position […] where your interests come in 
conflict, that mere fact authorises him to set aside the contract if he chooses to do so. 
(McPherson v Watt, 1877 p.272) 
Undue influence should thus remain an influential doctrine to assist vulnerable parties, being 
applicable even when the exploitation is subtle and not manifestly obvious. It is clear therefore 
that within the legal neighbourhood comprising stakeholders within the biomedical research 
community, all of the factors that give rise to caution are present.  Research institutions interact 
with communities in transactions that are often less than straightforward, and the communities 
are vulnerable in that they defer to and rely entirely upon the former party for crucial 
information. Researchers are educated people, often with a high status relative to the community.  
The notion of vulnerability in cases of relational undue influence is thus highly relevant, as with 
other forms of exploitative contract, but it is more importantly linked specifically to the 
relationship of trust, which a participant community can quickly acquire with a researcher, 
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especially if they believe that the research is medical and might be linked to the provision of 
health care.  
The culpability of the trusted party, known in legal terminology as the fiduciary, is that she has 
knowledge of the beneficiary’s particular susceptibility towards her influence, which she 
proceeds to exploit. To trust a person is to render oneself vulnerable to that person, who acquires 
a certain corresponding power over the trusting one. The greater the trust, the greater the 
interpersonal vulnerability to the other’s power. What Bigwood (2003) terms equity’s 
“prophylactic stance against possible wrongdoing by a fiduciary” (ibid p.404), is thus triggered 
by the inherent inequality and potential for abuse inherent in all status-based relationships of 
trust. The consent provided by the vulnerable party where such a relationship of influence exists, 
is thus closely examined by the law’s procedural enquiry for signs of deference of voluntariness.   
Concluding the discussion on undue influence, it is, together with unconscionable dealing and 
duress; inimical to the existence of the free agency required to constitute legal voluntariness and 
a person’s ability to freely assent. The precise bounds of undue influence overlap with the other 
exculpatory doctrines of duress and unconscionable dealing discussed above, in addition to the 
doctrines of mistake, breach of fiduciary duty and misrepresentation (Bigwood, 2003 p.378). 
What is required for the doctrine of undue influence to assist an aggrieved party is firstly, a 
relationship of influence, and secondly a suspicious transaction (ibid p.424), the latter meaning a 
transaction that is not clearly in the interests of the aggrieved party. In all cases the weaker party 
is justified in trusting that the other will not act contrary to the former’s best interests (ibid 
p.428). Biomedical research clearly provides situations where communities are specially 
disadvantaged in relation to a researcher (Flanagan, 2000 p.314), in that they place reliance on 
information provided by that trusted person. Undue influence is a powerful and flexible tool for 
justice in such cases.   
The three forms of contractual exploitation are distinguished from one another on the basis of 
characteristics determined in a holistic procedural assessment. The following diagram reflects the 
most important characteristics of the three doctrines. 
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Table 1: Three Doctrines of Contractual Exploitation  
 
 
THREE 
CONTRACTUAL 
FORMS OF 
EXPLOITATIVE 
DEALING 
 
THE ROLE AND 
NATURE OF 
CONSENT 
 
THE 
RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES 
 
THE  ESSENCE OF 
THIS FORM OF 
EXPLOITATION 
 
THE PARTICULAR  
FORM OF 
VULNERABILITY  
 
UNCONSCIONABLE 
DEALING 
 
Real consent exists, 
but its voluntariness 
is impaired by the 
dealings of the other 
party. (Motivated by 
need or 
circumstances) 
 
No former 
relationship required 
between the parties.  
 
Taking unfair advantage 
of a vulnerable party, to 
achieve her real 
consent, for the benefit 
of the more powerful 
party; i.e. dealing in a 
wrongful manner 
 
Circumstances not of 
the stronger party’s 
making result in a 
vulnerability of the 
weaker party.   
 
DURESS 
 
Real consent exists, 
but its voluntariness 
is impaired as it takes 
place (is entirely 
forced) as a result of 
the illegal coercion 
by the other party. 
(Motivated by fear) 
 
No former 
relationship required 
between the parties.  
 
Improper use of 
coercion or illegal 
pressure in order to 
bring about consent, to 
the benefit of the 
coercer. 
 
The improper/illegal 
use of coercion or 
pressure by one party 
makes the other party 
vulnerable and secures 
forced consent.  
 
UNDUE INFLUENCE 
 
Real consent exists. 
However its 
voluntariness is 
impaired by the 
undue influence of 
the other. (Motivated 
by trust and 
influence.) 
 
The relationship of 
trust or influence 
between the parties 
is central to the 
presence of undue 
influence.    
 
Improper use of trust 
relationship in order to 
achieve the real consent 
of the influenced 
person, in a ‘suspicious 
transaction.’   
 
The relationship of trust 
makes the trusting party 
particularly vulnerable 
in respect of influence 
of the trusted party.  
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6.7 Conclusion 
In concluding this chapter on justice and the role of the law in its achievement, and prior to 
examining the warnings against undue influence and coercion contained in the bioethics 
guidelines, the briefest recapitulation of the above discussion is appropriate. What was required 
was an understanding of the concepts of undue influence and coercion, within a broad 
framework of justice and law. A glance over the realm of international justice and the place of 
law within the quest for fairness and equity led to Pogge’s conceptual depiction of justice, which 
was followed by an examination of the early foundations for law, justice and equity as laid down 
by Aristotle, where he divided forms of justice primarily into distributive and corrective justice. 
Corrective justice which concerns bilateral actions between humans, includes commutative 
justice, otherwise known as justice in exchange, which frames the discussions and concerns 
raised in this thesis. Mayer’s second form of exploitation, it should be recalled, a non-legal 
conceptualisation of exploitation, is similarly situated within such voluntary and bilateral 
exchanges.  
Modern law was then briefly reviewed as the manifestation of the attempt by states to both 
regulate and bring justice to dealings between people, commencing with an analysis of equity 
law followed by contract law, which regulates all voluntary exchange transactions. Finally, the 
three areas of contract law that were most strongly influenced by the law of equity and that were 
developed specifically to remedy exploitation of vulnerable parties were analysed in some detail.  
Each of these forms of contractual exploitation takes place within the context of the ‘legal 
neighbourhood’ of genomic research, which includes amongst all the other stakeholders, 
researchers and indigenous communities. This legal neighbourhood it will be recalled requires 
justice in exchange in all cases where a certain vulnerability exists on the one side of a 
transaction, where that vulnerability or dependency is known to the other, who then uses that 
power in the dealing (Bigwood, 2003 p.506). This thesis suggests that biomedical companies, 
genetic bio-banks, researchers, research participants and their communities are all encompassed 
within such relationships of legal neighbourhood, and when transacting in the processes of 
genetic research are bound by duties of equity and fairness towards one another. Bearing in mind 
the core components of and distinctions between the types of contractual exploitation as depicted 
in the figure above, the discussion will now turn to address whether and under what 
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circumstances benefit-sharing might either coerce or unduly influence potential participants in 
genomic research. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: UNDUE INDUCEMENT AND COERCION 
 
The final impediment to benefit sharing in genetic research now stands to be addressed. This 
objection is expressed in the warnings contained in the research ethics guidelines, namely that 
offered benefits or payments might either coerce or unduly influence vulnerable research 
participants to consent to providing their genetic resources, against their interests and without 
due consideration of the potentially harmful consequences. Protection of potentially vulnerable 
research participants from exploitation is the ethical backbone of biomedical research, from 
whom the obtaining of informed consent receives much attention. Guideline 6 of the CIOMS 
International Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research headed “obtaining informed consent” 
commences with the words, “Sponsors and investigators have a duty to refrain from unjustified 
deception, undue influence, or intimidation” (CIOMS, 2002 p.6), and the Declaration of Helsinki 
prior to its most recent version in October 2013 described vulnerable populations as “those who 
may be vulnerable to coercion and undue inducement (WMA, 2008).60   
Undue inducement and coercion, both wrongful ways of eliciting consent, are frequently 
cautioned against in the plethora of ethical guidelines as discussed further below. 61  In order to 
enable a better understanding of this objection against benefit sharing, the previous chapter 
provided a contextual background to the origins of these terms both in justice as well as in law. 
The distinction drawn by Aristotle between what he termed distributive and corrective justice 
enabled this thesis’ focus on the latter category, within which commutative justice is concerned 
with fairness in voluntary exchanges between two parties. A brief exposition of the laws that 
govern voluntary exchanges was commenced with an account of the law of equity, which 
influenced the common law of contract, and produced three defences against exploitative 
contracts, namely unconscionable dealing, coercion and undue influence. The criteria that 
                                                          
60 The most recent version of the Declaration of Helsinki published in October 2013 has removed this particular 
definition of vulnerability, discussed further below. 
61The most prominent international research ethics guidelines include the following: Council for International 
Organisations of Medical Science and the World Health Organisation, International Ethical Guidelines (CIOMS 
2002, guideline 7), UNESCO Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights Article 15 (UNESCO, 2005), 
Declaration of Helsinki (WMA, 2013) and Nuffield Council on Bioethics, the Ethics of Research Related to 
Healthcare in Developing Countries (2002).  
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evolved in contract law for determining the presence of exploitation in an exchange will be 
drawn upon in the discussion below. 
It is regarded as a concern by many that undue inducement and coercion have become something 
of an international orthodoxy (Wilkinson & Moore, 1997), presenting an impediment for 
research in the developing world (Grant, 2002). Whilst much of the earlier academic debate on 
coercion and undue influence is specifically directed at the situation of research participants in 
clinical trials, the ethical principles at stake are also broadly applicable to individuals as well as 
collectives recruited for genetic research, the focus of this thesis. An additional predicament for 
research conducted in the developing world however exists for the reason that, in resource poor 
settings, the provision of virtually any form of benefits can theoretically be and often is in 
practice interpreted as an undue inducement (Chokshi et al., 2005 p.5). For instance, Annas and 
Grodin (1998) have argued that in the absence of health care, virtually any offer of medical 
assistance, even in the guise of research, will be accepted as better than nothing.  
The purpose of this chapter is to replace the lack of clarity referred to by Chokshi et al., with a 
clear understanding of the meaning and application of undue inducement and coercion in genetic 
research. It is proposed to explain how the terms should be understood and applied by RECs, to 
provide useful guidance, and in particular to clarify whether or in what circumstances these 
concerns should stand in the way of the provision of benefits to research subjects in genetic 
research. This examination of undue influence and its two associated doctrines of coercion and 
unconscionable dealing will commence with a brief background to the concepts, during which 
two case studies will be provided to serve as benchmarks for the discussion. Next, a brief survey 
of selected extracts from biomedical research ethics guidelines will be conducted, in order to 
assess what guidance is currently available for RECs and other institutions that are required to 
approve genetic research, and in order to highlight the key ethical concerns.  
The three most significant and interrelated ethical concerns or problems reflected in the 
guidelines relating to undue influence and coercion of research participants will then be 
examined in turn, situated within the causal triangle between vulnerability, autonomy or 
voluntariness, and risk of harm. Firstly, the vulnerability of research participants, and secondly, 
their autonomy and voluntariness during research exchanges where inducements are involved, 
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will be discussed. Thirdly, the thesis turns to the issue of risks in relation to genetic research, 
including the relevance of such risks for communities and groups targeted for genetic research, 
and the central role of RECs in ensuring non-maleficence and beneficence. To conclude the 
analysis, the case studies will then be examined in the light of the earlier treatment of undue 
inducement and coercion, including the key indicators provided by the law of contractual 
exploitation. The chapter will close with a discussion and some ventured conclusions.   
7.1 Background to undue inducement and coercion in bioethics   
Godfrey Tangwa (2007) explains in an article on research with vulnerable human beings that the 
exploitation of human vulnerabilities is manifested in coercive research, deceptive research, and 
inductive research. He goes on to state,  
Inducement is a serious problem in present day research, especially in the developing 
world. It cannot properly be fully appraised without taking into consideration the 
distinction between the agent/patient of moral action. A high burden of disease, combined 
with desperate poverty and ignorance makes people highly vulnerable to inductive 
research. (ibid p.518)  
As background to this discussion on undue inducement it should be made clear that this thesis 
excludes from its purview any payments made to individuals or groups in the form of 
reimbursements, medical services, or compensation for inconvenience and expenses as set out in 
guideline 7 of CIOMS (CIOMS, 2002) as well as HUGO’s statement on benefit sharing (HUGO, 
2000 paragraph G). In genomic research such ‘payments for donors’ as compensation for 
inconvenience or expenses are likely to be insignificant, and are not regarded as ethically 
problematic. The type of benefits that this thesis anticipates as possible forms of inducement are 
the range of collective benefits described in the appendix to the Nagoya Protocol, which include 
in addition to various forms of monetary payments, seventeen forms of possible non-monetary 
benefits62  (CBD, 2010).    
When are the persuading or influencing of others coercive or otherwise undue in an exchange 
between two parties? It is a natural defence or excuse of a disgruntled person who regrets some 
                                                          
62 Non-monetary benefits under the Nagoya Protocol include a) sharing of research and development results, b) 
collaboration, cooperation in research and development programmes, c) participation in product development, 
d)education and training e) Admittance to ex situ facilities of genetic resources and to databases, f) transfer of 
knowledge and technology, g) strengthening capacity for technology transfer h) institutional capacity building and 
more (CBD 2010, annex ) 
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transaction, such as a child accused of a bad deed, to blame the influence of another. “She made 
me do it,” or “I only did it because I trusted her advice.” The basic inference in these excuses is 
some form of unseemly manipulation or exploitation of one by the other’s influence. Persuasion, 
influencing and inducements however form part of our everyday lives. From promises of rewards 
for children to do their homework, to salaries and desirable incentive bonuses at the workplace, 
to the bargaining of attractive terms in the process of negotiating and promoting economic and 
other exchanges.   
The question arises as to when and why are the various benefits, inducements or incentives, 
which are offered to humans in the course of research, in breach of the ethical line. Moreover, 
when is an offer or overture made by one to another, in the words of Grant and Sugarman (2004), 
“excessive, unwarranted, inappropriate or improper?” (ibid p.725). In addition, in view of the 
perennial need for research to advance biomedical science, how indeed are research subjects to 
be recruited effectively, but without coercion or undue inducement and thus in breach of the 
guidelines? (ibid p. 726). Let me introduce an example of the recruitment dilemma. When a 
group of medical professors from Harvard conceived of a novel way of getting individuals to 
have their blood tested for HIV in South Africa, by inviting the public to take part in a 
competition where prizes worth $10,000 were to be won, the South African Medical Association 
strongly condemned the popular campaign, finding it in breach of the ethical principle against 
undue inducement. The competition was duly terminated, despite the fact that the project was 
acknowledged as being both worthwhile in purpose and successful in outcome (Cape Argus, 
2011).63  
The previous chapter discussed the three defences developed over centuries by the English 
equity courts to assist any individuals wrongly manipulated, coerced or induced into detrimental 
contracts. A party complaining that she was persuaded or encouraged into an unsatisfactory 
agreement as a result of the overwhelming influence of another could for example have the 
transaction reversed in an equity court by claiming undue influence (Treitel, 1999 p.376).   
Similar defences came to the aid of vulnerable parties under the other two equitable doctrines, 
                                                          
63Notably, the principal objection expressed against the project was that the enticements, namely the possibility of 
winning prizes, were declared to be in contravention of ethical conduct, and more specifically that they were  
“undue” (ibid p.3).   
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namely unconscionable dealing and duress. The law of contract adopted these legal doctrines, 
and developed relatively clear criteria for determining when a transaction is deemed exploitative 
of a weaker party. It was explained that a legally competent individual, that is not a minor or 
otherwise incompetent person, is generally presumed to operate under a legal presumption of 
voluntariness, in terms of which such an individual was bound by the terms of a contract unless 
she could prove the existence of duress or other manipulation (ibid p.286).   
The more recent history of undue inducement and coercion in the field of bioethics rather than of 
law is closely associated with the evolution of the doctrine of informed consent from the 1950s 
to the present time (Beauchamp, 2012 p.515). The various abuses and atrocities that took place 
involving experimentation on human beings during the 1970s and 1980s, such as the 
Willowbrook case referred to below resulted in a crackdown and regulatory response against 
coercion or undue influence in research (Emanuel, 2003). One can assume that such abusive 
research was the primary target of the protective response. Voluntariness in consent began to be 
scrutinised under the law relating to informed consent (Appelbaum et al., 2009 p.11), which held 
that although decision makers are susceptible to multiple influences, voluntary decisions should 
reflect the will of the decision-maker, and consent would be inauthentic if given under duress or 
some such outside force (ibid p.11).   
A curious conundrum therefore persists in biomedical research, namely that projects in less 
affluent settings may be prevented or discouraged from sharing benefits with their relatively poor 
research participants by the strict application of the undue inducement prohibition. This is 
another form of double standard in medical research, in which the strict imposition of ethical 
standards formulated in a developed world ethos has the potential to disadvantage the developing 
world (Macklin, 2004). In the words of Chadwick et al. (2001), there is a perceived danger that 
emphasis on the distribution of benefits in such a research setting might be seen not as an 
exercise in distributive justice, but rather as an attempt to buy people off (ibid p.321). If applied 
incorrectly, or out of an excess of caution, this lack of understanding of undue inducement might 
cause benefits or incentives as part of developing world genetic research projects to be wrongly 
rejected, thus preventing the fair allocation of benefits for those humans whose genetic samples 
are required.  
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The underlying ethical concern thus resides in the supposition that providing payment or other 
benefits can, under certain circumstances, unduly influence, coerce or otherwise manipulate 
prospective research participants to consent to research, which might somehow entail 
unacceptable risks and compromise their welfare (Emanuel et al., 2005; Wilkinson et al., 1997).  
Undue inducement and coercion, associated with vulnerability of research subjects and exposure 
to risks of harm, therefore constitute perennial concerns for biomedical research, and require 
elucidation. However, RECs are neither clear nor consistent in their interpretation of undue 
influence and coercion, and continue, in the absence of clear understanding, to apply what 
Wilkinson and Moore (1997) term the, “anti-inducement orthodoxy position namely to withhold 
authorisation” (ibid p.375). This chapter aims to examine anew the prohibition against undue 
influence and coercion in the context of the guidance provided by the law of equity, and to 
provide practical guidance that can be applied by RECs and those that pursue genetic research in 
developing countries.  
Two case studies  
In order to ground the discussion, two examples of apparent undue inducement or coercion are 
provided, the first case involving an attractive offer combined with extremely high risks for the 
subject, and the second an imaginary case involving the offer of attractive benefits in order to 
secure participation of an indigenous community in genetic research.  
The first case concerns the well-known Willowbrook hepatitis study, where parents of mentally 
disabled children, who were the research subjects, provided the informed consent. The parents 
were encouraged to enlist their children in a study in which they were to be infected with 
hepatitis (Nelson, 1998 pp.47-66), the inducement being the offer of a guaranteed place for the 
child in Willowbrook State School, a desirable residential treatment facility for which there was 
otherwise a long waiting list (Grant & Sugarman, 2004 p.729). An additional inducement to the 
parents was the promise that the child research subjects would be particularly well treated in the 
institution (Macklin, 1981 p.3). The parents controversially consented to their children’s 
participation, in exchange for a guarantee of their admission into the Willowbrook State School.  
As Macklin states, this case was complicated for a number of reasons, including the fact that it 
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involved a highly attractive offer, followed by proxy consent on behalf of vulnerable subjects, 
who were to be knowingly placed at risk (ibid p.3). 
The second case is an adapted version of a thought experiment originally suggested by Arnason 
and van Niekerk (2009). A small tribe in Africa, confined to a few villages but with a strong 
identity, is found to suffer from an unusually high frequency of a serious disease, which happens 
to be a common cause of death in developed countries. A group of geneticists expects that a 
genetic study of the tribe will reveal a single gene, or a fairly small combination of genes, that is 
responsible for the disease.  
Finding the gene, or set of genes, is considered a key to developing a very effective and 
profitable treatment. Members of the tribe are approached by the geneticists, but they have 
various concerns about the risks associated with the study, and are not keen to participate. One 
concern is that they are poor and will never receive access to the resulting treatment. Another is 
that they might be stigmatised worldwide as the people with this terrible disease. A further 
concern is that they do not fully understand what unknown risks they might become exposed to 
via the study. As a tribe they have an unrelated problem, which is that they are being asked to 
leave their traditional and sacred lands to make way for development initiated by their 
government and some companies. They need a substantial sum of money to spend on litigation in 
order to be able to avert the development. The tribe is poor, and needs the money, whilst the 
geneticists urgently need the bio-samples.   
The negotiation or engagement takes place in two phases. Firstly, aware of the tribe’s concerns 
about participating in the study, and also wary of breaching the guidelines, the geneticists make 
an offer to the participants of a modest but reasonable sum of money to defray participant travel 
expenses and compensate them for inconvenience, and to the tribal leaders of a modest sum of 
money to be dedicated to a local health clinic.  Whilst some individuals indicate willingness to 
consent, the tribal leaders refuse to accept the offered terms and effectively prevent the project 
proceeding.  They convey the fact that the risks are unknown, and the rewards offered are simply 
not sufficiently enticing.  After due contemplation by the geneticists, and their commercial 
partners in the project, of the considerable benefits associated with securing access to the tribe’s 
samples, the geneticists raise their initial offer considerably. They now offer to pay to the tribal 
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leaders, in addition to the normal compensation for expenses and inconvenience, a considerable 
sum of money, to be used entirely as they wish, and calculated to be an amount sufficient for the 
tribe to keep the developers away and protect their land.   
Even if the tribe’s initial concerns about the research risks are real, the improved package of 
benefits now offered makes it very difficult, and unlikely if not impossible for them to say no 
under these circumstances. The tribal leaders willingly sign a document signifying their 
collective permission for the research, informed consent, which sets out all of the relevant details 
of the research including the terms and conditions relating to the offered payments. Thereafter 
they encourage the individuals to take part in the study and to give individual consent.  
7.2 The ethical guidelines 
The international biomedical research ethics guidelines have as their explicit purpose the 
protection of human subjects – individuals and groups – from all forms of exploitation or harm 
and are an attempt to universalise the moral norms and rules that humans have developed in 
order to achieve this purpose. Since the Hippocratic Oath, which was written by the Greek 
scholar Hippocrates in the 5th Century BC who is regarded as the father of Western medicine, 
physicians and healthcare professionals have sworn to practice medicine honestly and in 
accordance with a rigorous code of honour (Farnell, 2004 p.244). A succession of modern codes 
and guidelines has emerged to guide both medicine and research, and which attempt to apply a 
universal ethical code despite some peoples’ concerns about “the undeniable fact of cultural 
differences” (Tangwa, 2007 p.43).   
The international research ethics guidelines are generally regarded as being based upon three 
core ethical principles first identified and institutionalised in the landmark Belmont Report,64 
namely beneficence, respect for persons, and justice (CIOMS, 2002). To these three tenets an 
important fourth principle has been added, namely that of non-maleficence, which means do no 
harm. Non-maleficence requires a balancing with beneficence in the assessments of risks and 
benefits (Beauchamp & Childress, 2008), and was also said to be a direct response to the 
                                                          
64The Belmont Report (1979) was adopted by the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects in 
Biomedical and behavioral Research (the National Commission) According to Grant & Sugarman (2005) the report 
adopted a “principlist” approach in terms of which the three ethical principles of beneficence, respect for persons 
and justice are prima facie binding in consideration of research  (p.274).  
 
  
 126 
Tuskegee and Willowbrook ethical controversies (Hevesi, 2010). The guidelines balance a 
measure of protection of human subjects on the one hand with an emphasis on the autonomy of 
patients or research participants on the other. The move to autonomy has been suggested to be a 
departure from the more paternalistic frameworks that had reacted to the early history of 
coercion of human subjects (Sutrop & Simm, 2011p.533).  
7.2.1 Exploitation in the guidelines. 
Ethical concerns about exploitation of both individuals and groups are at the root of the 
guidelines, which concerns are broadly motivated by the third core ethical principle namely that 
of justice, and protection of the vulnerable against exploitation.  Many terms prevalent in the 
bioethics discourse, such as consent, voluntariness, risk and inducement have closely mirrored 
developments in the fields of law concerned with commutative justice or justice in exchange, as 
discussed in the previous chapter. The securing of informed consent from such vulnerable parties 
by means of the offering of an excessive, unwarranted, inappropriate or improper reward or other 
overture (Grant & Sugarman, 2004 p.725), the subject of this chapter, is one of the major 
bioethical concerns related to the protection of vulnerable participants in biomedical research, 
particularly in the developing world, as noted earlier.  
The ethical principles set out in the Declaration of Helsinki, which revolve to a large degree 
around autonomy and protection of the human subject, are fleshed out and further amplified in a 
number of other influential international guidelines. The International Ethical Guidelines for 
Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects issued by the Council for International 
Organisations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) issued in 1982, and revised first in 1993 and then in 
2002, includes amongst its stated priorities informed consent, vulnerability of individuals, groups 
and communities and populations, and finally equity regarding burdens and benefits (CIOMS 
2002 p.1). The background to the CIOMS introduction describes how the guidelines seek to 
encourage the avoidance of paternalism by richer countries, and prevention of exploitation of 
poor countries, whilst guidelines 4 to 7 prescribe requirements for informed consent. Guideline 5 
specifies that the competent individual participant is required, after having considered all the 
information placed before her to, “arrive at a decision without having been subjected to coercion, 
undue influence or inducement, or intimidation” (ibid p.5).  
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The common rule of the American Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects provides 
similar guidance, stating that the prospective subject must be able to consider whether to 
participate under circumstances that minimize the possibility of coercion or undue influence.65  
Further elucidation of warnings against undue influence is provided by CIOMS in relation to 
informed consent.  Guideline 6, for example, states that sponsors and investigators have a duty to 
“refrain from unjustified deception, undue influence, or intimidation”, the commentary to the 
guideline correctly reinforcing that “all intimidation invalidates informed consent” (CIOMS, 
Article 5).   
These words warn of the influence that a physician, health practitioner or principal investigator 
in a research project might exert or bring to bear upon a research subject.  It should be noted that 
the forms of prohibited dealings described in the guidelines, namely unfair deception, improper/ 
undue influence, and intimidation are all covered by one of the three legal doctrines against 
exploitation discussed in the previous chapter. Admitting that the borderline between justifiable 
persuasion and undue influence is imprecise, and reflecting the debates on the subject in the 
courts of law, this guideline 6 proceeds to say that the researcher, “should give no unjustifiable 
assurances about the benefits, risks or inconveniences of the research, for example, or induce a 
close relative or community leader to influence a prospective subject’s decision” (CIOMS, 2002 
Article 6).  
Despite the concerted effort by CIOMS to explain the meaning of undue influence and coercion, 
it has to be observed that the frequent use of the words undue, induce and unjustifiable without 
any further elucidation or criteria provide little practical guidance to health professionals or 
laypersons as to the interpretation and precise meanings of these terms. This difficulty resonates 
with Lord Clyde’s conclusion that a precise definition of undue influence is impossible, and that 
it can be more easily recognised on the facts rather than analysed in the abstract (Royal Bank of 
Scotland plc v Etridge, 2001 p.1050). Finally, CIOMS guideline 7, which is headed ‘inducement 
to participate’, describes how research subjects may be reimbursed for lost earnings and other 
expenses, as well as being given medical benefits. However, the payments should not be so large 
or the medical services so extensive as to induce prospective subjects to consent to participate in 
the research against their better judgement. The commentary to guideline 7 uses phrases such as 
                                                          
65 Code of Federal Regulations. Protection of Human Subjects. 45 CFR 46 
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“against their better judgement” and “rewards that undermine a person’s capacity to exercise free 
choice,” in an effort to distinguish and identify the wrongful form of inducement (CIOMS, 2002 
Article 7). 
These explanations reflect the tension between free choice, which is associated with autonomy of 
persons, and situations where judgement is to some extent and wrongly influenced or clouded, 
requiring protection. Other guidelines emulate this attempt to describe the prohibition against 
undue inducement, but are less than helpful, simply repeating words such as influence, improper 
and inducement. UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, for 
example, simply states “benefits should not constitute improper inducements to participate in 
research” (UNESCO, 2005 p.15), whilst the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, in its report headed 
The Ethics of Research Related to Healthcare in Developing Countries, describes the nature of 
undue inducements as those that are able to change a prospective participant’s mind with regard 
to the costs and benefits of the research, 
[…] in a less than benign manner, so that the benefit offered by the inducement 
outweighs all risks, however substantial.  This could cause individuals to expose 
themselves to risks or potential harms that they would ordinarily view as unacceptable. 
And it is in such circumstances that the inducement would be inappropriate. (Nuffield, 
2002 p.79) (emphasis added) 
Furthermore, the explanation is added that inducements are inappropriate for the reason that 
they, “jeopardize the voluntariness required for informed consent “(para 6.2) and might lead a 
research subject to accept a risk that would “not otherwise be acceptable” (para 6.29). The 
guidelines thus resort to circuitous reasoning to describe the situation where the voluntary 
exercise of choice is trumped by the attractiveness of inducements, which are larger, wrongful or 
manipulative, using the very words that need elucidation as part of the explanation. Genomic 
research, whilst fully bound by the ethical principles reflected in the above guidelines, is also 
guided by additional formulations aimed at dealing with its specific concerns. For example, the 
HUGO Ethics Committee of the Human Genome Organisation (HUGO) in its seminal statement 
on benefit sharing stated “that undue inducement through compensation for individual 
participants, families and populations should be prohibited” (HUGO, 2000). 
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7.2.2 The central concerns of the guidelines 
The aforementioned guidelines are the primary guidelines available to RECs entrusted with the 
task of assessing research projects, and who are required to determine (inter alia), whether or not 
benefits or inducements offered to research participants are coercive or otherwise undue. The 
guidance is however, to a large extent circuitous, and is in practical terms according to many 
authors minimal if not contradictory (Grady, 2005; Dickert & Grady, 1999). The conclusion of a 
recent article by Largent et al. captures well the concerns intended to be addressed by this 
chapter. 
We conclude that human subject’s protection professionals hold expansive and 
inconsistent views about coercion and undue influence that may interfere with the 
recruitment of research participants and impede valuable research. (Largent et al., 2012 
p.1) 
A synthesis of the above research guidelines however, enables three interrelated ethical themes 
to emerge from the pronouncements on undue inducement and coercion. Firstly, it is the 
vulnerability of certain individuals and groups that demands protection from particular types of 
exploitative inducements. Secondly, autonomy and voluntariness, essential for informed consent, 
are jeopardised by undue inducement and coercion; and thirdly, non-maleficence or risk of harm 
in relation to offered inducements is a central component of this form of potential exploitation, 
vulnerable people being in danger of consenting to potential harm against their better judgement.  
The discussion below will examine each of these interrelated ethical themes in turn, bearing in 
mind the two examples provided above, and will incorporate the guidance on exploitative 
contracts provided in the previous chapter.        
7.3 Vulnerability  
Vulnerability demands constant attention in bioethics, being inextricably linked to the idea of 
exploitation, and recurring throughout any discussion of coercion or undue influence.  
Vulnerability amongst and within humankind is the subject of a considerable body of research 
(Forster et al., 2001; Arnason & Schroeder, 2013). The word is defined in the International 
Ethical Guidelines for Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects of the Council for 
International Organisations of Medical Science as follows: 
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Vulnerability refers to a substantial incapacity to protect one’s own interests owing to 
such impediments as lack of capability to give informed consent, lack of alternative 
means of obtaining medical care, or other expensive necessities, or being a junior or 
subordinate member of a hierarchical group. (CIOMS, 2002)  
 
The word spans a vast spectrum of human conditions, ranging from the primary existential fact 
on the one extreme that as part of humankind all humans share a certain flesh and blood mortal 
vulnerability, and spreading across multifarious and more obvious criteria and forms of 
vulnerability –minors, mentally disabled, minorities, the very poor and illiterates to list the most 
prominent categories – on the other. The commentary to the CIOMS guideline 13 describes 
vulnerable persons as those who are relatively or absolutely incapable of protecting their own 
interests, referring more specifically to a lack of power, intelligence, education, resources, 
strength or other needed attributes (CIOMS, 2002). 
An analysis of current bioethics guidelines in relation to vulnerability reveals numerous further 
groups and categories, all of which are deemed deserving of special protection under certain 
specific circumstances.66 Article 8 of an earlier version of the Declaration of Helsinki included in 
a description of vulnerable research populations, those who are economically and medically 
disadvantaged, who cannot give or refuse consent for themselves, and who may be subject to 
duress (WMA, 2000). This definition cast the conceptual net so widely that much of the 
developing world could logically have been branded as vulnerable, and was rightly criticised for 
virtually eliminating vulnerability as a meaningful concept (Forster et al., 2001).  
The 2008 version of the Declaration of Helsinki withdrew the previous formulation, choosing to 
focus on two particular groups, namely “those who cannot give or refuse consent, and “those 
who may be vulnerable to coercion or undue influence” (WMA, 2008). The current version 
however has simplified the description even further, stating in paragraph 19, “some groups and 
individuals are particularly vulnerable, and may have an increased likelihood of being wronged 
or incurring additional harm. All vulnerable groups should receive specially considered 
                                                          
66 Examples of such further vulnerable groups include racial minorities, the economically disadvantaged, the very 
sick, the institutionalized, children, prisoners, pregnant women, fetuses, incompetent persons, persons susceptible to 
coercion and undue influence, junior members of hierarchical groups, subordinate personnel, members of the armed 
forces, elderly persons, residents of nursing homes, people receiving welfare benefits and other poor people, the 
unemployed, patients in emergency situations, homeless persons, nomads, refugees or displaced persons, patients 
with incurable diseases, individuals who are politically powerless, members of communities unfamiliar with modern 
medical concepts (Hurst, 2008 p.193). 
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protection” (WMA, 2013).  The fact that the Declaration has now excluded undue inducement 
and coercion as two particular forms of vulnerability would appear to represent an advance in 
thinking, consistent with the views being developed in this chapter. Neither of these formulations 
however assists with the question as to how to identify such groups, and whether the tendency to 
exercise poor judgement is in itself a form of vulnerability. If this were the case, all individuals 
would be potentially vulnerable, at least on occasion, and to that extent in need of protection 
from their own poor judgement, whilst “impoverished persons might be regarded as 
automatically vulnerable due to their diminished autonomy” (Macklin 1982:6).  The 
Declaration’s new formulation relating to research involving vulnerable groups gives rise to 
additional concerns.  
Medical research with a vulnerable group is only justified if the research is responsive to 
the health needs or priorities of this group and the research cannot be carried out in a non-
vulnerable group. In addition, this group should stand to benefit from the knowledge, 
practices or interventions that result from the research (WMA 2013, paragraph 20). 
Not only does this sentence assume an ability to define such vulnerable groups accurately, but it 
has been criticised as being potentially unfair as well as patronising in cases where the intended 
research either had direct health benefits or presented minimal risk for the vulnerable group 
respectively (Schroeder & Gefenas, 2013). The concept of vulnerability is clearly difficult to 
convey accurately, and will be examined further by first exploring some attempts at definitions, 
followed by exploring the most extreme examples described as desperate need and low baselines.  
7.3.1 Definitions and categories of vulnerability 
Coleman (2009), in an analysis of vulnerability as a regulatory category in human subject 
research, has suggested a framework that examines which of the interests of the research 
participant – individual or group – might be at risk. Firstly, consent-based vulnerability is the 
person or group’s low capacity to protect her interests (ibid p.15). Less educated groups, such as 
the Havasupai tribe, would fall into this category as well as individuals or groups living in dire 
poverty67 who are potentially subject to coercion or undue inducement. Secondly, risk-based 
vulnerability occurs where the person’s level of exposure to certain risks is at stake, which would 
relate to the potential risks associated with the type of research envisaged. Finally, justice-based 
                                                          
67 What Wertheimer termed a ‘low baseline’. 
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vulnerability concerns both the distribution of the benefits and burdens of research, which would 
normally, in cases of genetic research, involve an analysis of whether the research participants 
were fairly treated, or taken advantage of (ibid p.15).   
In order to be treated justly, according to Mayer’s second class of exploitation, they would need 
to not only receive fair benefits, but also not be exposed to untoward risks. The justice-based 
vulnerability of research participants in genetic research, closely associated with the first two 
forms of vulnerability, well describes the intended emphasis and focus of this thesis. As stated by 
Wang (2011), target groups in HPGR are vulnerable in respect of all of these three categories, 
due to factors such as low education, lack of economic and social resources, cultural sensitivities 
and an absence of effective legal regulations or guidelines in most developing countries (ibid 
p.117). 
In attempting to arrive at a unifying definition of vulnerability, Schroeder & Gefenas (2009) 
build on and combine the external elements of vulnerability that are contained in most dictionary 
definitions of the term with the internal aspects which comprises the potential failure, otherwise 
put as incapacity, of certain people or groups to be able to protect their own interests. This 
distinction is useful in practice, suggesting that policy attempts to address vulnerability, or to 
reduce the likelihood of harm being suffered, can be approached in two ways, externally by 
minimising the likely outward causes of harm, and internally by raising the capacity of the 
vulnerable to protect themselves (ibid p.116).  
 
An example of attempts to address these external and internal components of vulnerability is 
provided by the case of communities that are vulnerable to malaria. External vulnerability is 
addressed by eliminating the mosquitoes carrying the parasite, and internal vulnerability is 
addressed by providing the community with knowledge, mosquito nets, repellants and 
medication. The composite definition of vulnerability proposed by these authors, incorporating 
both external and internal components, is as follows, “to be vulnerable means to be faced with a 
significant probability of incurring an identifiable harm, while substantially lacking the ability or 
means to protect oneself” (ibid p.117). 
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Determining the parameters of who are vulnerable, under what circumstances and in what 
manner is important for this thesis. Vulnerability relates directly to the issue of potential 
exploitation, the identification and prevention of which comprises one of the central tasks of a 
REC assessing the non-maleficence and beneficence of proposed research. Whilst some research 
participants might be ostensibly autonomous but suffer from a poor ability to resist a particular 
form of temptation, others might differ in vulnerability in response to different stimuli. Powerful 
influences shape peoples’ subjective values, choices and decisions, sometimes making them less 
than fully authentic or independent (Macklin, 1981 p.6). All humans are, to some extent, 
objectively and subjectively as well as externally and internally vulnerable in differing ways and 
circumstances. This reality adds to the complexity of the task faced by the biomedical research 
community, namely to seek to ensure that every research participant or community, even the 
poorest imaginable, is sufficiently protected in the proposed research, whilst at the same time 
respecting his, her or their autonomy. 
7.3.2 Desperate need and low baselines 
Some have suggested desperate need as an extreme form of vulnerability that clearly has the 
potential to reduce voluntariness, and to thereby vitiate consent, to predispose people to take 
unseemly risks, and to thereby expose themselves to exploitation. It is desperate need that in the 
words of the ethical guidelines can lead peoples’ judgement to be clouded and for them to accede 
to harmful or risky research “against their better judgement” (Wilkinson & Moore, 1997 p.377).  
However, as Wilkinson and Moore conclude after examining a number of scenarios, desperate 
need on the part of a weaker or more vulnerable party on its own, “is not sufficient in itself to 
undermine consent” (ibid p.377). The categories desperate offeree and enormous offer have been 
coined in the literature to describe precisely these types of situations, namely where either the 
vulnerable victim of inducement is in desperate need of money due to poverty, or the amount 
offered is so huge as to become virtually irresistible (Wilkinson, 2005 p.30). The inference 
contained in the terminology is that financial incentives above a certain, admittedly difficult to 
determine level, can make vulnerable or desperate peoples’ decisions less autonomous.   
Vulnerability of circumstances alone however, does not exclude the right to exercise the most 
advantageous choice under the circumstances. For example, the choice of a desperately poor 
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person to sell off her property in order to pay for an operation, or to take on dangerous 
employment in order to reap the rewards.  The parents of the mentally disabled children and the 
tribe in the case studies were all in some degree vulnerable, but their particular states of 
vulnerability were in none of the cases sufficient cause alone upon which to base a conclusion 
that autonomy was impaired, or that the consents to participate were impaired and therefore 
invalid. In addition to their state of vulnerability, what could make such cases abhorrent and 
deserving of correction, reminiscent of the infamous Tuskegee syphilis trial, is the added factor 
that the harm was intentionally committed on the unprotected research subjects. This was an 
exploitative transaction of Mayer’s third form, where a transaction took place, which was 
improper, inauthentic, and simply should not have been allowed.     
Following Wilkinson’s assertion in regard to cases of desperate need, why indeed should a poor 
person, parents of a mentally disabled child, or a poor community respectively not be entitled to 
engage actively and voluntarily in order to improve their dire circumstances?  Furthermore, 
where persons present and hold themselves out as being able to engage without assistance, why 
should other parties not be entitled to show respect for such persons?  
Wertheimer (1996), as an element of enquiry into exchanges, has proposed baselines of 
individuals, as discussed in the previous chapter. A person’s baseline represents the sum total of 
their circumstances, rights and options prior to the engagement. The holistic enquiry required by 
equity law would examine first, whether they stood to improve or worsen their baseline, and 
secondly, in what manner their particular situation was targeted, utilised or manipulated by the 
other party. In the broad spectrum of human interactions, parties are seldom equal in power and 
other resources, hence the ethical dilemma as to how exactly to establish when one party to an 
interaction is so weak as to be categorised as vulnerable in one or other of its multiple potential 
manifestations.   
Godfrey Tangwa, for example, describes research participants in Africa as being often “triple 
vulnerable” in relation to their research counterparts, in view inter alia, first, of their poverty, 
second, belonging to medically disadvantaged groups, and in many cases, third, being minors 
(Tangwa, 2009 p.517). The children in the Willowbrook hepatitis study could similarly have 
been described as triple vulnerable under those same three categories, and indigenous peoples 
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experience a cultural vulnerability of an altogether different variety. This dilemma of identifying 
and responding to differing forms of vulnerability is thus likely to remain a perennial concern 
with regard to the legal rights and obligations that arise from research in developing countries, 
which places a large responsibility on the REC as the institution charged with approving 
research.  
In conclusion, vulnerability remains a major ethical concern signifying the desire both in 
bioethics and in law to protect the weak and helpless. Individuals or groups targeted for genetic 
research can be exposed to one or more of consent-based, risk-based and justice-based 
vulnerability, and the various groups and types of vulnerability described in the guidelines are 
not conclusive of the issue. Members of such categories are able under certain circumstances to 
act with full autonomy, whilst fully autonomous persons can equally on occasion become 
vulnerable to exploitation. Where individuals belong to a community, broader issues of 
representation become relevant, and a later discussion will explore particular vulnerabilities of 
indigenous peoples in relation to genetic research.   
On a practical level, the three aspects of vulnerability distinguished in the previous chapter are 
useful in this analysis, where it plays a different role and is of a different nature in each of the 
three categories of exploitation. Firstly, people with low socio-economic baselines or in 
generally vulnerable circumstances are particularly susceptible to manipulation by anybody in a 
manner regarded as unconscionable dealing.68 Secondly, a wider group of people in addition to 
those with low baselines are potentially vulnerable to improper coercion or persuasion by certain 
persons, who expressly and wrongly apply such pressure on them. This form of dealing is called 
duress, which is somewhat similar to blackmail, where it is the action of the coercer that 
contributes to the vulnerability. Thirdly, as a result of a particular relationship of influence or 
trust, some individuals are particularly vulnerable to the improper or undue influence of such 
trusted parties.  
These three categories of vulnerability relate directly to the legal protections provided by 
contract law, namely unconscionable dealing, duress, and undue influence respectively. Due to 
the interrelatedness of baselines, relationships and inducements, whenever issues of vulnerability 
                                                          
68 The parents in the Willowbrook hepatitis study, for example. 
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and exploitation are at stake, evaluations require a comprehensive enquiry into the ability of such 
participants to act voluntarily in protecting their interests, which leads to the topic of autonomy.   
7.4 Autonomy   
Autonomy and associated voluntariness, the second of the ethical concerns raised in the 
guidelines about coercion and undue inducement, are concepts central to the core principle of 
respect for persons. The principle of autonomy strongly infuses debates not only on vulnerability 
but also on the moral and legal aspects of informed consent (Rehbock, 2011). In this discussion, 
a general overview on the role of autonomy will be followed by a brief exploration of the limits 
on voluntariness of consent, and then by an examination of inducements as one of the ways in 
which informed consent might be influenced and affected.  The discussion of inducements will 
refer to terms used by the guidelines to denote loss of voluntariness, and discuss this under the 
most extreme circumstances provided by the enormous offer and the desperate offeree. In 
conclusion, the question will be posed whether and under what circumstances autonomy and thus 
voluntariness are impaired by exploitative acts or circumstances.  
7.4.1 Overview 
The notion of individual autonomy as expressed by Isaiah Berlin’s statement “I wish my life and 
decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind” (Berlin 1969 p.123) is a 
central principle in bioethics, regarded as an individual’s prima facie right to self-determination 
in regard to her body. This right is closely entwined with the notion of informed consent, the 
pivotal moral requirement for medical research (Childress & Fletcher 1994 p.33).  Respect for 
autonomy is generally interpreted as “respect for the autonomous choices of other persons”, 
which has in turn been taken to mean individual liberty and self-determination (Rehbock, 2011 p, 
524). This understanding of autonomy, namely one that acknowledges the legitimacy of people 
shaping their lives according to their own aims and values, and which may of course differ 
between individuals and situations, is thus central to discussions on when such legitimate actions 
are curbed or tainted by pressures or influences from others.   
Another way of depicting autonomy as a principle is succinctly encapsulated by the expression, 
“persons should be free to choose and act without controlling constraints imposed by others” 
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(Faden & Beauchamp, 1986 p, 8). It should be noted that the above individualistic versions of 
autonomy have been challenged by communitarian philosophers who stress the principle that 
individuals exist as part of a community (Weijer, 1999), as well as by feminist theorists who 
emphasise the relational nature of all human life (Keller, 1997). Another criticism is that this 
view of autonomy is a particularly Western worldview, and is not shared by other collective or 
communitarian value systems (Dalton-Brown, 2013). These criticisms of the individualistic 
model have infused debates on consent as well as group exposures to genetic risks, and some 
authors regard the notion of relational autonomy as being widely accepted with regard in 
particular to genetic research. (Wang, 2011 p.38)   
As discussed in the previous chapter, the law governing voluntary exchanges – contract law – 
regards all legal parties as fully autonomous legal persons. This term encompasses all persons, 
collectives or corporations that are entitled to enter into contracts in their own names, and 
assumes their personal or collective autonomy. In other words, individuals and collectives are 
together with corporations deemed to be equally capable of understanding, concluding, and 
consenting to legally binding agreements. Proper informed consent where the one party is an 
illiterate individual or a rural community is however, notoriously difficult to achieve and all the 
more so in exchanges that involve complex issues, for example where the implications and risks 
associated with genetic research need to be conveyed (Kegley, 2004 p.32).   
Informed consent is regarded as the bastion upon which approval for the entire subsequent 
clinical or research exchange transaction is grounded. A concern exists that in most cases the 
descriptions of the intended research required for such informed consent are inevitably and in so 
many cases incomplete (O’Neil, 2004 p.1134).  Bioethics and contract law draw strongly upon 
and influence each other in this regard, as the quality and authenticity of informed consent 
remains the ethical and legal touchstone of a fair contract between two parties (Berg et al., 2009).  
Voluntary informed consent, as a central tenet of autonomy, first emerged in the guidelines as a 
buttress against exploitation during the 1970s, leading to a wealth of ethical analysis as well as a 
flurry of court cases that fleshed out the moral demands and meaning of the term (Beauchamp, 
2011 pp.515-6). The threat of litigation in the form of malpractice suits, in many cases involving 
analysis of the duty of disclosure of risk that should accompany informed consent, fuelled the 
refinement both of the legal doctrine of informed consent, as well as of the ethical guidelines 
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(ibid p.516). Informed consent has thus evolved as a device to signify autonomous and voluntary 
acceptance. This begs the question then as to under what circumstances should that voluntariness 
be limited or curbed?  
7.4.2 Limits on voluntariness of consent 
The question of limits on or the compromising of voluntariness and autonomy is central to all 
discussions on fairness, equity or exploitation in voluntary exchanges. Voluntariness has been 
described as a person’s right to decide freely, without undue influence, coercion, force or 
manipulation (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009 p.133). The liberal notion that individuals should 
be free to enter into all and any transactions coexists with society’s acknowledgement that 
certain limits to such autonomy should be provided.  Authors promoting voluntariness in 
contract, for example, hold that obligations can only be assumed if the terms are meaningfully 
understood, and the decision is substantially unconstrained (Robertson, 2005 p.180). Systems of 
law attempt to protect vulnerable groups such as consumers, children, tenants, and research 
participants, which endeavour is generally regarded as a form of justifiable paternalism (Kimel, 
2003 p.118).  
The law governing contractual exchanges, as described in the previous chapter, supported both 
the freedom of as well as the sanctity of contract, in order that commerce might benefit from 
certainty in exchange transactions. However, in opposition to unbridled freedom of contract, 
some commentators have asserted that the autonomy of individuals and the liberalistic, 
individualistic ideals of liberty should be restricted in favour of the public interest (Callahan, 
1992), as well as in accordance with the newly compelling ethical frameworks comprised of 
solidarity and equity (Chadwick et al., 2001).  
The assertions of the latter critics are in general that public interest motivations should justify 
certain compulsory freedom-diminishing actions, such as public vaccinations, the imposition of 
which might be against the will and autonomy of some.  Rehbock (2011), suggests that respect 
for autonomy should be understood in a broader sense and primarily as respect for the will of the 
person, bearing in mind that the will is not always the same as the wishes of the person, which 
may on occasion be immoral, unjust, or even irrational (ibid p.526). Her view is that autonomy is 
to be understood in a Kantian sense more as a moral autonomy rather than as individual liberty. 
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Her explanation being that, where the autonomous will of a person is applied in a manner seen as 
being immoral or unjust, such a will should indeed be overridden in favour of public interest; and 
where the application of such autonomous will is irrational, she argues that beneficence should 
provide the overriding factor (ibid p.527). The crucial question raised by the latter viewpoint is 
who or what institution precisely should make this intrusive judgement to override the expressed 
wishes of people, and how would appropriate evidence be mustered to support such a radical 
intervention?   
Michael Neumann (2000) captured well the fact that Kant’s view of autonomy is radically 
different from what people might wish for. Kant is not interested in the individual dreams, lives 
and purposes of human beings, but rather in their functioning as rational, autonomous self-
legislators.  As he aptly describes the distinction to be made in this approach, 
When I contemplate how to treat you, I’m in no way guided by your natural inclinations, 
your hopes, desires or dreams. These are put to one side. They are unworthy of you as a 
person, a homo noumenon, and belong to you only as an intrinsically worthless thing, a 
homo phaenomenon. Treating your rational nature as an end in itself, I ask whether my 
actions towards you are consistent with the universal principles of pure practical reason. I 
ask whether my act could be a universal practice, and willed as such. Once I have done 
so, I’m through with my moral deliberations: if the act is universalisable, I perform it: 
otherwise not. No messy consideration of what you want, as a flesh-and-blood human is 
required, otherwise it is positively excluded. (ibid p.286)  
According to Neumann then, one does not need to know the unique situations and desires that 
distinguish persons in order to make universalisable moral decisions. Whilst it is not proposed to 
explore further the vibrant ethical debate around the place of autonomy and limits on 
voluntariness (Beauchamp, 1994; O’Neill, 2002), moral and ethical conflicts continue to abound 
in the biomedical context.    
Appelbaum et al. (2009), concluded in an empirical study on the voluntariness of consent in 
research, that voluntariness and its impairment are conceptualised and rooted in the legal 
doctrine of informed consent (ibid p.11), which as the previous chapter described holds that 
consent is voluntary unless given under some form of improper manipulation, pressure or duress.  
In an article exploring the limits of voluntariness in contract, Andrew Robertson (2005), states 
that two different but closely associated claims are dominant in contract law, namely the 
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voluntariness claim and the autonomy claim (Robertson, 2005 p.180), which themes are 
repeatedly explored in leading judgements, scholarly writings and practitioner treatises.   
The former claim embodies the assertion that contractual obligations are voluntary, which can 
only take place if the terms are meaningfully understood and the decision to enter the contract is 
substantially unconstrained, whilst the latter claim holds that parties are free to shape their 
obligations exactly according to their wishes (ibid p.180). The distinction between these two is 
one of emphasis and further dissection is not relevant for this thesis.  Bearing in mind however, 
the fact that contractual obligations emanate from the will of the parties, it remains the voluntary 
assumption of obligation that is at the core of all contractual obligations (Craswell, 2000 p.99). 
Freedom of contract and voluntariness are according to O’Neill synonymous, and in her words, 
imply no limits as to what inducements could be offered. Classical freedom of contract would 
permit researchers to offer whatever conditions they like and, “ it would be up to subjects 
whether or not they accepted them” (O’Neill, 2002 p.128). 
Limitations on or a reduction of voluntariness are thus synonymous with invalidation of consent.  
The law of equity brought justice to contract law by intervening wherever the consent of a 
vulnerable party was somehow improperly obtained.  The three forms of exploitative contracts 
discussed in the previous chapter respond to three distinguishable ways in which the 
voluntariness of consent is compromised, providing relief in the name of unconscionable dealing, 
duress or undue influence respectively.  In all of these forms of exploitative contracts, in which 
the baseline of the weaker party would form a factual basis of the enquiry, some form of dealing, 
including the presentation or offer of inducement would have precipitated the transaction, 
serving to cloud the mind, coerce or otherwise dominate the better judgement of the vulnerable 
party. Equity thus provided very useful guidance on how the voluntary consent of a vulnerable 
person could be impaired. Having discussed autonomy generally, followed by limitations on 
voluntariness, it is now necessary to examine the inducements that are said on occasion to reduce 
the voluntariness of their victims.  
7.4.3 Inducements  
Inducements have long formed an intrinsic part of life, and clearly have an effect on the 
autonomy or voluntariness of the recipients. In a film titled Indecent Proposal featuring Robert 
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Redford as a handsome millionaire, his clearly inductive offer of a million dollars to sleep with a 
poor and beautiful woman, acted by Demi Moore, and the fraught voluntariness of her 
subsequent consent become the compelling ethical drama at the heart of the tale.  In another 
commonly referred to example, the consent given by a poor woman for her five children to 
undergo risky medical experiments in exchange for payment of a large sum of money is 
examined and generally regarded as morally dubitable (Wilkinson et al., 1997 p.376). This opens 
one up to the question as to whether these inducements are ethically wrong, and if so, why? 
Inducements and incentives, not necessarily as dramatic as these, are ubiquitous in our lives and 
are generally employed without too many ethical qualms. China’s well-known policy of 
increased taxation for families with more than one child is an example of a legal disincentive or 
inducement for citizens to plan for small families, and the punishing by law of speeding car 
owners provides clear examples of a stern form of official inducement. Inducements can range 
from benign, to morally dubious, to downright illegal, an extreme example of the latter being 
pointing a gun at a person’s head in order to persuade him to do something. Such inducement for 
good reason being sanctioned by the criminal law, together with crimes such as bribery, 
blackmail and extortion.  
Negotiation and interaction in the process of forming agreements entails normal and acceptable 
forms of persuasion but can lead to more obviously exploitative forms of bullying or 
manipulation that are prohibited both by moral codes as well as by the common law. The 
negotiation between parties that seek agreement in a transaction is after all, as described by 
Eisenberg, “a relatively norm-free process centred on the transmutation of underlying bargaining 
strength into agreement by the exercise of power, horse-trading, threat and bluff” (Eisenberg, 
1976 p.638). This less than reassuring quote is reflective of the wry warning provided by Charles 
Dickens on the dangers and nature of the negotiation process in the 19th Century. “Here’s the rule 
for bargains. ‘Do other men, for they would do you.’ That’s the true business precept” (Dickens, 
1844 p.19).   
Whilst not all biomedical research is ostensibly commercial in nature, the engagement with 
potential research participants or communities as part of a genetic research project may 
nevertheless comprise a form of negotiation, or bargaining with potentially significant 
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consequences. As was discussed in the chapter on law and justice, how to regulate such 
interactions and to ensure justice in such privately conducted transactions is far from 
straightforward. Some categories of incentives might raise ethical concerns yet remain difficult 
to distinguish from legitimate motivation. Such as the practice employed by pharmaceutical 
companies of rewarding medical doctors in various ways for promoting their drugs, and of 
acknowledging the achievements of successful researchers with shares, bonuses and other 
valuable inducements. In a world full of incentives and inducements, the concern of this chapter 
is that researcher might recruit and incentivise research participants by means that similarly 
induce them unduly. 
The task to determine what makes inducements, regularly used in research, as Grady describes, 
ethically controversial or contentious in practice (Grady, 2005 p.1681). The carrot and the stick 
depicted in the well-known metaphor serve as both positive and negative incentives for the 
donkey’s forward motion, and the term incentive is used widely and indiscriminatingly as the 
carrot part of the motivation, in some cases as if it were synonymous with the meaning of 
reward.  The word incentivise entered the English language meaning to motivate, whereas the 
word reward, unlike inducement, always implies some form of merit or desert.  
For example, a reward offered for information leading to a person’s arrest might well motivate a 
person to come forward, in which case it would serve as an inducement. However, a reward 
offered to individuals after they have performed feats of bravery might well be fully deserved, 
but would in this context not have served as a motivator of the particular act, and could therefore 
not be adjudged as an inducement. The definition of incentives as being, “external prompts to 
which the individual responds” (Grant & Sugarman, 2004 p.719), thus correctly captures the 
behaviour-affecting meaning in the word.  In attempting to distinguish further what separates 
incentives from other forms of motivators or rewards offered in negotiations, Grant and 
Sugarman suggest that the offer must be all of the following:  
1. an extrinsic benefit or bonus, (rather than a natural consequence of an act, a reward, or 
compensation).  
2. a discrete prompt expected to elicit a particular response.  
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3. usually made in the context of an authority relationship, and  
4. intentionally designed to alter the status quo by motivating a person to choose differently 
from how she would choose in its absence (ibid p.721).  
These four factors could be condensed by simply saying that an incentive is the added element 
without which the desired action probably would not occur. The guidelines referred to above 
show that payment of such external prompts, whether as incentives, compensation or honoraria 
in biomedical research arouse considerable concerns, which led to rules prohibiting coercion and 
undue influence. Moreover, where research recruitment is carried out by professionals such as 
doctors, who carry a particular status of respect and trust vis a vis potential research participants, 
controversy surrounds not only potential conflicts of interests, but also the risk of the influencing 
or coercion of vulnerable participants (Groth, 2010).  
The above has described incentives generally in research, more importantly we need to address 
the way in which they are utilised in genomic research. It should be remembered that financial 
incentives or inducements are distinct from the notion of compensation for time or expenses, 
often included in research proposals as reimbursement for travel expenses, or even per diem 
payments to compensate for time lost.  Compensation and re-imbursement are by definition 
designed to place the research participant in the position she would have been, and should not 
contain any of the motivating potential of financial and other incentives.    
In practice, incentives and inducements occur at the interface between researchers and 
communities exchanging information, including the anticipated risks and benefits, related to 
proposed genomic research.  In such an engagement, a community should under normal 
circumstances always be free to withdraw from the discussions, and research representatives can 
be expected to employ whatever ethical strategies or powers of persuasion they can muster, 
including the offering of incentives or related benefits and consequences.  
Benefits are not likely to be large in most forms of genomic research, and would generally be of 
a collective nature such as support for health care or payment into a community trust, but their 
consideration should not be excluded for the wrong reasons. It is the primary task of institutions 
and bodies regulating research to abide by the established limits on freedom of contract 
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discussed above, namely to ensure that research approaches are legal, appropriate and do not 
encroach upon the reaches of ethically permissible behaviour. Relations of power inevitably 
come into play during such engagements, including a predictable form of asymmetry between 
researchers and communities in terms of knowledge, resources and wealth, all of which increase 
the potential for exploitation.   
Clearly, tension remains between freedom of contract and autonomy on the one hand, that would 
allow people to respond freely to inducements, and paternalistic protection of the vulnerable on 
the other.  As will be discussed below, it is the task of the REC to determine the limits of 
autonomy or voluntariness in respect of any transaction. In order to further explore this particular 
tension in the context of biomedical research, it will be useful to examine briefly the most 
extreme challenges possible to the autonomy and informed consent of individuals, namely 
circumstances where the inducements are extremely large on the one hand, and where the 
recipient is extremely poor on the other. The underlying question remains whether and when the 
voluntariness of consent is invalidated. 
7.4.4 Extreme inducements and needy offerees 
Genetic research is not likely to produce situations where huge benefits are offered to groups of 
research participants. Too many samples are needed and the benefits available for research 
communities, if any, are likely to be modest. However, to be completely safe, one can ask the 
question whether large inducements are wrong. Some authors argue that desperate people with 
no alternatives, those with a low baseline, or consent-based vulnerability, cannot be other than 
exploited by extremely attractive incentives (Murphy, 1998). Arnason and van Niekerk (2006) 
have argued persuasively that the size of an inducement itself should not be an ethical problem.  
Nobody objects, they argue, when a person accepts a huge sum of money to play football for 
Manchester United, or to perform dangerous stunts for a Hollywood blockbuster.   
The real concern is not the size of the offer, but whether the combination of factors, such as 
vulnerability, relationship, pressure or manipulation of trust, was such as to diminish the 
autonomy and voluntariness that is required to form a valid and just exchange (ibid p. 125). 
According to these authors, a question far more important than the size of the inducement is 
whether the will of a person has become dominated or otherwise overcome in an exchange.  
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Wilkinson et al. (1999), concur with this conclusion. After examining numerous impecunious 
individuals’ choices to accept potentially harmful but nevertheless financially attractive 
inducements, they believe that denying any individuals the option of taking inducements, 
“reduces their freedom, since it removes an option that they clearly prefer to the alternatives” 
(ibid p. 377).   
Somewhat surprisingly, studies in both developed and developing countries concluded that high 
inducements do not inevitably lead to impaired voluntariness or poor comprehension of research 
participants (Pace & Emanuel, 2005 p.11). Other authors have suggested that what is perceived 
most unfair and objectionable underlying undue inducement concerns is not the nature or level of 
the incentives offered, as is implied in the excessive offer argument, but rather the state of 
inequality of humankind that leads some desperately poor people to choose differently (Newton, 
1982 p.5). In other words, it is regarded as unfair that some people, such as the parents of the 
mentally disabled children in the first case study above, should find themselves in such pitiful 
straits, with such low baselines, as to find such dire options attractive.   
7.4.5 Is authentic consent possible under extreme conditions? 
A question on autonomy of individuals is whether authentic consent is ever possible under the 
extreme conditions depicted above? There is no doubt that in extreme cases it might be very 
difficult for a desperate offeree to decline an offer of such attractiveness. However, as concluded 
by these authors and supported by the previous chapter’s discussions on exploitation in contract, 
neither the size of the incentive nor the poverty of research subjects should automatically vitiate 
consent.  Nor should difficulty of choice be a candidate for reduced autonomy. Some choices 
require careful weighing of consequences, and individuals have legitimately differing value 
systems and circumstances. As Ruth Macklin (1981), puts it in a response to a critique of her 
article on undue inducement by Lisa Newton (1982), autonomy is difficult to define, is bound to 
be a matter of degree, and at times the same person exhibits differing degrees of autonomy under 
different circumstances. In her original article on the subject, Macklin described her thoughts on 
respect for autonomy as well as acknowledging of the weaknesses of humans and the need for 
research to protect people against their weaknesses in the following terms,   
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[…] respect for persons and their liberty can still recognise the tendency they have to 
succumb to temptations, to fail to recognise their own best interests on occasion, and to 
undertake what may be irrational risks... Researchers are not being overly paternalistic in 
guarding against unduly inducing people to take a risk that only a large sum of money 
would lure them into incurring. (Macklin, 1981 p.2)   
Many authors disagree with the latter part of Macklin’s statement. Newton for example, regarded 
Macklin’s concerns for undue inducement as being “insupportable paternalism”, whilst stating 
the real problem to be the fact that the urban poor have so few attractive alternatives for the use 
of their time (Newton, 1982 p.5). Others emphasise the duty on society to put basic safeguards in 
place, prior to protection of autonomy, precisely to assist such vulnerable people (McNeill, 1997 
p.390). Under scrutiny therefore, the argument for undue inducement and coercion as cogent 
reasons not to offer benefits to vulnerable research participants is shown to be difficult to sustain 
against claims of autonomy, supported by freedom of choice, and objections against paternalism.   
In conclusion, this discussion on autonomy has attempted to display its vitality as a primary 
ethical principle underpinning not only informed consent, but also deeply implicated in 
assessments of fairness and justice in biomedical research. This thesis supports the notion 
expressed by Rehbock (2011) that the autonomy of research participants, no matter how needy, 
is an important ethical principle, unless it is in some way contrary to the public morals or the 
public interest (ibid p.531). Even in the most unlikely extreme scenario posed for this discussion, 
involving large payments and/or impoverished research subjects, it may be possible for such 
persons to cogently defend their right to consent autonomously and to participate voluntarily in 
the research (Wilkinson, 2005 p.31). Genomic research is not likely to throw up such challenges.  
Situations can however, arise where research participants might be manipulated, forced, or 
otherwise unduly overridden, and the concept of voluntariness remains fundamental to the 
combating of exploitation within the field of research ethics as within the field of law. The most 
extreme circumstances postulated above are useful in debating the limits of autonomy of genetic 
research participants, bearing in mind firstly that inducements in genetic research are likely to be 
of a more modest nature, and secondly that the interests of genetic research participants are 
generally situated within a less individual and more relational or collective form.   
Respect for persons as a principle and the desire to protect the weak will continue to require a 
balance in practice, eluding resort to glib formulae. It is suggested that the procedural guidance 
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provided by the law of equity in cases of alleged unfairness in exchange, namely to consider all 
the relevant procedural factors, most effectively musters the wherewithal for an accurate 
determination of autonomy and voluntariness. The actual process involved in the transaction: 
namely the precise manner in which the vulnerable party was approached by the other, bearing in 
mind the respective baselines, risks, relationships and motives of the parties, enables scrutiny of 
how the dealing including inducements affected the voluntariness of the other. This provides a 
tried and tested tool for identifying and distinguishing between different forms of exploitation.   
In particular, for voluntariness to be compromised or defective under one of the three forms of 
exploitative contract, the consent would have to have been obtained either firstly, by means of 
targeted manipulation focussed on the party’s baseline, secondly, by means of some untoward 
threat or coercive pressure or thirdly, by inducement unduly associated with a relationship of 
influence or trust. Underlying all such analyses of voluntariness in research is the principle of 
non-maleficence, and the question to what degree potential participants are to be exposed to risk 
of harm.     
7.5 Risk and beneficence/ non-maleficence 
Genomic research, involving the taking of a DNA sample, does not entail the level of physical 
risks associated with clinical and other forms of biomedical research. The principle of non-
maleficence referred to above and enjoining that no harm should be done to research subjects has 
become regarded by some as the most important of all the ethical principles (Gillon, 1994). This 
applies equally to genomic research.  Risk of harm is the third and final ethical concern extracted 
from the research ethics guidelines in relation to undue inducement or coercion, the first 
discussed above being the vulnerability of certain groups and their need for protection, and the 
second being the autonomy and voluntariness of research participants.  Whilst the guidelines 
accept the need for incentives or inducements in the recruitment process, they warn against their 
potential to lead research participants to underestimate or to take otherwise unacceptable risks. 
Discussions around risk are associated with the ethical principles of beneficence, connoting acts 
of kindness, and charity, and is suggestive of altruism, love, humanity, and promoting the good 
of others (Stanford, 2010), as well as the closely associated non-maleficence. The latter, regarded 
by some authors as the stronger of the two, implies that risks of harm to human subjects as 
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research participants should be minimised, if not avoided.  ‘First, do no harm’ is the translation 
from the Latin primum, non nocere (Beauchamp & Childress, 2008).  
Application of these central principles determines whether any research project should be 
ethically permissible, a determination which is prior to and separable from consent (Grant et al., 
2004 p.724). Where risks of harm are not justified by the potential benefits of the research, to 
research participants, science and the public, research does not pass the tests of non-maleficence 
and beneficence, and should not proceed. This thesis will not venture into the rich discussions 
around these two terms in biomedical ethics (Beauchamp & Childress, 2008), but continues 
directly to the weighing up of risks of harm against benefits, followed by an examination of the 
particular situation pertaining to genomic research.  Thereafter the role and function of RECs in 
their assessment of research projects is discussed, leading to an examination of some particular 
and current concerns.    
7.5.1 Risks and harms  
Risks are not necessarily bad.  Normally functioning autonomous individuals shape their lives to 
no small degree by the risks that they are prepared to take in the active pursuit of gain. Generally, 
actions that are associated with known risks are regularly taken in the full knowledge that a lack 
of success might result, and even on occasion a degree of harm.  Humans regularly take risks 
both in recreation and in the working environment, engaging for example, in risky sports such as 
skydiving or boxing, and signing up for dangerous careers such as firefighting or the police force 
fully aware of the attendant hazards. They also legitimately determine and discount what level of 
risk they are prepared to allow in life.  
In fact, the individual regularly and logically trades off the risk of possible future harm in 
exchange for a more tangible current benefit.  Whilst some forms of harm are relatively minor, 
for example, those that might have embarrassing, annoying, unfortunate or even painful 
consequences, they might not be deemed sufficiently severe or permanent to undermine what 
authors have identified as a person’s fundamental interests (Macklin, 1981; Newton, 1982). It is 
generally agreed however, that the kind of harms that are considered to bear the risk of undue 
inducement are of a higher magnitude, and should be clearly unreasonable in essence, requiring, 
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“substantial risk of serious physical, psychological, economic, or other harms, which threaten a 
person’s fundamental interests” (Emanuel et al., 2005 p.337).    
The various non-binding ethical guidelines have focussed on ensuring that the informed consent 
process enables individuals and groups to assess the risks and implications of the proposed 
research fully, and in addition to dealing with benefit sharing as such, have approved of 
incentives and provisions for compensating subjects for harms incurred, for time and effort 
spent, for actual expenses incurred, for inconvenience, as well as for risks taken. Risks of harm 
have been divided into physical, psychological, social and economic risks (Weijer, 2000), and as 
stated, these aspects of the guidelines have clinical research as a primary focus.  So how are 
these events termed risks to be evaluated?   
The definition of undue inducement contained in CIOMS guideline 7 warns against the 
likelihood that an individual’s poor judgement might lead to a risk of serious harm (CIOMS, 
2002 p.337). As will be explained below, this is not left to the individual to decide, but it is the 
task of the REC to weigh up whether anticipated risks to participants are of a level to justify the 
adjective serious. Moreover, whether they are reasonable and acceptable in relation to anticipated 
benefits, if any, to the participant and to others is also the task of the REC. Determining the 
seriousness of the risk requires an assessment both of the severity of the possible harm, and of 
the likelihood of its occurrence.  
CIOMS guideline 8 differentiates the standards for benefit-risk assessment for therapeutic and 
non-therapeutic research, the latter being the subject of this thesis.  Given its focus on therapeutic 
research, in respect of non-therapeutic research seeking knowledge of potential benefit to 
humankind, the guidelines state that the risks must be “reasonable in relation to the importance 
of the knowledge to be gained” (CIOMS, 2002 Article 8).  A person’s fundamental interests, the 
term used by CIOMS and analogous with the previously described baseline, are not limited to 
health or economic issues, and can include matters of culture, belief, values and of dignity.  
According to Grant et al. (2004), where one party deliberately induces religious persons for 
example, to work on the Sabbath, or to sell their eggs or sperm against their religious scruples, 
such act would constitute a seductive offer if not a form of bribery resulting in a form of harm 
(ibid p.728).   
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However, people differ in their convictions no less than in their circumstances. For example, one 
woman might agree to sell her ova without moral or spiritual compunction, whilst another might 
equally legitimately refuse due to strongly held cultural or religious convictions.  Or a person 
might volunteer to participate in research for altruistic reasons, despite the fact that this might 
assail or erode her privacy or dignity within the context of her culture (ibid p.730). An example 
of the latter might be an indigenous person agreeing to be part of a genetic study, despite the fact 
that there is a risk of possible cultural harm in the form of social stigma or discrimination. 
Participation in public life, in which commoditisation and economic development inevitably 
generate a range of different options, therefore and naturally provides continuous challenges to 
peoples’ spiritual and other values (Wilkinson & Moore, 1999 p.122).   
7.5.2 Risks in genomic research. 
Genomic research is specifically regulated by a number of international guidelines reflecting the 
different form of likely risks, including the statements of the HUGO ethics committee referred to 
above, as well as UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights 
(UNESCO, 1997). All of these stress the particular nature of risks relating to identity, privacy 
and stereotyping that are present. Genome Wide Association (GWA) studies are an example of 
genetic research, having the potential to extend their impacts far beyond the original research 
participants, for example, revealing that a stigmatising condition is more likely to occur in one 
population than another, with obvious social consequences (de Vries et al., 2011 p.3). As stated 
by Brody (2002), there is always a danger that communities might inappropriately discount 
possible long-term harms of such types of genetic research, and that their own judgements can be 
clouded by short-term benefits (ibid p.2856). Genetic research on target groups or communities 
therefore poses what Tsosie and McGregor (2007), call “distinctive risks and disadvantages” of a 
collective nature (ibid p.352). 
Information sourced from individuals provides information relating to the group, which raises 
issues related to genetic privacy. Such information can lead to potential external harms such as 
stereotyping or stigmatization, and can also bring about internal harms of a psychological and 
cultural nature (Tsosie & McGregor, 2007). Many of these risks are not only of a less than 
tangible nature, taking place at some undetermined date in the future, but are in addition often 
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closely associated with group rights linked to the particular culture and ethos of the group (ibid 
p.410). The particular way in which genetic risks are experienced by indigenous and Aboriginal 
peoples is deserving of special attention, and is discussed in the next chapter.   
The Declaration of Helsinki provides the fundamental rule that, “every medical research project 
involving human subjects should be preceded by careful assessment of predictable risks and 
burdens to the individuals and groups involved in the research in comparison with foreseeable 
benefits to them and to other individuals or groups” (WMA, 2013 p.17). All the research ethics 
guidelines similarly require research to be justified on the basis of a favourable risk/benefit 
assessment (Belmont, 1979 para 46). Whilst protection of the individual and community from 
untoward risks in research is regarded as paramount, the broader public also has a prior and 
fundamental interest in the assessment of risks and benefits. As stated in paragraph 16 of the 
Declaration of Helsinki, research involving humans should only be conducted if the importance 
of the objective outweighs the inherent risks and burdens to the research subjects (WMA, 2013).  
The balancing principle described as the required favourable risk/benefit assessment, first 
described in the Belmont Report, requires application of what Wertheimer describes as the 
reasonable risk criterion (RRC) (Wertheimer, 2011 p.107). Much academic debate has taken 
place over the precise weighting of risks and benefits making up this reasonable risk, including 
risks that are personal or collective, prospective, predictable or potential, present or future, 
physical or psychological (Hansson, 2004), further analysis of which is not relevant to this study.   
Only negligible risks to persons are justifiable by the scientific value as well as the social value 
of research, which according to Emanuel must fully outweigh such risks (Emanuel et al., 2004 
p.934). Risks are thus at the heart of the prior assessment done by a REC, and only those risks 
deemed necessary to achieve the research objectives are justified.     
Emanuel et al. regard two benchmarks as being applicable to developing countries. Firstly the 
risk-benefit ratio for individuals must be favourable in the context of the affected individuals, 
and secondly the risk benefit ratio should also be favourable for the broader community (ibid 
p.934). Benefits to be included in the assessment are listed as ‘information obtained from the 
study, services provided to participants, or improvements in the health of the community” (ibid 
p.934), and the enquiry remains on the justification or otherwise of the risks to participants.   
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“Only benefits that accrue to participants from the interventions necessary to achieve the 
research objectives or those deriving from the knowledge to be gained by the research should be 
used to justify risks to participants” (Freedman et al., 1992 p.660). 
The benefits to society from genomic research are considerable, whilst the benefits to research 
participants are likely to be small. It is however the attendant risks that perhaps assumes a more 
central role. A strong espousal of autonomy lies behind the general position, which is that 
individuals should generally, where the approval of a REC is provided, be allowed to determine 
the risks that they are prepared to undertake when participating in research. A clear limit on their 
autonomy or voluntariness is however provided by the interest of the public to ensure that 
ethically unconscionable risks must not to be incurred, and that vulnerable persons are protected. 
Hence, the institutional response which ensures that publicly approved institutions (RECs) rather 
than individuals are required to determine what level of risks are allowed in research.   
7.5.3 Assessment by RECs69  
RECs have been instituted worldwide in order to ensure public accountability by independent 
review bodies, to safeguard research participants and to provide assurance of non-malificence 
and beneficence in biomedical research. The Nuffield Council on Bioethics recommended that 
scientific and ethical review should be undertaken separately, reflecting the twin purposes of the 
review,  
Research may only be undertaken if the research project has been approved by the 
competent body after independent examination of its scientific merit, including 
assessment of the importance of the aim of research, and multidisciplinary review of its 
ethical acceptability. (Nuffield, 2002 Article 7) 
The formal and independent evaluation is required to precede the approval of a research project, 
and only then are individuals invited to participate. This process is designed to provide a sense of 
assurance to the public wherever such RECs are functioning efficiently and correctly. For 
example, the infamous Tuskegee and Willowbrook research experiments would have been 
rejected by properly functioning RECs on the basis of non-maleficence, which decisions would 
have been quite independent of and prior to any consideration of undue inducement or 
                                                          
69 As stated earlier, RECs, also called Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) or Ethics Committee (EC) are required to 
determine the risk-benefit ratio in terms article 17 of the Declaration of Helsinki (2013).  
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exploitation.  RECs now are bound to carefully assess risks and burdens, and only conduct 
research “if the importance of the objective outweighs the risks and burdens to the research 
subjects” (WMA, 2013 paragraph 16). 
What are broadly referred to as the medical and associated risks of participation are not the only 
subjects of the assessment? Generally, the REC is required to be placed in possession of 
sufficiently comprehensive information on broader issues relating to the proposed research, such 
as the full range of benefits offered to participants, relevant cultural and social issues, the 
research entity’s policy on future utilisation or sharing of findings, and including the possibility 
of downstream commercial developments or profits (Bauer et al., 2004 p.114). As has been 
emphasised throughout this thesis, justice is a core ethical principle, which applies to the 
research exchange, the fact that individuals might not receive a fair distribution of the advantages 
produced by their participation should raise concerns about possible exploitation (Wertheimer, 
1996 pp.3-34).  
A proper assessment of the entire range of risks and benefits by an REC thus entails analysis not 
only of the scientific risks or harms directly associated with the research, but also of broader 
ethical questions, including an evaluation of the entire transaction.  At stake ultimately is an 
overall and holistic assessment of the fairness and equity of the entire research exchange to all 
parties.  However, because the commercialisation of research without compensation is one 
particular version of potential exploitation and thereby of non-medical risks related to a research 
project, the presence of this likelihood would thus constitute one of the possible non-medical 
risks to which research participants are exposed.  
Whether financial inducements or benefits to be paid to individuals or a community should be 
weighed up, as part of the benefits in the risk-benefit assessment is not completely settled.  In a 
paper entitled, Is payment a benefit? Wertheimer (2013) disagrees with the standard view, which 
is that RECs should not regard financial payment as a benefit to participants for the purpose of 
risk-benefit assessment. He motivates for what he terms an “incorporation view” which holds 
that RECs should incorporate the value of financial payments as one of the benefits accruing to 
participants in assessing whether the risks of research are reasonable in relation to the anticipated 
benefits (ibid p.105). He goes on to state that,   
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[…] if subjects can reasonably regard the financial benefits of participation as greater 
than the risks of participation, and if IRBs should demonstrate respect for the interests 
and judgements of prospective subjects, there is at least prima facie reason for IRBs to 
incorporate that judgement into their own risk/benefit assessment. (ibid p.109) 
This thesis suggests that for genomic research it may be appropriate that the REC should have 
the flexibility to incorporate and weigh up all forms of benefits for participants, not excluding 
financial benefits, against the various risks of participation, and in accordance with the non-
maleficence and beneficence principle. This process is analogous to the analysis of all relevant 
facts conducted in the courts of equity described in the previous chapter, where all the 
circumstances of a case were balanced against principles and rules in a reflexive manner, seeking 
an equilibrium of equity such as that envisaged by John Rawls. It was clear from the reported 
cases on contractual exploitation that judges applying the law of equity often differed in such 
weighing up process, precisely because a single mechanical solution did not exist.  It should 
therefore not be surprising that members of RECs, whilst weighing up risks against the benefits 
against the principles laid down by the guidelines as well as the moral public policy ethos of the 
times, might legitimately differ whilst fruitfully debating a fair solution 
In the same article Wertheimer returns to the issue of autonomy of research participants in 
relation to risk, and concedes the particular difficulty faced by the REC tasked with deciding on 
whether research with a certain level of risk should proceed. Conceptions of the right thing on 
the one hand, compete with concerns about “decisional impairments” on the part of the 
participant on the other (Wertheimer, 2011 p.112). He then endorses a compromise on the issue 
which he terms a sort of soft paternalism, arguing that the REC should be entitled to override 
individual decisions based upon what are regarded as cognitive mistakes, whilst rejecting a hard 
paternalism that would interfere with decisions that the REC thinks are erroneous based on some 
objective account of a person’s interests (ibid p.112). Hard paternalism, such as requiring cyclists 
to wear helmets or motorists to wear seat belts by law, is what some would regard as an extreme 
form of restriction on freedom of persons. Wertheimer’s position is comparable with the view of 
David Lamb that a principle of limited paternalism should be applied in balancing the moral 
values of health care professionals with the respect for autonomy of patients (Lamb, 1995 p.15). 
If, according to this benign paternalism entrusted to the REC a study including the risks of harm 
and range of benefits is approved, then the general assumption should be warranted that research 
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participants would not be subjected to choices that are harmful, inappropriate, or against their 
better judgement.  In assessing the entire research proposal, the REC is required to ensure not 
only that the proposed consent documentation adequately reflects all of the facts possibly 
relevant, but also that prospective participants are to be fully informed of such risk prior to 
signifying their informed consent. This includes taking into account the broader communal 
aspects of the affected community, including elders and leaders of extended families which 
Emanuel describes as the various ‘spheres of consent’ (Emanuel, 2004 p.934). Engagement with 
indigenous peoples, a focus of this thesis, is discussed in the next chapter.70   
7.5.4 Concerns about functioning of RECs. 
Whilst RECs are the institutional pillar upon which ethical principles are assured in research, 
concerns have been expressed regarding their lack of capacity in developing countries (Kass et 
al., 2007; Kadam & Karandikar, 2012 and Ouwe-Missi-Oukem-Boyer et al., 2013). Where such 
RECs fail, and the concerns of this thesis focus on indigenous communities targeted for genomic 
research, the assurance of non-malificence is hollow, and the likelihood of exploitation remains 
present.  Kadam and Karandikar’s conclusions relating to RECs in India for example, reflect 
those of other authors in regard to their functioning and effectiveness in other developing 
countries, and give cause for concern. As they explain,   
[...] many ECs [ethics committees] are oblivious to their roles and responsibilities. It is 
reported that ECs lack standard operating procedures, do not have a proper composition 
or adequate representation, thus affecting their functions in regulating clinical research. 
Moreover, ECs seem to function in isolation, as self-sufficient bodies, having no 
communication with the regulatory agency or other ECs. (Kadam & Karandikar, 2012 
p.50) 
Legislation involving humans in biomedical research in many developing world countries is 
entirely absent, and RECs in many African states are barely functional (Ouwe-Missi-Oukem-
Boyer et al., 2013 p.10). Even where RECs have been formally constituted, they can nevertheless 
fall far short of providing the assurance required of them.  In addition to the lack of 
governmental funding and support, other reasons for REC failure include human fallibility 
resulting in random as well as systemic mistakes, inadequate assessment of cultural and social 
                                                          
70Spheres of consent refer to village elders, leaders of extended family, or community. Whilst broader groups 
provide ‘permission’, only individuals may validly give consent.   
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values, the allowing of excessive risks, and even scientific error (Emanuel et al., 2005 p.339). 
The point does not need to be laboured that RECs, particularly in the developing world, do not 
yet provide the institutional role required of them in research.  
Ruth Macklin (1981) expressed an additional unease about RECs, pointing out that they are 
neither qualified nor equipped to conduct intricate investigations into the range of possible 
subjective value systems, circumstances and vulnerabilities of potential research subjects (ibid 
p.2). This concern is exacerbated in the case of indigenous communities and specific groups 
targeted for genetic research, who often hold distinct and unique cultural values, and who face a 
complex suite of potential harms which are not amenable to easy assessment by a group of 
professionals. In addition, it is surprising in view of the particular difficulties relating to 
indigenous communities, that few guidelines have been formulated (McMillan & Conlan, 2004 
p.206). These particular concerns will be addressed further in the next chapter.  
Risk and beneficence/ non-maleficence have now been discussed, as the third of the ethical 
concerns relating to undue inducement and coercion. It was established as a given that some 
degree of risk is always present in research, and that the prior evaluation of risks juxtaposed with 
benefits to society as well as to research participants by RECs is the foundation of the non-
maleficence and beneficence assessment required prior to the approval of biomedical research. 
There are many circumstances in which individuals can make themselves vulnerable to unwise 
choices. However, it is a combination of their baseline circumstances including poverty or need, 
vulnerability to risk, and the manner in which the inducements are presented, that determines the 
presence of exploitation and thus wrongfulness in exchange transactions. Whilst individuals as 
well as communities are generally entitled to exercise their discretion whether or not to accept 
risks that are associated with genetic research, it is only the non- maleficence assessment of an 
independent REC that provides assurance both to society as well as to research participants.   
If a research study fulfils both the scientific and the ethical requirements, as determined by a 
properly functioning REC, it can generally be assumed both by the public and by potential 
research participants that non-maleficence is assured, and that concerns about exploitation of 
research participants in the form of excessive risks, as well as in the form of undue inducement 
or coercion, are simply not appropriate (Emanuel, 2005 p.338). Two important concerns have 
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however emerged from this reliance on RECs in relation to risk and exploitation, both of which 
have relevance for indigenous peoples targeted for genomic research.  Firstly, RECs can fail, as 
noted above. Secondly, genetic research entails collective, rather than individual, interests in 
relation to an entirely different range of potential external and internal harms, which need to be 
understood and assessed both in relation to the benefits of the research and to the particular 
group. These concerns will be addressed in the next chapter. RECs are therefore responsible, 
bearing in mind the potential for their failure, to carry out prior assessments of both risks and 
benefits relating to genomic research. 
7.6 The case studies 
Having discussed the three primary ethical concerns relating to coercion and undue inducement, 
namely vulnerability, autonomy and risk of harm, the two case studies chosen to depict 
exploitation in biomedical research can now be briefly examined. They were chosen to represent 
the kind of exploitation feared both in clinical and genomic research respectively. The question 
addressed in each case was whether, in the light of the ethical concerns discussed above, undue 
inducement or one of the other two forms of contractual exploitation discussed in the previous 
chapter were present.     
The first example, namely the Willowbrook hepatitis study, throws up the issues of vulnerability 
and autonomy in stark relief. The mentally disabled child subjects were evidently vulnerable in 
multiple ways as minors lacking facilities for treatment, and their wellbeing resided entirely in 
the hands of their parents.  They would have fallen clearly under the catch-all phrase used by the 
Declaration of Helsinki (WMA, 2013), namely possibly people who are particularly vulnerable 
and may have an increased likelihood of being wronged, and Coleman would have referred to 
them as being both consent-and risk-vulnerable (Coleman, 2009). The numerous ethical concerns 
about this controversial study have been widely debated and are largely beyond the scope of this 
thesis.   
One can accept with confidence that if a REC had been constituted at the time and had 
considered this study, it would have been found to be unacceptable on the grounds of non-
maleficence, the entire methodology being based upon the intentional commission of harm on 
the children. No form of benefits, whether scientific benefits of the research, or the social 
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benefits for the children – the attractive inducements: offers of residency at Willowbrook State 
School – could have made up for the known risks of intentionally imposed harm associated with 
the proposed hepatitis infections. The study would thus clearly have been disallowed for on the 
principle of non-maleficence, namely ‘first, do no harm.’  
In considering this case, Ruth Macklin concluded that the offer made to the parents was not only 
an undue inducement, but, based upon her ‘moral intuitions,’ constituted a coercive offer 
(Macklin 1981 p.3).  Duress under the law of equity however, which encompasses coercion, 
requires ‘improper pressure or threat of harm’ (Bigwood 2003 p.279).  For consent to be coerced, 
it must be unwilling and to a degree improperly forced.  Coercion that involves legal pressure 
however, and as stated earlier, takes advantage of what is termed a pre-existing lack of 
alternatives in the other party, such as poverty or illness, forms what is termed lawful duress, 
namely a wrong which the courts prefer to distinguish from duress, and to rather define as 
unconscionable dealing (ibid p.280).   
Macklin’s diagnosis of this case as being not only undue inducement, but in fact the more serious 
abuse of coercion, is therefore not strictly and legally correct. The consent of the parents was not 
forced, but was eventually willing, following the expressly targeting and manipulation. Again 
following the guidance provided by the law of equity with regard to the targeted manipulation of 
a vulnerable party, using a form of coercive pressure which is not illegal to bring about consent, 
unconscionable dealing would be the more accurate legal term for the exploitative transaction.  
The dealings, namely the offers made to the parents, were thus ostensibly legal, but intentionally 
exploitative of the parents’ particular baseline and form of vulnerability in a manner that the law 
of equity would punish as being unconscionable; namely dealing that is unfair, inequitable and 
against public conscience.      
In the second example, the tribe described in the thought experiment would have been consent-
vulnerable as well as risk-vulnerable, and possibly justice-vulnerable as well as a result of their 
poverty.  Were these vulnerabilities wrongly exploited by the geneticists, and did the second 
offer constitute exploitation in the form of duress, wrongful coercion or undue inducement?   
The particular form of the tribe’s vulnerability first needs to be assessed in relation to all the 
other factors, which would require answers as to whether the tribe generally was lacking 
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information or alternatives. The questions arise whether the tribe was open to targeted 
unconscionable dealing by any party, vulnerable to a particular type of coercion or illegal 
pressure, or vulnerable to inducement by a certain trusted party. All of these factors would have 
formed part of an examination of the tribe’s composite and collective baseline of rights and 
options, which importantly to note, were pre-existing and not in any way of the researchers’ 
making. Then the effect of the dealings and the relationships would be scrutinised.   
The first and second offers of the researchers might well have fallen within the description of 
what can be termed hard bargaining or even as soft blackmail. However, there is no indication on 
the facts given that the tribal leaders were unable to understand the risks and benefits, or to 
engage fully and voluntarily. Whilst the tribe’s baseline, its impoverished situation and relative 
external vulnerability might well have contributed to its lack of alternatives or better options, it 
chose to exercise the freedom and right to decide for themselves. The tribe’s decision to accept 
the increased offer thus bears all the hallmarks of a voluntary act, rather than one that was 
manipulated coerced or unduly influenced. The second aspect of the enquiry relating to 
autonomy, namely whether the consent of the tribe was voluntary, appears similarly to be 
answerable in the affirmative.  
The dealings of the researchers bore no suggestion of exploitative manipulation, nor any 
manifest or even implied improper threat of harm, the latter, which would have constituted the 
wrong of coercion. The tribal leaders as well as the geneticists could, at any subsequent juncture, 
have still chosen to refuse and walk away. Other possible ethical concerns about the transaction, 
such as whether and to what degree the tribal leaders consulted with the community, and whether 
their use of the money for the purchase of land rather than for medical purposes was contrary to 
best practice or guidelines, are issues related to collective representation and decision-making, 
and not relevant for the issues being addressed in this chapter. Another fact about the dealings 
was whether a relationship of trust had been created, which predisposed the tribe to accept the 
offer. This did not appear to be the case.  
The final ethical concern to be examined relates to the aspect of risk, which as stated above is a 
far more complex matter in relation to genetic research. Assuming a REC had approved the 
study, the distinctive risks and disadvantages described by Tsosie and McGregor (2007), which 
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accompany genetic research and which would potentially affect the entire group rather than only 
research participants would have been of a complex nature. These would have needed to be 
carefully assessed in the light of the particular cultural beliefs of the tribe, and failure to do so 
may have given rise to a collective harm on the entire group.  
Proper assessment of such a case study requires assembly of all the above factors in an 
essentially procedural enquiry similar to that carried out in equity law, to the extent that the 
information is available. According to Bigwood (2003), a focus on process in the context of 
contractual justice carefully examines all aspects of the consent, namely whether the parties did 
in fact authentically agree to the contract (ibid p.19). A substantive approach on the other hand 
would focus purely on the content of the agreement, thus judging the fairness of the outcome 
against some or other relevant standard (ibid p.19). The latter substantive enquiry is reminiscent 
of Aristotle’s justice in exchange, where a bilateral transaction is examined in order to assess 
whether the outcome is fair and equitable to both, and was applied in the earlier discussions on 
justice in exchange. On the known facts of this case study, neither of these two approaches yields 
evidence of wrongdoing or unfairness, as the tribe appears firstly to have validly consented after 
a robust exchange of positions, and secondly the outcome was not marked by obvious inequity.   
In closing the discussion on this case, the engagement between researchers and tribe bore the 
hallmarks of two apparently autonomous parties dealing with one another in order to advance 
their respective interests, and one that would not attract the remedial attention of the law of 
equity. The eventual agreement carried what appeared to be the tribe’s informed consent, free of 
manipulation, coercion or undue inducement. A nagging concern arises from the tribe’s 
assumption of the future collective risks that are particular to genetic research, which will be 
addressed specifically in the next chapter. The asymmetrical power and strengths of the two 
parties as they exchanged offers and incentives and sought to achieve their variously different 
objectives is not uncommon (Grant, 2002 p.111), but would provide realistic grounds for 
caution. Nevertheless, it is suggested that a holistic analysis of such exchanges, in which both the 
process of engagement is examined together with the parties’ respective baselines, relationships 
and dealings, should readily detect the presence of exploitation in one of its forms. 
 
 
  
 161 
7.7 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter set out to examine undue inducement and coercion as understood today, explaining 
how they present a serious stumbling block in the way of benefit sharing in genetic research.  
The origins of the international orthodoxy, warning against payments of benefits to research 
participants – particularly from the developing world – on the grounds that they might constitute 
coercion or undue influence, were first sketched, and then amplified by two case studies, which 
depicted transactions generally deemed to be exploitative for reasons of coercion or undue 
inducement. Extracts from the research ethics guidelines with jurisdiction over what some 
scholars have referred to as the legal neighbourhood, that is the stakeholders in genetic research, 
established the primary ethical concerns. It was also made apparent that the degree of guidance 
provided to RECs and biomedical researchers on the topics of coercion and undue influence in 
genomic research is limited. Prevailing ethical concerns as reflected in the guidelines on the 
topic were found to mirror those issues pivotal in cases of contractual exploitation, namely the 
protection of vulnerable persons, respect for persons and their autonomy, and risk of harm to 
participants in relation to inducements. These three inextricably linked considerations were then 
examined in turn in order to throw light on and understand undue inducement and coercion in 
genetic research.  
Vulnerability as a concept was first explored as an ephemeral element of complex human-ness, 
which shifts and defies precise definition. Whilst certain groups were variously identified as 
being vulnerable, the state of being unable to adequately protect one’s interests was found to be 
often circumstantial. The external and internal forms of vulnerability described by Schroeder and 
Gefenas provided useful guidance for policymakers, whilst Coleman’s consent-, risk-, and 
justice-vulnerability also enabled practical distinctions to be made. The fact that commutative 
justice is essentially bilateral in nature led to a useful distinction between factual and relational 
analyses of vulnerability. The former is the primary examination of the person’s entire 
circumstances (baseline) and the latter refers to the person’s relationship with the other party. In 
other words, a person’s being potentially vulnerable to a particular approach or dealing by the 
other person is a central component of the relational analysis that was further developed in the 
law of equity. Whilst vulnerable people are entitled to and do demand respect for their 
autonomy, it was noted that fully autonomous individuals are also on occasion susceptible to the 
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making of harmful life choices in response to a particular type of offer, with consequent 
exploitation.  
Autonomy of persons and voluntariness of consent were then explored as the second of the three 
ethical concerns, calling for appropriate respect for peoples’ decisions whilst cognisant of the 
range of circumstances that can influence their variously activated vulnerabilities. The 
importance of informed consent as the lynchpin of respect for persons and autonomy was 
affirmed, with deference to the law of contract, which places voluntary consent as the sine qua 
non of valid legal agreements. Inducements as an intrinsic part of human interactions were then 
discussed, noting the potential effect of extreme offers on the ability of desperate and vulnerable 
individuals to exercise valid or authentic voluntary consent.   
A number of leading authors firmly espouse the belief that undue inducement and coercion are 
largely overrated as ethical concerns, their views based upon the assurance provided by an 
independent REC to approve the scientific merit and non-maleficence of research (Arnason & 
van Niekerk, 2009; Grant & Sugarman, 2004 and Emanuel et al., 2009). The appropriateness of 
risks in relation to benefits, they aver in addition, should be the sole domain of the REC, which 
has the establishment of non-maleficence as a primary purpose. A notable contribution to the 
analysis of informed consent provided by the law of equity was that the dealing, or the manner in 
which such consent is obtained from a vulnerable party, differs clearly in each of the forms of 
exploitative contracts. These three wrongful methods or procedures of inducing consent, namely 
manipulation, coercion and unduly influencing respectively, all result in a form of consent which 
is defective, and which is legally addressed by one of the three forms of contractual exploitation.  
Risks of harm were finally discussed as the third ethical apprehension relating to undue 
inducement and coercion in biomedical research. The focus of the ethical principle of non-
maleficence was described as being rooted to a large extent in the desire to prevent harm to 
vulnerable individuals, such as had taken place in infamous scandals such as Tuskegee and 
Willowbrook. An additional apprehension was however, noted namely that genomic research, 
which entails minimal physical risks, generates ethical unease of an entirely different nature.  
Risks relating to dignity, privacy and identity including stigmatization and discrimination are 
present for all susceptible groups selected for genomic research, including groups defined by 
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race or ethnic identity, geographic situation, disease and other factors. Indigenous communities 
such as those depicted in the earlier examples of biopiracy, as well as the second case study 
above present particular challenges in this regard, where lack of trust as well as pervasive 
differentials of power and of world view constitute more complex collective baselines, and thus 
present obstacles to genetic research.   
The fundamental role and function of the independent RECs required to assess risks and benefits 
associated with proposed research both from a scientific as well as an ethical point of view was 
acknowledged as a vital institutional process in research, designed to provide assurance of non-
maleficence for research participants and beneficence for society. It was nevertheless emphasised 
that this assurance falls entirely short whenever RECs are not able to perform this function 
adequately, a known concern in many areas of the developing world.  Where RECs are not able 
to assess risks and associated cultural concerns of indigenous peoples and other vulnerable 
groups adequately, the assurance provided by them to avoid exploitation of research subjects 
cannot be relied upon. However, it would seem more important to focus on putting functioning 
RECs in place than to place the burden of calculating risk-benefit ratios on individuals without 
clinical or genetic knowledge. 
Finally, the two case studies were discussed in turn. In summary, the Willowbrook hepatitis case 
was found to be exploitative of the participants primarily due to the fact that the study was in 
clear breach of the principle of non-maleficence, which would never have been allowed by a 
properly functioning REC under the research ethics guidelines. Applying the criteria drawn from 
equity law on the procedural judicanda, the form of exploitation was held to be unconscionable 
dealing, the contractual harm which takes place when a person’s particular state of vulnerability 
– her low baseline – is improperly targeted for the benefit of the stronger party.  The second case 
study involving the tribe selected for genomic research contained all the elements of an 
asymmetrical exchange, which would normally arouse unease relating to justice and in particular 
the manner in which the consent of the tribe was obtained. Concerns about whether the risks of 
harm had been properly assessed, and whether the tribe’s fears about the future implications of 
the genetic research had been duly evaluated by a competent REC, resonated with the general 
apprehension about genomic research expressed over the past decades by indigenous peoples.  
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This case highlighted the importance of RECs, juxtaposed with concerns that they are unable to 
fulfil their essential roles in many developing countries. In order to provide assurance of non-
maleficence in genetic research such as the second case study, RECs need to address issues 
relating to trust as well as to culturally rooted fears of harm, including external harms such as 
discrimination or stigmatization, and internal harms of a social or psychological nature. The 
specific concerns of indigenous communities targeted for genetic research are addressed in the 
final chapter.  
In wrapping up the above discussions, it has been shown that benefit sharing should not be 
prevented or limited by fears of undue influence or coercion in genomic research.  In arriving at 
this conclusion, the following positions have been influential. Firstly, prevention of exploitation 
of vulnerable research participants, whether by undue influence, coercion, or by the broader form 
described as unconscionable dealing, remains a legitimate concern in bioethics. However, the 
identification and scope of these forms of exploitation have been both exaggerated and 
misunderstood by the research community. Where a REC has approved a research study for non-
maleficence and beneficence, benefit sharing should be allowed.  
Secondly, the field of genomics was and is not the primary focus of these two forms of 
protection in research. The type of harms originally intended to be prevented by the prohibition 
of wrongs such as undue inducement, coercion and unconscionable dealing were primarily 
physical harms perpetrated on individuals such as the research subjects in the Willowbrook and 
Tuskegee clinical trials; not the collective, potential and more subtle identity-related harms 
present in genomic research.  
Thirdly, the criteria provided by the law of equity illuminate and guide the accurate identification 
of these forms of exploitation, by differentiating between the various wrongful forms of dealings 
or manners in which vulnerable people can be approached and misused in bilateral research 
encounters.  Equity law focussed on the relational aspects of the dealing, identified through the 
procedural enquiry, in order to categorise the different forms of exploitation.  
Fourthly, the RECs primary task is to provide institutional assurance of non-maleficence, which 
aims to prevent transactions that are inauthentic; the third form of exploitation described by 
Mayer denoting transactions that are harmful on a vulnerable party and that should not be legal 
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or permissible. A heavy responsibility rests upon RECs as the research community’s bastion of 
assurance against this altogether different form of exploitation. Where RECs fail, for a number of 
possible reasons, public trust is damaged and genomic research is threatened.   
Fifthly and finally, indigenous peoples, representing particular and important forms of 
communities targeted for genetic research, experience unique forms of risks and challenges that 
are not currently addressed by adequate guidelines, nor by the presence of functioning RECs, and 
are addressed in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT: RISKS TO INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AS 
VULNERABLE POPULATIONS 
 
This chapter aims to examine how risk in genetic research is perceived and dealt with by 
indigenous communities approached to participate in genomic research, with the intention of 
ensuring the ethical principles inter alia of justice and non-maleficence. Justice would be served 
if, in addition to appropriate benefits being considered in reciprocal exchange for participation, 
the community were treated as an equal partner in the research, and reasonably assured in respect 
of potential harms. The discussion on non-maleficence explores the particular type of risk faced 
by indigenous peoples, and how such risks are best identified and dealt with. The discussion will 
commence with a brief description of those peoples that identify themselves as indigenous, and 
then will secondly proceed to answer the question of what risks do they face. Thirdly, the 
procedural question will be posed, namely how to engage properly with such groups. Finally, the 
role and capacity of RECs in such research will be examined. The purpose is to add to this 
thesis’ general conclusions regarding exploitation of communities in the developing world, 
specific suggestions aimed at ensuring proper inclusion of indigenous populations in genetic 
research.  
8.1 Who are indigenous peoples? 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, certain groups are targeted for genetic research, 
especially human population genetic research (HPGR) that is also known as population-based 
genetic research (Wang, 2011 p.10). These groups are normally selected for reasons associated 
with their particular circumstances, which often include a history of development separate from 
mainstream society, and includes groups that identify themselves as indigenous, but also using 
descriptions such as Native Americans, Alaskan Native, Australian Aboriginals, Torres Strait 
Islanders, and New Zealand Maoris. The National Geographic’s Genographic Project, styled as a 
“landmark quest to decipher our distant past,” sought to collect the DNA of “very special people 
living today” to tell the story of the “human journey” (Wells, 2007 p.45). Spencer Wells, leader 
of the Project, described these special peoples as follows, 
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Ideally, they would be living in the same place as their ancestors did countries ago. They 
should have been relatively isolated from immigration from surrounding groups who 
have moved into the region recently.  They should also retain some of their ancestor’s 
ways of life, be it language, marriage patterns, or other cultural attributes. In other words, 
what we want are indigenous people. (Italics in original) (ibid p.45). 
It has been estimated that there are some 5000 distinct indigenous or Aboriginal71 peoples living 
in varying degrees of autonomy or assimilation with the larger society (Mander & Tauli-Corpuz 
2005 p.4), and the terms used by authors overlap with other adjectives such as tribal, native, 
Indian or even local that attempt to describe certain rural communities (Laird, 2002 p.180). The 
prevailing view is that no formal or universal definition is necessary, but for practical purposes, 
the commonly accepted understanding of the term is that provided in the Jose R. Martinez 
Cobo’s Study on the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations, the working 
definition of which reads as follows,  
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical 
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, 
consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing on those 
territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are 
determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral 
territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in 
accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal system.72 (Cobo, 
2010)  
All of the cases of perceived exploitation referred to in the first chapter, including famous cases 
such as the Hagahai, the Havusapai and the Nuu-Cha-Nulth, consisted of such groups selected 
because of their particular status and relatively isolated genetic history. McGregor refers to these 
groups constituted as a result of and for population genomic studies as being socially identifiable 
groups, despite their use of other defining words such as peoples and communities (McGregor, 
2007). Group and collective issues are now widely debated in relation to human genetic research, 
where for example, in genome wide association studies large numbers of participants from 
selected remote communities are targeted (Greely, 2001). Various definitions have been 
attempted to distinguish groups that choose to be defined as peoples (UNESCO, 1990), as well 
as minority groups and ethnic groups (Pogge, 1997 p.193).   
                                                          
71As stated above, the terms indigenous and Aboriginal are synonymous, and are used interchangeably throughout 
this thesis. 
72[Online] Available at http://www.indigenouspeoples.nl/indigenous-peoples/definition-indigenous  
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HPGR is defined generally in the report of the UNESCO International Bioethics Committee 
entitled, Bioethics and Human Population Genetics Research as, “…a study which aims at 
understanding the nature and extent of genetic variation among a population or individuals 
across different groups” (UNESCO, 1995) and which research relies upon the large-scale 
collection of genetic, genealogical and medical data from many individuals (Greely, 2000 p.157). 
The Human Genome Development Project (HGDP), was one such project, which targeted 
isolated human populations for the reason that they “contain much more informative genetic 
records than more recent, urban ones” (Cavalli-Sforza et al., 1991 p.490). 
Such groups can also be referred to as susceptible or vulnerable communities for research 
purposes, a category which also includes other types of groups such as the Ashkenazi Jews, 
African Americans, or the very poor (Soskolne, 1997). For example, the stigmas faced by the 
Ashkenazi Jews following genetic research on them has been widely debated (Struewing et al., 
1997), raising questions as to who exactly falls into the group, and how are such determinations 
to be made.  Dena Davis (2000) examines groups, communities and contested identities in 
genetic research, concluding that people can be members of a racial, ethnic or genetically defined 
group in one of the following ways:  
            1. Genetic identity, by carrying genes associated with a group such as Ashkenazi Jews 
2. Ethnic or cultural identity, usually by self-proclaimed affiliation with a community, 
including issues of language and culture 
            3. Religious identity, such as membership in a certain church or synagogue 
4. Stakeholder identity, such as being a parent, spouse or even teacher of a member of a 
group 
5. Legal identity, such as a recognized membership of a Native American Tribe, and 
finally  
6. Shared disease experience, (breast cancer survivors) or a shared risk for Huntington’s 
disease (ibid p.40). 
Whilst this list might not be exhaustive, the point is that genetic research can legitimately 
separate out a range of such different collective identities or communities, each of which might 
need to be engaged with in a particular or different manner.   
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This thesis examines the problems of indigenous or Aboriginal peoples rather than other types of 
groups, the former being succinctly described by the following definition used by the indigenous 
Peoples’ Health Research Centre of Canada (IPHRC) report, “indigenous Peoples are the tribal 
peoples in independent countries whose distinctive identity, values and history distinguishes 
them from other sections of the national community” (IPHRC, 2005 p.5). 
The concept of community and its epistemological underpinnings held generally by indigenous 
peoples provides new challenges to institutions accustomed to operating within Western notions 
of an ethical order or the individual’s place in society (ibid p.6). The IPHRC report expands on 
this point where it refers to the confrontation of worldviews that exists at the, “meeting point 
between the dominant Western research paradigm and the emerging Aboriginal epistemological 
discourse” (ibid p.11), which it describes as being most evident when discussing the ethics of 
matters such as informed consent (ibid p.25). In its analysis of the worldview of indigenous 
peoples, the report states that academics trained in the Western liberal tradition have, 
“systematically and radically different ideas” from people socialised in Aboriginal societies (ibid 
p.30). Further authors have opposed the domination of the research domain achieved by Western 
frameworks and worldviews, describing indigenous worldviews and theories as, “challenging the 
hegemony of Western theoretical production” (Pillai, 1999 p.218).   
Indigenous peoples are well on their way to taking ownership over their approach to and 
participation in genetic research. Organisations such as the Indigenous Peoples Council against 
Biocolonialism, described above, and the Waitangi Tribunal of New Zealand, a legal 
commission which published the beliefs and policies guiding bio-prospecting and research on the 
Maori peoples (Waitangi Tribunal, 2011), strongly articulate their particular views and concerns.   
In Canada, indigenous peoples have lobbied the government for decades, in Australia genetic 
research with indigenous communities has been the focus of much attention (Kowal, 2010), 
whilst in Africa the interests of indigenous peoples are generally represented by the continent-
wide organisation Indigenous Peoples of Africa Coordinating Committee (IPACC). This is a 
network of 150 indigenous peoples’ organisations in 20 African countries. The aims of this 
organisation are indicative of the aims of other indigenous bodies, and are as follows: 
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To promote recognition of and respect for indigenous peoples in Africa 
 To promote participation of indigenous African peoples in United Nations events and 
forums 
To strengthen leadership and organisational capacity of indigenous civil society in Africa 
in particular strengthening sub-regional networks of indigenous people.  
 
Each member organisation of IPACC deals with the particular priority issues of identity, rights, 
recognition and self-determination that affect them in their own country, as are articulated in the 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP, 2009). Amongst the better-
known indigenous peoples that belong to IPACC are the Pigmy peoples from Western and 
Central Africa, the Hadzabe, Masai, Sumburu, Pokot, Barabaig and Okiek from East Africa, the 
Amazigh, Tuareg and Berbers from West and Northern Africa, and the San and Khoikhoi from 
Southern Africa.73 The South African San Council, which represents the San in South Africa has 
for example, recently responded to deep concerns with regard to the processes and outcomes of 
genetic research upon them as a community. They requested and held a conference with a group 
of geneticists, lawyers and ethicists on 9 September 2013, aimed at airing their concerns about a 
particular genomic research project conducted on Namibian San during 2010, which had caused 
great unhappiness in the broader San community.  
The purpose of the workshop was firstly to address the causes of the mistrust aroused by 
genomic research where community consultation and consent is perceived as lacking, and 
secondly, to begin a process of formulating an ethical research protocol to guide all such research 
in the future. According to the San leaders from three countries74 that attended the workshop, the 
San individuals who had provided informed consent for the genomic research were not able to 
understand and assess the collective risks that the research would pose to the broader 
community, or the potential damage to be caused by publication of the outcomes. The case study 
is discussed further below. The apprehensions expressed by the San resonate with Charles 
Weijer’s opinion in this regard, who states that when considering the various philosophical and 
                                                          
73 The author is a trustee of IPACC and has acted as the lawyer for the San peoples for the past fifteen years. This 
thesis does not deal with issues where he would have a conflict of interest as a researcher. 
74 South Africa, Namibia and Botswana. 
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pragmatic challenges associated with protecting indigenous communities in research, the 
concerns of such communities are perhaps seen most immediately through the lens of the 
concept of risk (Weijer, 1999 p.501).  
8.2 What are the risks faced by indigenous populations? 
What are the specific risks faced by such groups and populations that are targeted for genomic 
research? How do they perceive and formulate these risks? Unlike clinical research, negligible 
direct risks exist for individuals who provide DNA samples, whilst the broader community to 
which one belongs may be put at some present or future risk. A number of legislative and 
regulatory measures have attempted to address the new risks and challenges arising from genetic 
research, such as the United States’ Genetic Information Non-discrimination Act of 2008, which 
deals inter alia with concerns, that employers or insurers might use genetic information to 
discriminate against certain groups. Despite such efforts to adjust to the dangers arising from 
genetic research, it remains a legitimate concern that in much of the world, regulatory standards 
remain largely focussed on individual rights, and do not yet adequately protect such groups or 
collectives (Sharp & Foster, 2002 p.145).   
Two broad categories of risk exist in genomic research that do not occur in standard medical 
research, with implications for individuals and groups.  Firstly, genetic information discloses 
information not only about the subject, but also her group, family and community (Annas et al., 
1995 p.360). The publication of a genome sequence taken from a tuft of human hair from an 
Aboriginal man in the early 1920s resulted in a number of bioethical dilemmas, including 
questions as to whether and what form of consent should be sought, and if so from which modern 
group of Aborigines. As stated by Henk Greely, “in a sense, every Aboriginal Australian had 
something about themselves revealed to the world without their consent” (Callaway, 2011 
p.522). Secondly, information about the participant and her relatives or group members has a 
future component, as a future diary, “with attendant anxiety, discrimination and related 
concerns” (Annas, 1993 p. 2346).  
For example, information that a parent has a certain genetic disease, such as Huntington’s 
disease, holds powerful implications for her progeny (Davis, 2000 p39). Generally, individuals 
as well as communities approached to participate in genomic research have expressed 
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apprehensions relating to a number of concerns, including privacy (Ginsburg, 1999), 
discrimination and stigmatization (Spaak, 2006), commodification and patenting of tissue 
(Caulfield, 2003), amongst other associated harms. These apprehensions are often exacerbated 
by the different belief systems, and lack of trust of the modern research agenda (Reilly, 1998: 
Kowal, 2012: Weijer 1996, 1999, 2000). McGregor has suggested that the risks specific for such 
socially identifiable populations are identifiable on the one hand as external, which would 
include discrimination and stigmatization, and then on the other hand as internal which would 
include dignity, privacy and psychological issues experienced within the group (McGregor 2007 
p.362).   
The most commonly perceived external risks are associated with identity and subsequent 
discrimination or stigmatization based upon the research results (Weijer & Miller, 2004 p.10). 
Studies involving genetic markers can, for example, reveal that certain participants and their 
family may be more European than they believed, with social consequences (Sharp & Foster, 
2002 p.147). In other cases the identity status of individuals holding political office, or belonging 
to a certain tribe, might be risked by such genetic testing (ibid p.147). Other identity related risks 
flow from research results that link the group, beyond those that provide samples, with 
susceptibility to a disease, which might prejudice members in insurance and employment. For 
example, the risk of society-wide discrimination resulting from published results, the risk of 
perceptions that a particular indigenous community is, “a drain on the system”, and the risks or 
damage to community cultural identity from results indicating population identity and origin 
(Weijer & Miller, 2004 p.11).  The potential social or psychological impact of the above types of 
consequences on the affected group, including feelings of shame, humiliation or lack of esteem, 
is not surprising.   
A public example of discrimination resulting from thoughtless publication was provided by the 
controversy resulting from a geneticist’s finding that Maori were twice as likely to carry a gene 
associated with alcohol and tobacco abuse; the gene was also associated with aggression, and 
identified as the “warrior gene” (Lee & Chambers, 2007). This was widely reported in the media 
as proving that the Maori were genetically predetermined to be violent, which naturally caused 
much damage to genetic research in New Zealand (Kowal, 2012 p.19). Maori academics 
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objected strenuously to the racial stereotyping, calling it “unethical and scandalous” (Hook, 
2009). 
McGregor has described these forms of harms as being firstly tangible harms, such as 
stereotyping or stigmatizing, and secondly dignitary harms, including self-conception, 
depression, humiliation and the like (McGregor, 2010 p.2007). An example of the latter is Jews 
perceiving themselves predisposed to cancer, American Indians being prone to alcoholism (ibid: 
p.363) or African Americans being associated with sickle-cell disease (Foster et al., 1999 
p.1719). As has been suggested, the overall problem in each case is that members of such groups 
not even approached to participate or given an opportunity to consent are nevertheless able to be 
affected or harmed by such research.  
It is well known that indigenous communities in many countries have struggled to come to terms 
with and to prosper in the modern world. Reports of alcoholism, suicide and general dysfunction 
amongst indigenous peoples abound, leading to a plethora of research and analysis (Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 1996). Some have suggested that unresolved historical grief 
following trauma and losses across generations have led to the current social problems (Brave 
Heart & De Bruyn, 1998), and other theories postulate historical trauma transmission passed 
down through memories and story-telling, cultural behaviour, hereditary disposition and 
psychological processes (Wesley-Esquimaux & Smolewski, 2004 p.76). Whilst some have 
suggested cultural traits or customs as explanations for the various forms of modern 
vulnerability, according to Susan Abadian, tribes or peoples subject to social as well as political 
violence over generations, exacerbated by discriminatory schooling policies, experience a form 
of trauma which manifests in a state of collective depression (Abadian, 1999).  
Culture is a broad and multifaceted component of an indigenous or other group identity, which 
can suffer a form of internal harm following genetic research. Population genetics can for 
example, have legal implications for a tribe’s standing and relationship to land, change 
perceptions of relationships to other groups, and affect collective notions of ancestry and identity 
in different ways (Sharp & Foster, 2002 p.147). A community’s culture, which includes self-
perceptions, spiritual traditions, belief and knowledge systems as well as historical narratives 
have been shown to be amongst the most sensitive components of genetic research. As described 
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previously, indigenous activist organisations such as the Indigenous Peoples Council against 
Biocolonialism (IPCB) have stated that the human genetic resources of communities constitute ’ 
sovereign cultural property of those communities, which forms part of a legal property regime 
(Harry & Kanehe, 2006).  
Other indigenous organisations have made similar ownership claims regarding genetic resources, 
as did the Mataatua Declaration on cultural and intellectual property rights of indigenous peoples 
of 1993, which was passed by a plenary of delegates from Ainu (Japan), Australia, Cook islands, 
Fiji, India, Panama, Peru, Phillippines, Surinam, the United States and Aotearoa (New Zealand) 
(Mead & Ratuva, 2007). These declarations of right have however, not proved effective in 
securing increased tribal control of samples and data (Reardon & Tallbear, 2012 p.341). Pullman 
and Nicholas argue strongly against such cultural appropriation by tribes of genetic resources, as 
well as against placing such cultural property under the dictates and strictures of a property law 
system. They argue that human DNA need not be treated as exceptional, that no special rules 
need to be applied, and that research involving DNA should be subject to the common principles 
of research ethics (Pullman & Nicholas, 2011). They warn in addition about the potential of such 
approaches to conflate the ambiguous and flexible concept of culture with biology (ibid p.157). 
Cultural harms have been described as the violations of groups’ rights to their own culture, 
(Tsosie, 2007 p. 411), which are accepted in International Human Rights Law instruments such 
as Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (UN, 1966). For 
example, migration patterns long held to be sacred parts of indigenous tribes’ belief system and 
culture can be brought into question by genetic research, posing deep problems for the 
community (Tsosie & McGregor, 2007 p.352). In the Havasupai case, publication of human 
migration studies resulting from unauthorised research recorded the tribe’s origin as having 
migrated from Asia across the Bering straits, a narrative contradictory to their closely held 
cultural beliefs on identity and origin (Drabiak-Syed, 2010 p.217).  
On being questioned about this research the author stated that it never occurred to her that this 
theory might be upsetting to the tribe (ibid p.219). Markow, the original researcher in this case, 
defended the publication of the research on human migrations which was objectionable to the 
tribe, on the grounds that such information was “good science”, and of ‘”public benefit” (Hart & 
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Sobraske, 2003 p.87). A New York Times editorial explained that the tribe’s deploring of the 
Bering straits theory was that it ran contrary to their “traditional myths”, using terminology that 
emphasized the journalist’s failure to respect or even understand the cultural system of the 
Havasupai (ibid p.219).  
Science, in the hands of the dominant culture, claims to be neutral but is used by researchers in a 
way not always acceptable to indigenous peoples. In the Havasupai case again, the scientists 
claimed pursuit of knowledge for the public good, but the process proved to be harmful for the 
tribe.  Genetics is increasingly being used as a scientific tool to demonstrate nativeness, and the 
state relies upon genetics in disputes of rights such as land claims in order to determine whether 
applicants meet a certain “socially constructed image of the Indian” (McCulloch & Wilkins, 
1995). When the 9,000 year old Kennewick Man was discovered in Washington State in 1996, 
assumptions of his identity as Native American were followed by tribal attempts to claim the 
remains which were unsuccessful, and the state ordered genetic testing to establish the body’s 
cultural affiliation. When the results were found to be inconclusive, it was ordered to be stored at 
the Washington University’s Burke Museum (Reardon & Tallbear, 2012 p.240). In another case 
involving ancient ancestral remains, DNA was extracted from a corpse estimated to be have been 
stored for 10,000 years in the ice, which was discovered by the Tlingit tribe of the Prince of 
Wales Island in Alaska. Two hundred and thirty Native Alaskans voluntarily participated in the 
study aimed at establishing its identity as well as early population settlement patterns (Kemp, 
2007).  
Agreeing to take part in such studies can, as has been seen many times, lead to unpopular 
conclusions. The Mashpee Tribe of Massachusetts for example, tried for 32 years to obtain 
recognition, which was refused after DNA studies revealed a mixed ancestry unsupportive of 
their identity claim (Pullman & Nicholas, 2011). An additional ongoing ethical debate surrounds 
the question of who has the right to control access to ancient DNA, which may have serious 
implications on the origins, identity and cultural narrative held by indigenous peoples (Carlyle, 
2005). The ownership of body parts and DNA stored in museums is generally repatriated to the 
respective communities, but as stated by Kowal, the British Museum in London generally 
excludes hair and nails from its repatriation policy, which are a valuable tool for examining 
human genomes (Callaway, 2011 p.523). The view that genetic knowledge is an objective 
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neutral good that benefits all thus is not equally held or shared by indigenous peoples, for whom 
the right to control their own culture and identity remains crucial (Reardon & Tallbear, 2012 
p.240).  
Specific issues related to culture and belief, other than the identity issues discussed above 
continue to surprise Western researchers. For example, indigenous peoples including the 
Havasupai often relate to blood in ways that are profoundly spiritual, with reverence, respect and 
responsibility, and in the same way that they relate to their ancestors (Harry, 2009 p.190). Ahora 
Mead of the Ngati Awa and Ngati Porou lineage of New Zealand is reported as explaining the 
sacred nature of blood by saying, “a physical gene is imbued with a life spirit handed down from 
the ancestors” (ibid p.189). Concerning blood and tissue, the National Congress of American 
Indians stated in a declaration on the issue that, “the taking of blood, hair and tissue samples is 
an affront to the religious beliefs, cultural values and sensitivities of many indigenous peoples” 
(ibid p.190). Terms such as Indian blood and memory is in the blood (Olsen, 1967) resonate with 
the burden of an anguished history of colonial oppression, during which the oppressors tried to 
terminate Indian tribes (McMillan, 1988).  
In this quaint poem about a nosebleed entitled, Cheeky Moon, author Marie Annharte Baker 
captures the precarious status of Indian identity and its relationship to blood. It reads, 
             I’m left to defend,  
             One lonely drop of blood! 
             I might terminate, 
             If I get nosebleed. (Baker, 1990 p.38)  
In addition to blood itself, genetic information extracted from the blood too is, from the 
indigenous perspective, an inalienable part of persons long after it has been removed from the 
body of an individual (Kowal, 2012 p.9). In the Havasupai case, a scientist later defended his use 
of DNA samples without consent, saying firstly he had received only transformed cell lines 
rather than the original tissue, that is descendants of original cells (Hart & Sobraskne, 2003 
p.71), and secondly that because the cell lines had no genealogies associated with them, his 
research was exempt from REC approval (ibid p.72). The belief system indicated by this 
argument gives credence to questions raised by indigenous peoples relating to possible future 
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uses of the samples including their commodification, and to the fair exchange of benefits, if any, 
resulting there from.  In addition, the technical nature of such an argument ignores the real 
concerns being expressed, comes across as arrogant and dismissive, and is hardly likely to 
enhance a relationship of trust. 
Some authors deny that potential research participants should be warned that one or more 
findings from the research might challenge their religious beliefs, feeling that this would be too 
onerous and a burden on science (Reilly, 1998 p.684). Such views support the notion expressed 
by Markow in the Havasupai case that good science justifies such intrusions. However, after 
receipt of evidence indicative of the yawning cultural gaps between researcher and community, it 
is perhaps not surprising that many genetic researchers have reported serious resistance to 
genetic research involving indigenous and rural communities, one author describing this by 
simply stating that “indigenous people don’t like genetics” (Kowal, 2012 p.19). Kowal also 
commented that in the lack of clear guidelines as to how to engage with indigenous peoples, 
declining to participate in research had for many years proved to be appropriate and “the only 
safe option for Australian Aborigines” (ibid p.20).  
Richard Grounds describes the eventually negative response of the Yuchi Indian tribe to the 
approaches of the Human Genome Diversity Project (HGDP), explaining how within most 
indigenous peoples’ epistemologies, the questions of origins, their past and relations to other 
groups are dealt with in a unique manner (Grounds, 2009 p.3). He explains how the caution and 
mistrust expressed by the tribal elders responded to a history of betrayal and loss perpetrated by 
the Euro-American society, as follows: 
They are the current expression, the echo, of the long memory of the oppression and 
genocide perpetrated by Euro-American society upon Native Peoples. The great disparity 
in levels of trust between Native American and non-Native American societies regarding 
such a project derive from fundamentally different historical experiences. The issue is not 
simply the good intentions of the members of the HGDP. (ibid p.6)  
The gulf between those of European and other descent in countries with a colonial history such 
as the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and parts of Africa has been exacerbated by the 
advance of science, during which the Western or modern notion of science is often used in a 
Eurocentric manner to reinforce the belief of what is perceived true and correct.  In an article that 
examines biological anthropology and population genetics, authors Reardon and Tallbear quote a 
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powerful extract from a film, The Journey of Man, during which Wells, the population geneticist, 
tries to level the playing field and engage on an equal plane with an Aboriginal leader whilst 
providing the following explanation of Western science, 
What I’d like you to think about with the DNA stories we are telling is that they are just 
that.  They are DNA stories. It’s our version as Europeans of how the world was 
populated, and where we all trace back to. That’s our song line. We use science to tell us 
about that because we don’t have the sense of direct continuity. Our ancestors didn’t pass 
down the stories. We’ve lost them, and we have to go out and find them. We use science, 
which is a European way of looking at the world to do that. You guys don’t need that.   
(Reardon & Tallbear, 2012 p.233) 
This passage reflects an earnest attempt by the scientist to engage as an equal, and to 
acknowledge without judgement the validity of the two differing realities held by his group and 
the Aboriginals.  The authors conclude that most genome scientists and biological 
anthropologists involved with indigenous DNA miss the deeper histories and meanings of 
relations between European and indigenous peoples, failing also to understand the deeper and 
painful connotations of race and culture (ibid p.234).  
The asymmetry of power between Western and indigenous is omnipresent, and admittedly 
difficult to deal with in a balanced or satisfactory manner.  Rebecca Tsosie examines the social 
and political nature of research, calling for the development of an “intercultural justice” which 
would, “restructure the relationships among Native nations and the United States, and alleviate 
the historical and contemporary grievances and harms that continue to affect native 
communities” (Tsosie, 2007 p.498). She describes how inherent values and assumptions differ, 
for example with property, where Euro-American values see all resources as being capable of 
being owned.  Indigenous peoples, on the other hand, understand property to be communal in 
nature, and recognise that property can have spiritual value (ibid pp.397-398).  
This radically different worldview, between Western and indigenous Inuit, is described by Hugh 
Brody in biblical metaphor. He explains that whilst indigenous peoples regard themselves as 
being of nature, regarding it as perfect in every way, Western society is afflicted by the “curse of 
Eden” described in the book of Genesis, where God ordered Abraham and his tribes out of 
paradise, cursed to strive forever to conquer and seek dominion over the birds of the air and the 
animals of the field (Brody, 2001 p.244).  In the light of such potential gulfs of understanding, 
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such vastly disparate worldviews colliding, genetic researchers might well ask how then should 
such communities be engaged? 
8.3 How to engage with indigenous groups? 
Engaging properly with such communities for genomic research is no simple matter, the 
acquiring of proper informed consent being a fundamental requirement. A vast body of research 
has addressed related questions such as how group or collective informed consent should be 
secured in such cases (Sharp & Foster, 2002). This and the broader debates around genetic 
exceptionalism, which revolve around the question whether genomic information is so different 
to other medical information that it requires wholly separate forms of legal protection, will not be 
engaged with here (Murray 1997; Suter, 2001). Whilst clinical research encompasses and 
envisages various physical harms such as reactions to drugs or procedures, genomic research is 
normally commenced with a non-invasive sample of DNA from blood, saliva or other tissue, and 
involves an entirely different and far more subtle form of risk for participants and communities.   
Some authors have suggested that the extraction of human genomic material has caused the most 
controversy of all the other issues in indigenous health research (Kowal, 2012 p.19), emphasising 
the importance of proper engagement aimed at securing authentic informed consent. 
8.3.1 Informed consent 
The first of the six charges levelled by the attorneys of the Havasupai tribe was breach of 
informed consent (Reardon & Tallbear, 2012 p.241). Although this was one of the strongest 
charges, leading to the eventual settlement, which awarded damages to the tribe, the lessons 
learned from this case were far broader than informed consent. As can be concluded from the 
numerous cases referred to earlier including the Havasupai, the Hagahai and the Nuu-Chah-
Nulth, where scientists failed to understand the concerns of their research participants, the central 
problem appears to be that they entirely missed the cultural and worldview context described 
above. Reardon and Tallbear postulate in this regard that whereas most contemporary genomic 
researchers reject racism and believe that it has long been abandoned, they nevertheless   
continue in their methodologies to control native peoples and own their resources (ibid p.234).  
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Pullman and Nicholas (2011), postulate that had either the Havasupai or the Nuu-chah-nulth 
projects been initiated as an archaeological or anthropological study, the outcomes might have 
been different (ibid p.155). The latter groups and other social scientists, they add, operate within 
a community-based approach, a research culture that emphasises cultural sensitivity and 
relationship building. This is in contrast to the impersonal paradigm long established for health 
research, where research participants are anonymous, and part of a statistically significant sample 
(ibid p.156). Guidelines and proposals for community based research in the fields of science and 
biodiversity emphasise respect for communities as both users and providers of knowledge, and 
the shared goals of building healthy communities whilst improving applied scholarship 
(Bannister 2005; Bannister & Hardison 2006). 
The question of how to appropriately obtain informed consent in the community context has 
spawned a wealth of writings in the field of bioethics, including those that postulate the need for 
various forms of consultation, permission, and even consent for the group to be required over 
and above individual informed consent of participants. The issue of different forms of informed 
consent –broad, narrow, open, general – for population bio-banks and genomic research 
generally is important for the protection of individuals, but not relevant for the issues of group or 
collective risks being discussed here (Karlsen et al., 2011; IPHRC, 2005). The movement to 
encompass the collective or communitarian ethos of communities more effectively has 
nevertheless taken place both in clinical as well as general research, in many cases 
acknowledging the importance of including community values as part of the design of research 
(Karlawish, 1998).  
Regulatory protection was extended from individuals to groups; for example, the National 
Bioethics Advisory Commission proposed that investigators and RECs should consider how to 
minimise group harms (NBAC, 1999, Article 17). In addition, it proposed that when significant 
risk to a community can be identified before a study has begun, the researchers should work with 
community representatives to develop study methods that minimise the potential for harm (ibid 
Article 17), and include collective risks as part of the informed consent process (ibid: Article 18). 
There were those that supported community involvement through dialogue in the development 
and review of population-specific genetic studies (Greely, 1997), whilst others again questioned 
the viability or practicality of requiring community review (Reilly, 1998). A major problem 
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identified with affording such regulatory or veto power to an identified community is the 
phenomenon described as nesting, where smaller communities exist as part of broader and 
dispersed or larger communities, and where gate keeping can and does take place (Sharp & 
Foster, 2000 p.47).  
8.3.2 Collective consent 
An article entitled, Groups as gatekeepers to genomic research: conceptually confusing, morally 
hazardous, and practically useless, aptly describes one author’s position and concerns about 
group consent (Juengst, 1998). Other authors are concerned particularly about making 
consultation with communities a requirement as part of regulatory policy, and question whether 
communities should have the right to actually veto a research proposal (Foster et al., 1999 
p.1720). It should be noted that the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol discussed earlier gave rise to a 
wealth of commentary on the implementation of prior informed consent as a requirement to 
ensure fairness for indigenous peoples, much of which gave rise to entirely analogous issues.   
Foster et al. agree with those who recommend community dialogue in development and review 
of research as a policy, for the reason that these authors generally do so on the basis of 
experiences with populations where culturally specific risks are of collective concern, rather than 
on the basis of conceptual or academic arguments (ibid p.1720). Continuing this trend, Charles 
Weijer (1999), proposed that a fifth ethical principle, namely respect for communities, should be 
added to the previously accepted ethical research principles namely autonomy, non-maleficence, 
beneficence and justice (ibid p.505). He suggested that this new principle, effectively summed up 
by the expression, “be sure and think about the community” is best described as an “emerging 
duty,” namely a prima facie duty rather than an absolute duty, which can be set aside if a 
compelling justification to do so exists (ibid p.506). This principle is effectively encapsulated as 
the placing upon the researcher of an obligation to take the values and choices of the community 
seriously, and where possible, to protect the community from harm (Weijer & Miller, 2004 
p.12). 
The need to bridge differing worldviews and to adapt ethical standards formulated within 
Western paradigms has attracted special attention by governments, such as the Australian 
government's Commission on Aboriginal Health, as well as the Royal Commission on 
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Aboriginal Peoples that met in 1992 to assist developing an ethical code for research within these 
communities in Canada (RCAP, 1992). Research had acquired a bad name amongst Aboriginal 
Peoples in Canada, as recounted by Marlene Castanello (2004), elders had complained that they 
had been badly treated over the years by “misguided and harmful” research, and had according to 
some been “researched to death” (ibid p.98). Reflecting a new mood amongst the assembled 
Aboriginal leaders that it had become time for them to participate more actively in formulating 
research ethics codes together with the Western trained researchers, one elder responded, “well, 
maybe it’s time we started researching ourselves back to life” (ibid p.98).   
Despite the recurrence of “jagged worldviews colliding”, the term coined by one leader to 
describe the encounter between Aboriginal thinking and positivist scientific thought (ibid p.103), 
many of the potentially conflicting issues such as intellectual property rights, informed consent 
and community control of research agendas were resolved with the formulation of eight 
principles for an ethics regime for Aboriginal research which are described below. The report 
drew heavily on research conducted by Charles Weijer, who had examined 16 prior documents 
on research ethics written by and for Aboriginal Peoples internationally, including Canada, the 
United States and Australia, which emphasised informed consent from leaders prior to 
approaching individuals, amongst principles reflecting collaboration with and respect towards 
the community (Weijer et al., 1999). Generally, consensus was reached on the principle that 
collective approval if not consent was required for research, which was captured in various 
documents and guidelines. 
8.3.3 Specific guidelines and principles for indigenous peoples 
Despite the striving for fairness in research contained in all the major bioethical guidelines, as 
well as in the more focussed guidelines aimed at ensuring fair engagement with communities 
from low and middle income countries promulgated by the Council on Health Research for 
Development (COHRED 2013), indigenous peoples present particular challenges and 
complexities which require more explicit approaches. Guidelines specifically for research in 
indigenous communities have therefore appeared in Australia (NHMRC 1991), Canada (ACUNS 
1982, ICC 1992, 1998, IPHRC 2005), New Zealand (SPEAR, 2008), and the United States 
(American Indian Law Centre, 1994). In addition, a number of institutions have emerged in 
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response to the need to embrace and engage with these communities, such as the Indigenous 
Peoples’ Health Research Centre of Canada (IPHRC, 2005), the Indigenous Peoples of Africa 
Coordinating Committee (IPACC) referred to above, the Indigenous Wellness Research Institute 
in America (IWRI), 75 and the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Straits Islander 
Studies (AIATSIS). 76  The latter body revised its research ethics guidelines in 2010, which 
focussed primarily on developments in areas such as intellectual property rights and genetic 
research (AIATSIS, 2010; Davis, 2010).   
The growing international corpus of ethical codes subscribed to by these organisations reflects a 
number of common features, prominent amongst which is the shared intention to regard and 
place the relationship between researchers and the community as a form of partnership. For 
example, full partnership in the research enterprise is now required in all Canadian research 
ethics guidelines, as originally formulated by the Tri-Council Policy Statement developed by the 
three major research granting councils in Canada (TCPS, 1998). As a further example of this 
principle, Australia’s National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) establishes 
equal moral status for both parties, and requires consultation with the community in preparation 
of the proposal, ensuring sensitivity to the community’s culture and politics (Weijer, 1999 
p.508).  
In addition, these guidelines state that the written informed consent of the community is to be 
obtained before individuals are approached, and that sensitive issues such as benefits, 
reimbursement, ownership and disposition of samples and data need to be negotiated during the 
consultation process.  Finally, before publishing of data, the community must be provided with 
draft copies, and consent must be sought before publication in the media (ibid p.508). The most 
recent version of the NHMRC emphasises the aspiration for ethical relationships, the 
development of mutual trust and respect, and states unequivocally that, within the research 
process, “failing to understand differences in values and culture may be a reckless act that 
jeopardises both the ethics and quality of research” (NHMRC, 2003 p.3). 
                                                          
75 Indigenous Wellness Research Institute, University of Washington, USA [Online] Available at 
http://www.iwri.org  
76 Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Straits Islanders Studies IATSIS. [Online] Available at http://www.iatsis.gov.au  
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It would be beyond the remit of this thesis to describe the numerous guidelines, declarations and 
documents that have emerged in response to the need to both protect and include indigenous or 
Aboriginal peoples in research. The following eight abbreviated principles proposed by Marlene 
Castanello (2004) and based upon a review of current guidelines however provide an accurate 
reflection of the primary concerns and requirements for such research:  
1. Aboriginal peoples have an inherent right to participate as principals or partners in 
research that generates knowledge affecting their culture, identity and well-being. 
2. The Government has a fiduciary obligation to guard against infringement of Aboriginal 
rights in research activities, which safeguards must be endorsed by Aboriginal 
representative organisations. 
3. Ethical standards of research should strike a balance between restriction and 
infringement of Aboriginal rights, and respect for the primacy of ethical codes originating 
in affected communities. 
4. Ethical regulation of research affecting Aboriginal peoples should be of broad scope, 
including protection for all knowledge, languages, territories, material objects, and 
literary or artistic creations. 
5. Aboriginal collective interests in regard to intellectual property should be protected. 
6. Aboriginal peoples should develop and implement ethical standards for Aboriginal 
research, and should serve as majority members on Aboriginal-specific research ethics 
boards serving local, regional and national communities. 
7. The costs of developing and implementing an ethical research regime should be borne 
by the government. 
8. Responsibility for the education of Aboriginal communities should be shared between 
the communities themselves and the government as well as other organisations. (Pp.111-
112) 
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8.3.4 Guidelines on consultations and negotiations 
Implementation of institutional arrangements and principles such as those set out above in 
relation to indigenous communities however, requires a process of engagement, consultation and 
community review, which in most cases results in some form of negotiations eventually reflected 
in a contractual arrangement. Negotiations aimed at research contracting are of necessity 
between research organisations on the one hand and a participant community on the other, 
arousing concerns about asymmetrical power relations. Such power differentials in bilateral 
engagements give rise to heightened fears of taking advantage and exploitation of one or other of 
the forms that have been discussed above, leading to the defences against procedurally unfair 
taking of advantage developed in the law of equity. The focus on the precise form of the dealing, 
the improper coercion, or the abuse of trust component of negotiations in equity was an attempt 
to understand the subtle shifts of power that take place during negotiations.   
The Council on Health Research for Development (COHRED) is an example of an international 
body that has developed guidelines in order to assist low and middle-income country (LMIC) 
institutions, with the stated purpose of strengthening such LMIC institutions’ ability to negotiate 
fair research contracts with their higher income research partners. The key issues that need to be 
recorded in order to prevent exploitation and unfairness of the weaker parties include, according 
to COHRED, intellectual property rights, ownership of data and samples, and related contractual 
matters. Indigenous peoples as targeted communities within LMICs are similarly at a potential 
disadvantage vis a vis the research institutions, and need assistance over and above the 
institutional protection provided by society to ensure that guidelines are observed and that their 
contracts embody the elements of fairness. 
Weijer’s comparison of sixteen guideline documents written by and for indigenous Peoples, 
enabled him to extract five essential guiding themes relevant to the process of engagement, 
aimed at enabling the implementation of Castanello’s eight principles described above: 
1. Consultation should take place with the community when developing research 
protocols and throughout research. 
2. Informed consent should be obtained from community leaders prior to approaching 
individuals. 
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3. Community involvement should take place both in conducting the research and 
transfer of skills, 
4. Access to data and samples, as well as further or additional use of samples should be 
regulated. 
5. Advance drafts of research reports should be distributed to the community to identify 
community views.  (Weijer et al., 1999) 
As Weijer and Miller show in a subsequent discussion of protection regimes for various forms of 
communities in research, community consultation and consent is the highest protection regime, 
appropriate for highly cohesive communities with legitimate political authorities, which would 
include indigenous or Aboriginal communities. For other forms of community, including groups 
such as African American and Ashkenazi Jews, at the very least a process of community 
consultation is required (Weijer & Miller, 2004 p.13).  All of these processes have one common 
defining feature, namely that members of the study population are respectfully and actively 
engaged in the process (Sharp & Foster, 2000 p.42). 
8.3.5 Group consent and community review 
According to Isselmuiden and Faden (1992), a certain consensus has emerged in bioethics in 
relation to communities involved in research, expressed in the notion that whilst broader groups 
are able to provide permission, sometimes at the level of consent, only individuals may validly 
give what is termed informed consent (ibid p.832). The group consent contained in all the 
guidelines on indigenous peoples referred to above reflects the model protocol developed by the 
North American Regional Committee of the Human Genome Diversity Project (HGDP).  The 
protocol was motivated, in addition to assertions that such groups are generally economically 
marginal and discriminated against in their own countries, by the fact that,  “under such 
circumstances, it cannot be ethically appropriate to sample some members of a group when the 
group itself has not agreed to participate” (HGDP, 1997 p.1443). 
The outpouring of opposition to the HGDP emphasised that an entirely different approach was 
required in order to access these valuable sources of genetic information, and that the particular 
world views of such peoples needed to be engaged with, respected and understood, in order to 
address their fears and concerns (Dodson & Williamson, 1999). The ethics committee of the 
HGDP proposed that group consent as outlined in their protocol should replace protection of 
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individuals as the dominant paradigm in the management of genetics research with indigenous 
peoples (Sharp & Foster, 2000 p.41). Group consent raised radical issues, including questions 
relating to definitions of legitimate groups, and fears of the consequences of such a group veto as 
mentioned above (Weijer, 1999; Davis, 2000). Others preferred to suggest the term community 
permission rather than consent, as a preferable collective process required to accompany 
individual consent (Diallo et al., 2005 p.255). Rising above these differences, the term 
community review emerged and became widely used to describe the careful engagement 
between researchers and communities in order to address cultural and related concerns. 
Community review thus includes community approval, group consent, communal 
discourse, and other methods of consulting with communities about the potential 
implications of genetic research. In its least demanding form, community review could be 
little more than informal dialogue between researchers and members of the study 
population. At the other extreme, community review could involve the negotiation of a 
formal agreement between researchers and the study population. (Sharp & Foster, 2000 
p.42). 
In some cases the words community approval rather than community consent were intentionally 
used to describe a less legally rigorous process, such as in the case of a research project 
involving the Akwesasne Mohawk community in Canada (Sharp & Foster, 2002 p.146). Many 
subsequent proposals have been made to expand the regulatory system protecting communities 
from harm, not limited to indigenous communities, and also giving effect to what is now 
generally regarded as a new ethical principle in genetic research, namely Weijer’s “respect for 
communities” (Weijer, 1999 p.505). Other debates, respond to what one author has termed, “a 
new era of public interest, controversy and ethical problems” related to “the new human 
population genetics” (Greely, 2001 p.785). During the course of this debate, the particular need 
to consult with communities in relation to large-scale genetic databases also received academic 
attention (Godard et al., 2004). Issues to do with race, ethnicity, disease and other external forms 
of identifying populations for such research remain relevant and continue to evolve (Davis, 2000: 
Fujimura et al., 2008). This thesis has however elected to focus on the particular types of risks 
perceived and faced by those described as indigenous communities in genetic research. 
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8.3.6 The Southern African San case  
A paradigmatic example of reliance upon individual informed consent for genomic research on 
indigenous peoples, despite the obvious group implications of the research, occurred in a 
genome-sequencing and extended genetic diversity studies genotyping project published as 
Complete Khoisan and Bantu Genomes from Southern Africa (Shuster et al., 2010). This research 
project sought to collect and analyse samples from four San, also termed Bushmen in the article, 
“indigenous hunter gatherers” from Namibia and from one “Bantu” from South Africa (ibid 
p.943). 77 The San were targeted in this research for the reason that they represent, “the oldest 
known lineage of modern human” (ibid, p.943), and the stated purpose of the research was to 
seek a greater understanding of human genetic variation and its effect on human health (ibid 
p.947). The indigenous San of Southern Africa are widely known as descendants of the earliest 
forms of humankind, and have formed advocacy organisations particularly to protect their 
interests, and their culture and heritage, since the mid-1990s (Chennells, 2009).  
The San leaders were unhappy with many aspects of the subsequent publication of the research, 
which included unreservedly describing the San community as hunter-gatherers. This label 
however, brought about associated perceptions of stigma and discrimination. Their primary 
concerns were firstly, the fact that they as the leaders of San had not been consulted, and 
secondly, the fact that uneducated community members had provided informed consent on this 
complex project without assistance, each participant being described in the paper as the oldest 
member of his tribe.  A letter addressed to the editor of Nature by San leader Mathambo 
Ngakaeaja read as follows: 
We were truly shocked when the article was published. None of the official San 
structures in Namibia had been approached in the customary and expected manner.  The 
Namibian San Council has representatives of all the language groups, and such a project 
was clearly far too complex to be explained to simple rural San, particularly ‘tribal 
elders’ in the words of the article, who were unlikely to have any form of education 
whatsoever. I can only conclude that no effort was made to contact the community 
leaders in the haste or alternative secrecy that drove the researchers. (Ngakaeaja, 2011)   
Numerous further concerns arose from this study.  Firstly, ethics approval was provided by three 
foreign Universities, namely from America, Australia and South Africa, with only a research 
                                                          
77The Bantu sampled in this project was Archbishop Desmond Tutu from South Africa, a Nobel Peace prize winner 
and well-known member of the Sotho and Xhosa linguistic groups. 
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permit being issued in the host country, Namibia (Schuster et al., 2010 p.943). Secondly, despite 
the San being well known and in fact selected for their status as indigenous peoples, none of the 
established best practices or guidelines referring to research with indigenous communities, such 
as those described above, were acknowledged or followed. This would have required an entirely 
different consultative approach to the involvement of the San, giving effect to the ethical 
principle respect for communities. Thirdly, the individual nature of the informed consent process 
raised unease not only for the reasons of the complexity of the proposed project and the 
deliberate selection of illiterate aged participants, but primarily for the fact that the broader San 
community was never engaged in order to ascertain its inputs or concerns. Fourthly, the project 
being intended to cover a wide spectrum of issues as is common in genetic diversity studies, the 
likelihood of research results having the ability to affect, stigmatise or otherwise affect the 
broader community was predictably high.  It is not known whether and in what manner these 
risks were discussed with the individuals who provided consent.   
A document entitled, Supplementary Information, published alongside the paper, contained 
numerous potentially sensitive comments on lifestyle, migration and intermarriage theories 
relating to the San. These included repeated reference to the low social status of Bushmen, as 
well as research outcomes relating to genetic markers on personal attributes such as 
pigmentation, hair colour, lactose persistence, lipid metabolism, bitter taste alleles and hearing 
ability (Schuster et al., 2010 supplement pp.3-7). Finally, the project leaders refused to apologise 
for their oversight in avoiding community engagement, or to acknowledge any duty to engage 
with or sign the standard research contract used by the San representative organisation 
WIMSA.78   
Despite written requests, the project leaders also failed to provide copies of informed consent 
films or documents (Begbie-Clench, 2010). In response to the request, a member of the research 
team explained that none of the participants had expressed a wish to be represented by such a 
San representative organisation, going on to say “as we are dealing with individuals in a personal 
manner (via their DNA), the individual has the right to participate or not as the information 
gathered has a direct impact on that person” (Hayes, 2010). This view entirely ignored the 
                                                          
78WIMSA (Working Group of Indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa) is a San organisation representing San in 
Namibia, South Africa and Botswana and based in Windhoek, Namibia.  Its website is not currently functional.  
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potential for the collective implications of the study.  Whilst the San decided not to take their 
complaints further, they expressed the fact that the case has left the community deeply 
mistrustful of genetic research (Ngakaeaja, 2011), evoking comparison with Kowals’ statement 
that, “indigenous people don’t like genetics” (Kowal, 2010 p.19).  
The researchers’ attitude in refusing to acknowledge the need to engage with the San leadership 
on the issue was reminiscent of Markow’s defiant defence of her research in the Havusapai case, 
on the basis that it was good science. The fact that the Havusapai research took place in the 
1980s and prior to the evolution of ‘respect for communities’ as an acknowledged additional 
ethical principle of research gives pause for thought. This thesis holds that what some bemoan as 
the lack of guidelines on how to ensure ethical research with specific indigenous peoples 
(McMillan & Conlan, 2004 p.206) no longer provides researchers with a legitimate excuse.    
In concluding this section on engagement with indigenous peoples as an important category of 
participants in genomic research, the range of guidelines that have been developed in different 
countries have a number of principles in common, most important of which is the need to treat 
such communities with appropriate respect.  The principle of respect for communities includes 
many of the procedural guidelines. For example, the need to engage with them in a participatory 
process building ethical relationships, and to treat them as equal partners rather than as 
subservients, must be regarded as a sine qua non for modern genomic research.  What the San 
example serves to emphasise however, in addition to a host of ethical failings on the part of the 
research team, is the fact that RECs from three different developed countries somehow failed to 
apply essential elements of the above body of guidelines on community engagement. In addition, 
they failed to give effect to the fifth ethical principle, namely by showing respect for, and by 
acknowledging the legitimate concerns of the affected San community.  RECs were thus shown 
to be the weak link in the chain of protection, which topic requires further investigation.  
8.4 Research Ethics Committees: roles and concerns 
The San case study shows that RECs, the institutional assurance of non-maleficence, with the 
responsibility to refer to guidelines that have been developing over the past decades, are by no 
means reliable forms of protection. Their assessment of non-maleficence is intended to provide 
the research community with assurance that the research is ethically sound.  Issues such as 
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benefit sharing, risk, and the potential for exploitation in the exchange as discussed earlier in this 
thesis should be weighed up, and reliably pronounced upon.  Genomic research on indigenous 
communities however presents particular challenges for RECs, as has been demonstrated above, 
and regulatory guidelines in relation to terms such as undue influence and coercion still reflect 
the original primary purpose of clinical rather than genomic research. Drawing on the above 
discussions, the problems with RECs can be regarded as being situated in the realms of attitude, 
capacity, representivity and process. 
8.4.1 Attitude 
Attitude can be summed up by the proposed new ethical principle of ‘respect for communities’ 
described above, aimed at redressing the individualistic nature of existing moral, policy and legal 
frameworks (Weijer & Miller, 2003 p.9). RECs should, in the words of Solomon Benatar (2004), 
ensure that their well-meaning approaches are not paternalistic, meaning that they should be 
focussed on “helping people from their perspective, and not ours” (ibid p.1). The narrow 
scientific attitude personified by the defiant defence of the benefits of pure medical science given 
by Markow and others in the Havasupai case, as well as in the failure of Schuster et al. to 
understand or engage with the grievances expressed by the San leaders, needs to be tackled.  The 
communitarian setting and ethos of genetic research, which often involves vulnerable 
communities, now requires an attitude that places the status of the participant community as 
equal to that of the researchers (Weijer, 1999). This is well expressed by the call contained in the 
Australian NHMRC for “ethical relationships” between community and research organisations, 
including values such as reciprocity, respect, equality, responsibility and integrity (NHMRC, 
2003). These guidelines and principles are intended to reverse the scientific culture and paradigm 
reflected in the following explanation by Pullman and Nicholas (2011), 
Because health care workers have been trained in a culture that treats the research subject 
as a somewhat anonymous participant within a larger research endeavour that purposely 
set out to separate research from day-to-day clinical practice, they see little need or value 
in developing relationships with the community, or in reporting results that have no 
particular relevance to the subject. (ibid p.156) 
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The attitude of REC members can be expected to evolve together with the improvement and 
refinement of guidelines applicable when indigenous and other vulnerable populations are 
targeted for research, as well as with training and further development of capacity.   
8.4.2 Capacity   
It has long been accepted that research ethics in the developing world requires an expansion of 
the capacity and functioning of RECs in those countries (Benatar, 2000 p.1137). Despite the 
consensus on this issue, the pace of improvement appears to be slow. Recent research on 
research ethics in Central Africa showed that, “legislation governing biomedical research 
involving humans is absent in almost all the countries in the sub-region,” and that many of the 
countries did not yet have a functioning REC (Ouwe-Missi-Oukem-Boyer et al., 2013 p.10). 
Whilst guidelines have been developed in countries where researchers are required to engage 
with Aboriginal or indigenous peoples, including Australia, Canada and the United States 
(Weijer 1999, p.507), the capacity of RECs to engage communities as required in the guidelines 
is questionable. Calls for increased capacity of developing world RECs that have been made for 
decades have had limited success, a disturbing fact confirmed by another recent study of genetic 
research in Africa (De Vries et al., 2012).  
This study, after commenting on the lack of capacity of national RECs, confirmed firstly that a  
clear understanding of the particular research project requires focussed community engagement 
in securing collaborative agreement of research protocols, and secondly that it is critical to 
engage with the diverse indigenous, Aboriginal or local communities that are identified for the 
research (ibid p.2).  Kowal’s description of the general mistrust expressed by indigenous peoples 
about genetics, de Vries’ confirmation of the lack of REC capacity, and the San example of the 
failure of no less than three RECs to address their most basic cultural interests should conspire to 
ignite a stern warning against complacency regarding RECs’ current capacity to protect.   
8.4.3 Representation 
As described by Weijer (1996), questions have been asked as to the role of RECs in assessing the 
representivity of study populations in research protocols. NIH guidelines provide specific 
mandates in regard representation of minority groups, including whether and to what extent the 
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specific community’s interests and views are reflected in the research protocol (ibid p.343). 
RECs should seek the assurance, according to Weijer, that relevant cultural, spiritual and related 
information is not only made available to them, but also that it is understood prior to their 
providing institutional approval of the research (ibid p.343).  
It has been widely acknowledged that outsiders struggle to identify particular culture-based intra-
community risks such as those described above, and various proposals have been made to 
address the issue of representation. These range from suggestions that at least one member of a 
REC should be a representative of the community, to submissions that indigenous peoples 
involved in the research should enjoy greater representation, even to form their own RECs. The 
Indian Health Service (IHS) in America for example, has formed its own REC in order to 
evaluate research proposals supported by the HIS (Freeman, 1998). This specialised REC 
includes twenty members from American Indian and Alaskan Native communities, including 
researchers, health professionals and laypersons.  
Attempts in Australia to protect the Aboriginal populations have resulted in similar insights in 
relation to representation. The NHMRC ethical guidelines for example, provide for the creation 
of specific Aboriginal RECs, and a number of Aboriginal RECs have been established with 
majority Aboriginal membership. These have the specific brief of reviewing the ethical quality of 
research proposals involving Aboriginal health (NHMRC, 2003 p.24). The NHMRC guidelines 
however acknowledge the problem of lack of capacity, namely that not all cases involving 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Island people are able to be dealt with by such Aboriginal RECs.  
They state specifically in response to this reality that non-Aboriginal RECs therefore need to 
“equip themselves to implement these guidelines” when they encounter such research projects 
(ibid p.24).  
This corresponds with Castanello’s recommended Principle 6, which states that development and 
implementation of ethical standards for Aboriginal research should be in the hands of Aboriginal 
peoples “as majority members on Aboriginal-specific research ethics boards serving local, 
regional and national communities” (Castanello, 2004 p.111). However, the costs of 
implementing such an ethical regime have remained an obstacle, as such costs are generally not 
recognised in the administration budgets of Aboriginal communities and organisations (ibid 
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p.111). Given Australia’s relative affluence, the problem described above can be expected to be 
more serious in developing countries.  
Representation introduces further challenges. Making sure that ancient cultures are adequately 
understood is a complex matter, and simply ensuring that one or more indigenous representatives 
are part of a REC is no guarantee of effective representation of a particular research 
community’s concerns. One of the problems relating to representation has been described as the 
nesting of indigenous communities within larger populations, which share cultures and values to 
a varying degree (Sharp & Foster, 2002). As an example of the nesting problem, individuals who 
consider themselves Mohawk may do so in a general sense for the reason that they reside in a 
discrete local community, whilst it is well known that discrete Mohawk communities residing 
both in the US and Canada have distinct local identities (ibid p.47). This means that a Mohawk 
representative on such a committee would be equipped to provide general guidance regarding 
Mohawk cultural matters, but would be unable to speak with authority on cultural matters from 
communities and settlements outside her own personal experience.   
The diversity of indigenous or Aboriginal cultures within certain overall shared traits has been 
repeatedly asserted (Castanello, 2004 p.110). In Southern Africa for example, the broader San 
community is made up of no less than eight major linguistic groups, in three adjoining countries, 
who share certain general cultural features and yet differ widely in others (Wynberg & 
Chennells, 2009). Whilst the presence of and consultation with one or more members of a 
targeted research community is thus regarded as an important component of REC representation, 
it is rather adherence to a community review process that ensures respect for community to 
establish trust and satisfy the real concerns of such indigenous peoples.  
8.4.4 Process  
Procedural justice has been described above as being achieved by a legitimate procedure, which 
ensures that all issues are tabled and all parties are equally heard during the process of a 
transaction. It was explained that a procedure perceived by all as fair is an absolute requirement 
for any perception of fairness regarding a distribution of resources (Tyler, 1987). Equity law 
contributed to procedural justice in transactions by ensuring enquiries that focus on all aspects 
leading up to a transaction, with the spotlight on issues of relationships, motives, power and 
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trust, any of which if misused would lead to identifiable exploitation.  Indigenous peoples as well 
as other groups targeted for HPGR have legitimate concerns both about the burden of risk 
associated with such research as well as the representation of their concerns and interests on 
RECs entrusted with their protection. Many of the problems arising from genomic research, 
epitomised by the legal challenges launched by the Havusapai and Naa-chu-nulth tribes, as well 
as by the San case and by indigenous peoples’ attacks on the HGDP described above, have all 
arisen from the failure of researchers to engage with the collective concerns of their research 
participants by means of a fair process. Such failures are seldom intentional, but they have the 
potential to harm communities as well as to destroy the trust that is needed in order to develop 
constructive research partnerships. 
RECs have been shown to fail to give effect to a respect for communities, to lack capacity in 
developing world countries, and to experience difficulty in establishing the true nature of cultural 
and related concerns harboured by indigenous peoples amongst other targeted participant groups.  
Representation of indigenous peoples on RECs alone has also been shown to provide no 
guarantee of understanding of specific cultural risks, whilst it nevertheless remains a useful 
procedural component when combined with the application of sound policies relating to 
community participation. Amongst the ethical guidelines developed to protect indigenous 
communities in genomic research which should be observed, the community review process 
described by Sharp and Foster above has the potential to fulfil this need. If followed with 
sensitivity to the diverse forms of research, risks and communities, community review is a 
process that provides considerable assurance both to the REC as well as to the community of 
procedural justice and ethical engagement.     
8.5 Conclusion and proposals  
The purpose of this chapter was to address the third research question of the thesis, namely 
whether the particular concerns of indigenous peoples are adequately met by the current research 
practices and guidelines.  
Not only do indigenous peoples form a vital resource for genomic research, but also their unique 
cosmologies and worldviews contribute towards a form of vulnerability that demands a careful 
ethical response.  From the analyses of vulnerability above, indigenous peoples could be said to 
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be vulnerable internally, in that their world views lead to particular insecurities vis a vis the more 
dominant Western countries, but they are also consent-vulnerable and risk-vulnerable. Some 
might add justice-vulnerable, referring to their well-documented failures to protect their own 
financial, cultural or identity-related interests from being harmed.  In addition to the usual 
collective risks of harm associated with genetic research, the potential identity-and privacy-
related harms of discrimination and stigmatisation faced by indigenous peoples was shown to be 
exacerbated in many instances by histories of domination by Western or developed world 
countries. This history has in many cases demonstrably contributed towards a pervasive distrust 
of the power and influence of Western researchers. 
Analysis of the various guidelines that have emerged in past decades governing research 
engagement with indigenous communities has enabled the identification of certain core 
proposals, which if followed by researchers, would address the most serious concerns.  The first 
is the requirement for respectful engagement, which emphasises the need for mutual respect and 
partnership between researchers and community as equals. The second proposal stresses the need 
for the inclusion of indigenous peoples in RECs that affect their communities, as well as for the 
creation of exclusively indigenous RECs.  The third proposal is a requirement for institution of 
community review processes designed to cover all aspects of engagement, permission and 
consent.  These processes bring about the respectful involvement of the indigenous community 
in key aspects of the consultations, ensuring collaborative and legitimate research. Where 
benefits are appropriate, these will form part of the research program, and community review 
would obviate concerns such as undue influence or coercion in the collective consent.  The entire 
process could be regarded as an assurance of authenticity, as well as of procedural and 
substantive justice in research with indigenous communities.  
The question as to whether concerns of indigenous peoples are adequately met by the current 
research practices and guidelines cannot be answered in the affirmative. The guidelines 
described above and this thesis’ proposals are useful steps in the right direction, but effective 
application will be required in order to ensure ethical research.  For example, mere representation 
on a REC by one or more indigenous representatives is no guarantee that the legitimate concerns 
of individual ‘nested’ communities will be met, and proposals for exclusive indigenous RECs, 
expensive to institute, have generally not found wide acceptance or budgetary support in 
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practice. A further less than positive outlook on the issue demonstrated by the San case is the fact 
that the institutional assurance provided by RECs, even where they do exist, is in practice far 
from adequate for indigenous peoples.  
Further legitimate apprehensions about reliance on RECs in the developing world stem from the 
lack of government support, funding, legislation and applicable guidelines in many countries, as 
well as other internal components of poor capacity. All of these problems contribute towards the 
continued vulnerability of indigenous peoples, as well as their potential mistrust of genomic 
research. The need to address these inadequacies should become an explicit goal in genomic 
research, and should encourage stakeholders to strive for enhanced ethical assurance.  Increased 
awareness of the legitimate apprehensions of indigenous peoples, plus institution of the 
proposals suggested above, would contribute significantly towards procedural as well as 
substantive justice in this arena of genomic research. Representatives of research organisations 
as well as all members of RECs entrusted with such issues should therefore be reminded of the 
particular responsibilities activated when vulnerable communities are involved.   Indigenous 
peoples, as an important category of such vulnerable communities, should be reliably assured of 
the ethical principles of justice, autonomy, beneficence and non-maleficence in genomic 
research.  
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CHAPTER NINE: CLOSING CHAPTER 
 
“The lion may well lie down with the lamb, but the lamb will not get a good night’s rest” 
(Attributed to Woody Allen) 
The wry quote above might appear rather informal for a serious academic thesis, but it has been 
chosen to reflect the latent power asymmetry that so often accompanies abuse of the weak in 
practice. After decades as a human rights lawyer seeking to correct institutional bullying or 
abuses of power by strong over vulnerable parties, latterly assisting indigenous peoples on 
benefit sharing under the CBD, I became increasingly disillusioned with the limitations of the 
law in correcting such wrongs. So many transactions take place in rural locations, far from 
watching eyes or sound advice, and under circumstances conducive for manifestly unequal 
engagements. David versus Goliath stories, such as the Havasupai case against the University of 
Arizona, are consequently few and far between. Whilst acting as a lawyer, I became aware of 
similar problems experienced by indigenous peoples targeted for genomic research. Effective 
policies and ethical practices were what was required, rather than the application of formal law.  
I was introduced to bioethics as a burgeoning field, and decided to approach the issues addressed 
below in the context of applied philosophy and public ethics rather than in the field of law.   
In continuation of this autobiographical beginning, the essential work of this thesis will be 
introduced by means of an imaginary conversation between an indigenous leader Andriemario 
and his legal advisor Rotman, based vaguely upon living persons, in which they deliberate about 
a meeting that they are about to hold with a genomic researcher. The structure for concluding 
this thesis will emerge from the discussion. 
Andriemario: So Rotman who is this person coming to meet us and what does she want? 
Rotman: She is called doctor Simla. She is a famous genomics researcher I believe, and wants to 
know if the San will participate in a genomic research program. She will explain it all to 
you I am sure.  
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Andriemario: OK so I suppose she wants to take the blood of the San people far away and 
publish a lot of lies about us and become even more famous than ever and make a lot of 
money as well, just like all the others have done?” Maybe she’ll offer us cigarettes? 
Rotman: Are you being serious? Anyway I am here to assist you make sure that does not happen. 
Now I just need to know from you Andriemario, what are your main concerns about the 
whole genomic research thing? Just so I can prepare myself. 
Andriemario: Ag Rotman you know us well.  We are not trying to be difficult. But we just want 
to be treated properly, the deal must be fair, and the whole research thing must not cause 
any harm for any of our people. 
Rotman: OK so what exactly do you mean by those things? What is being ‘treated properly’? 
Andriemario: It’s simple man. We just need to be treated with respect. They must not hurry us or 
force us or lie to us. They must give us all the information so we can understand and 
make a good decision on our own.  They must listen to us carefully and then respect our 
views on what is important. Not like those Schuster researchers did with the San in 
Namibia.  
Rotman: OK I’ve got that.  Now what do you mean by a ‘fair deal’? 
Andriemario: This all depends. It must just be fair and balanced.  If they are making money, they 
should offer a share to us. If they have some money, they should assist our community in 
some way for our contribution. If they have no money, and the research is a good thing 
for our people or for other people, we might still participate. 
Rotman: I’ve got you Andriemario. Now what do you mean by the ‘no harm’ part? 
Andriemario: Eish! Sometimes you ask silly questions, Rotman. How can we know until we hear 
more from this clever Dr Simla what she intends to do with our blood. If she is going to 
publish information, then we need to know what information they are looking for, and 
where they will publish it, so we can make sure that bad things are not said about us. We 
are sensitive about some things, and just don’t want bad things to happen for our people. 
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One can imagine variations of these three concerns expressed by the indigenous leader depicted 
above being replicated across different continents whenever genomic research encounters are 
envisaged. This thesis has endeavoured to approach the research topic within the parameters of 
the research ethics domain constituted by the applicable laws, guidelines and principles, the 
interpretations of which are influenced in no small measure by prominent commentators in the 
literature. The research questions set out at the start of this thesis were aimed to address precisely 
the three concerns expressed by Andriemario above, in a different order, and can be reformulated 
as being firstly a plea for fair treatment, secondly for a fair deal, and thirdly for assurance of 
research that gives rise to no harm.  
9.1 Fair treatment 
Fair treatment implies a fair process. The research ethics guidelines, created to ensure ethical 
research on humans, warn against undue inducement and coercion as being two of the ways that 
individuals can be exploited in the process prior to giving informed consent. Thomas Pogge’s 
schematic conception of justice was drawn upon to show that procedure is a core component of 
every dimension at which justice plays out, including the particular form known as commutative 
justice, which includes contract law. Equity law infused contract law with very clear criteria for 
ascertaining procedural justice, ensuring that a vulnerable party to a contract could be protected 
if she were treated unfairly. Unfair treatment in equity law was interpreted as some form of 
inappropriate dealing in which the vulnerable party was either wrongly manipulated, coerced, or 
influenced during the process leading up to the provision of legal consent. The holistic enquiry 
required by equity law showed that no aspect of the transaction, neither vulnerability nor extreme 
need nor other imbalances of power could stand alone from other factors, and needed to be 
weighed up in conjunction with relationships, motives and actions.  In explaining the elements of 
unconscionable dealing, duress and undue influence, the precise manner of the dealing was in 
each case central to the enquiry into fair treatment, and the actual outcome was shown to be of 
no more than peripheral import.  
The ethos of fair procedures embodied in the requirements of equity law resonated strongly with 
recommendations for more equitable treatment of indigenous peoples referred to in the eighth 
chapter. Respect for communities, equal partnership, participative processes, and community 
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review were all components of such fair processes. RECs overseeing research involving 
indigenous peoples were crucial for the improvement of such processes, and proposals for 
representation of communities on the important bodies were described.  These proposals, now 
captured in the growing body of guidelines that aim to ensure ethical research involving 
indigenous peoples, resonate with the deceptively simple request expressed by the imaginary 
Andriemario above, namely that they merely wish to be treated ‘properly.’  
To conclude discussion of this first procedural concern, the dangers of undue influence and 
coercion that were so prominent in the clinical domain were shown to be relatively minor with 
regard to genomic research. The ethical principle of respect for communities needs to be fleshed 
out and given practical effect, ensuring that indigenous peoples are engaged with sensitively and 
as equal partners in genomic research.   
9.2 A fair deal 
Seeking acceptable criteria on a fair distribution of benefits and burdens has been a 
preoccupation of philosophers and jurists for centuries, and this thesis did not attempt to solve 
the issue. How to deal with unequal bargaining power and vulnerable parties was one of 
Aristotle’s preoccupations whilst writing on justice, and remains a central concern of theorists on 
the nature of exploitation. The balance between freedom of contract and autonomy on the one 
hand and restrictive rules and laws on the other in the public interest remains a complex 
aspiration sought after by the applicable guidelines. Two particular benchmarks were selected in 
order to approach the question as to what would be a fair deal for an indigenous community 
engaged in research, namely commutative justice, and Mayer’s second class of exploitation. 
Aristotle’s concept of commutative justice, which governs voluntary transactions between two 
parties, was consistently referred to as one of the main reasons for the negotiation of the CBD, as 
well as a motivation for the institution of benefit sharing in relation to research involving genetic 
resources. The history of and reasons leading to the CBD were treated to an in-depth analysis, 
during which it became apparent that bioprospecting of human and non-human DNA are similar 
and parallel in every way. It was shown conclusively, I suggest, that the high research value of 
both forms of DNA in the hands of receivers justified both the imposition of benefit sharing as a 
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legal requirement of the CBD, as well as the subsequent extension of benefit sharing in relation 
to human genetic resources.  
After examining various theories relating to exploitation, Mayer’s exposition of the concept 
based upon fairness was drawn upon to provide a method of assessing fairness in exchange 
between two parties. Mayer’s second class of exploitation, which takes place when one party 
benefits unfairly at the expense of the other, resonates in every way with Aristotle’s commutative 
justice, both of which require some form of requital in order to correct an unequal transaction 
with a weaker party. Genomic research involving humans was shown to be motivated by exactly 
the same drive to patent and commercialise as that which fuels bioprospecting of other genetic 
resources. Despite the important contributions made by the open access movement, it was 
evident that registration of patents over all forms of DNA-related inventions plays a ubiquitous 
and prominent role in the research process. Mayer’s test of fairness enabled the point to be 
emphasised that even if research communities do benefit in some minor way, eventually, the real 
question was whether they received a commensurate or appropriate level of benefits in view of 
the research value of the samples.  
The assessment of a fair deal required under these tests, or otherwise stated the attempt to ensure 
beneficence in a transaction, requires a substantive or outcomes-based test. Aristotle envisaged a 
process in commutative justice where the respective benefits were the focus of the enquiry, 
rather than the motives, dealings or relationships of the parties. As was described above, finding 
the right criteria to establish fairness of an outcome is no simple matter, but the calculation 
nevertheless needs to be made. Wages paid to sweatshop employees in developing world 
countries can be judged as exploitative, even if the values and benchmarks for fairness are set 
elsewhere. The Tristan da Cunha islanders received nothing from profits made by Sequana 
Therapeutics, which enabled commentators to formulate a prima facie view that sufficient 
requital had not been made.  
The words of the imaginary Andriemario in the above conversation saying that what would be a 
fair deal would depend on the circumstances was thus an indication that a common-sense or 
practical process was able to establish the most appropriate criteria for fairness. All in all, with 
the assistance of a fair procedure enabling exchange of information, the tests for justice in 
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exchange proposed by Aristotle and Mayer are suggested to be clear enough to be applied in 
practice, and support the proposals for benefit sharing in genomic research. 
A final hurdle to be crossed was the fact that various objections have been made against the 
sharing of benefits with research participants. These arguments, namely the common heritage, 
the altruism and the no value added arguments were all dealt with extensively, and can be safely 
regarded as being disposed of as impediments to benefit sharing. As a final approach to what is a 
fair deal, the words of Andriemario above are reassuringly practical. The nature and extent of 
benefits should depend entirely upon the circumstances.        
9.3 Research that entails no harm 
This third requirement brings together elements of both procedural and substantive justice. The 
procedural aspect is covered by the recommendations for ethical engagement with indigenous 
peoples described in the eighth chapter, including the community review process and 
representation of indigenous peoples on the appropriate REC.  The substantive aspect on the 
other hand is covered by the REC assessment that the research should benefit the recipients 
authentically, in other words it should pass the test of non-malificence.  The five broad themes of 
engagement synthesised from independent indigenous documents by Charles Weijer provide 
ample guidance in the procedural regard, and are designed to establish trust and ascertain any 
particular cultural sensitivities relevant to the research. During such an engagement, all 
information relating to the research is to be exchanged and fully understood, ensuring that the 
outcome reached by such a legitimate procedure is authentic and approved of.  
Employment of sound participative and community review processes will not only lead to a 
relationship of trust with the indigenous community, but are designed to establish the risks of 
harm associated with the proposed research, namely the desired outcome of substantive justice.  
The leader Andriemario stated above, ‘we are sensitive about some things,’ a reminder that a 
REC’s assurance of non-maleficence can only be provided with full knowledge of the cultural 
context. Whilst the approval of an appropriate research protocol remains the ultimate 
responsibility of the REC, issues of representation, lack of capacity, lack of funding support and 
other factors contribute to the less than satisfactory state of the RECs in the developing world. 
According to the research ethics guidelines a REC should only approve research if it is authentic 
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in every way, namely that it does no harm, and that it complies with all the requirements for 
ethical research on the particular participant community. Nothing short of proper procedures and 
authentic outcomes by RECs are able to guarantee that indigenous peoples are protected in 
genomic research. The ethical guidelines, principles and protocols are largely in place, whilst 
legitimate concerns exist with regard to the lack of capacity of these important institutions to 
carry out their important roles.  
9.4 Closing remarks 
The three research questions, juxtaposed with Andriemario three questions as discussed above, 
are schematically depicted alongside the procedural and substantive enquiries brought to bear. 
The diagram shows the essential criteria to be applied at each stage, and also the research ethics 
principles most applicable in each enquiry. 
Table 2: Research Questions, Main Ethical Principles, Two Forms of Enquiry79 
Three Research 
Questions 
Main Ethical 
Principles 
Outcomes Enquiry Procedural Enquiry 
1. 
Is benefit sharing 
necessary? 
 
 
A Fair Deal: 
Justice  
(do not exploit) 
Apply: Justice in exchange 
and Mayer’s 2nd test for 
equitable exchange.  
The test: Benefits should be 
a proportionate requital to 
the sample donation 
 
2. 
Does benefit sharing 
lead to undue 
inducement and 
coercion? 
 
 
Fair Treatment: 
Protection of 
vulnerable 
populations 
(do not coerce) 
 
 Apply: The Law of Equity.   
The test: Did the method of 
dealing impair consent in 
terms of: 
1. Unconscionable dealing? 
2. Duress/coercion? 
3. Undue Influence?  
Continued on next page 
                                                          
79 This table is not to be understood as an Ethical Matrix as suggested by Ben Mepham based on Principlism. Its 
purpose is to capture the conclusion in one diagrammatic illustration.  
 
  
 205 
Continued from previous page 
Three Research 
Questions 
Main Ethical 
Principles 
Outcomes Enquiry Procedural Enquiry 
3. 
Are the concerns of 
indigenous peoples 
adequately met by 
current practices and 
guidelines? 
 
Primum non nocere 
(do no harm) 
Apply: Mayer’s 3rd test for 
authentic research. 
The test: REC must provide 
assurance of do no harm 
principle 
 
 
 
Respect for 
Communities  
 Apply: Consult on community 
values and choices.  
The test: REC must ensure 
indigenous representation or 
indigenous REC.   
 
            
Finally and in response to the words of the imaginary critic recorded in the introductory chapter, 
this thesis is now in a position to reply firmly as follows: 
Exploitation remains a potential problem in genomic research, for indigenous peoples as 
well as other communities in the developing world. Benefit sharing is essential in order to 
compensate for the value of resources imparted, and to bring about justice in exchange. 
The objections to benefit sharing (the common heritage of humankind argument, the 
altruism argument, and the ‘no value added’ arguments) were addressed and found to 
lack coherence. As a second point is must be added that the requirement of benefit 
sharing in genomic research is unlikely to lead to undue inducement or coercion of 
research participants, a danger far more applicable to the realm of clinical research. 
Finally, the legitimate concerns of indigenous peoples are not adequately met either by 
current guidelines or by the RECs, which are currently lacking in capacity and therefore 
unable to ensure non-maleficence.  Adoption of the proposals made in this thesis will 
alleviate these concerns.   
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